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SEC

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

When a private Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement investigation' uncovers evidence suggesting possible statutory viola1. 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1 to .8 (1979). See Ferrara, SEC Division of Trading and MarketsDetection, Investigation and Enforcement of Selected Practices That Impair Investor Confidence in the Capital Markets, 16 How. L.J. 950 (1971); Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange
Commission Investigations. The Needfor Reform, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 575 (1971);
Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations." Laying the Foundation/or Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative, and Criminal Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567

(1975); Mathews, Witnesses in SEC Investigations." A Primerfor Witnesses and Their Counsel
on the Scope of the SEC's Investigatory Powers, 3 REV. SEC. REG. 923-32 (1970); Merrifield,
SEC Investigations, 32 Bus. LAW. 1583 (1977); Winter, Representing Witnesses in SEC For-

malInvestigations, 5 LITIGATION 24 (Nov. 3, 1979); Comment, The Administrative Procedure
Act and the Rights of Witnesses in Investigatory Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, 20 AM. U.L. REV. 115 (1970). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
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tions that, in the view of the SEC's Enforcement Staff, may warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions, three principal adjudicatory enforcement weapons can be initiated by the SEC and its staff: criminal prosecution;2 civil injunctive actions;3 or administrative disciplinary proceedings.'
This article will synopsize current trends, primarily adjective law issues, in
the litigation and settlement of SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings.5
Admittedly, the administrative enforcement proceeding has not recently
1945-74 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 4079-108 (2d ed.
Supp. 1969). See also Markham, Investigations Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 31 AD.
L. REV. 285 (1979); Smaltz, Tactical Considerationsfor Effective RepresentationDuringa Government Investigation, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383 (1979).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1979). See A.F. MATHEWS, SEC ENFORCEMENT AND WHITE
COLLAR CRIMES (1979); Mathews & Sullivan, CriminalLiabilityfor Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws.- The National Commission's Proposed FederalCriminal Code, S. 1, and S
1400, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (1973); Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Investment CompanyAct of 1940 and the InvestmentAdvisers Act, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
1257 (1972); Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws and Related
Statutes. The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901
(1971); Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission. An Introduction to the Enforcement
of the Criminal Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1979).
See generally 3 Loss, supra note I, at 1984-2004; 6 Loss, supra note 1, at 4123-50.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1979). See A.F. MATHEWS, NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS & TACTICS FOR SETTLING CIVIL INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS (1979);
Harkleroad, Requirementsfor Injunctive Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 J.
CORP. L. 481 (1977); Jaeger & Yadley, Equitable Uncertaintiesin SEC Injunctive Actions, 24
EMORY L.J. 639 (1975); Mathews, SEC CivilInjunctiveActions-land1i, 5 REV. SEC. REG.
969 (1972); Pitt & Markham, SEC InjunctiveActions, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 955 (1973); Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1303
(1976); Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions." The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10
COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROB. 328 (1974). See generally 3 Loss, supra note I, at 1975-83; 6 Loss,
supra note 1, at 4108-23; Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976).
4. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201 to 201.27 (1979) (SEC Rules of Practice). See Block & Barton,
Administrative Proceedings to Enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 40
(1979); Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants. Philosophy, Objectives and
Approach, 28 VAND. L. REV. 19 (1975); Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice
Standards. The Importance ofAdministrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964); Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse ofRule 2(e), 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 774 (1979); Tew & Freedman, Practice in Securities and Exchange Commission Investigatory and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. I (1972); Thomforde, Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 709 (1976); Timbers &
Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission's Adjudicatory Process. Some Suggestions, 45 VA.
L. REV. 817 (1959). See generally 3 Loss, supra note 1, at 1891-944; 6 Loss, supra note 1, at
4020-78.
5. For an excellent primer on litigating administrative proceedings generally, see
Judge E. Barrett Prettyman's classic work published almost 20 years ago. Prettyman, How to
Try a Dispute Under Adjudication by an Administrative Agency, 45 VA. L. REV. 179 (1959),
REGULATION

reprinted as A

MANUAL ON TRIAL TECHNIQUE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

(1961).
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been the most widely used weapon in the SEC's enforcement arsenal.
During the 1960's and 1970's, the SEC primarily relied upon the civil injunctive action. For example, the Texas Gulf Sulphur civil injunctive litigation 6 - embracing strict duties proscribing the misuse of material
"inside" information by corporate insiders, tippers, and tippees, and novel
forms of ancillary relief - sent shock waves through the corporate business community. More recently, the National Student Marketing civil injunctive litigation 7 - raising sensitive questions of possible "whistleblowing" duties of corporate and securities lawyers - has caused a somewhat nervous Bar to reassess the efficacy of certain longstanding patterns
of corporate and securities legal practice. Both Texas Gul/8 and National
Student Marketing9 have generated a well-stocked stream of legal literature concerning the SEC's efforts to raise the professional standards applicable to both corporate managers and their legal advisers. Not enough has
been written, however, about tactics, procedures, and emerging legal principles arising from the SEC's concomitant use of administrative disciplinary proceedings to espouse fiduciary and professional standards
applicable to corporate managers, corporate legal advisers, and other securities industry participants.'°
6. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), rev'g
258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1970),judgment afd and order rev'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), order amended, 331
F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978), appealdocketed, No. 79-1051 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 1979).
8. See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices.- The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965); Mann, Prevention of Improper Securities Transactions by Employees." The Responsibility For and Feasibility ofAdopting Preventative Programs, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1974); Sandler & Conwill,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 225 (1969);
Schuyler, From Sulphur to Surcharge? - Corporate Trustee Exposure Under SEC Rule l0b5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 42 (1972); Note, Texas GulfSulphur and the Duty ofDisclosure, Another
View, 55 GEo. L.J. 664 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities
Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597 (1975); Hoffman, On Learning ofa Corporate Client's
The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389 (1978); Karmel, Attorney's
Crime or FraudSecurities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972); Koch, Attorneys'Liabiity. The Securities Bar and the Impact ofNationalStudent Marketing, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1973);
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force.- A New Rolefor Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437
(1974); Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationshio and the Code of Professional Responsibility.Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1113 (1976); Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities
Under Federal and State Securities Laws. Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CALIF. L.
REV.

1189 (1973).

10. The pertinent literature includes: Cohen & Rabin, supra note 4; Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC- Discplinary Proceedings
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Historically, the SEC has established professional standards for brokerdealers and investment advisers through ad hoc adjudication of administrative disciplinary proceedings." Moreover, both prior to12 and after
Texas Gulf,3 the Commission has employed administrative proceedings
as a vehicle to impose upon the corporate business community required
standards of conduct to prevent the misuse of material "inside" information. Indeed, there is presently subjudice before the Commission an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Raymond Dirks and certain
institutions, growing out of the Equity Funding fiasco. It is anticipated
that the SEC will espouse further standards in Raymond Dirks concerning
the selective dissemination by tippers and tippees of material "inside" or
"market" information respecting corporate issuers.' 4
Similarly, in the wake of the National Student Marketing civil injunctive
proceeding - the most important aspect of which is presently on appeal in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit' 5
- and the related criminal prosecution,' 6 the SEC apparently has intensified its pace of adjudicating administrative disciplinary proceedings conUnder Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice,25 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1974); Levine, Ferrara & Moylan, Administrative Proceedings Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 25 MERCER L. REV. 671 (1974); Mathews, Litigating andSettling SEC Administrative
DisciplinaryProceedings, 5 LITIGATION 30 (Nov. 3, 1979); Miller, The DistortionandMisuse
of Rule 2(e), 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 54 (1979); Thomforde, Negotiating Administrative Settlements
in SEC Broker-DealerDisciplinaryProceedings,52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 237 (1977).
1I. See generally Cohen & Rabin, supra note 4, at 702-08.
12. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
13. See, e.g., Faberge, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973), [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,378; Investors Mgt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633
(1971); George Wunch, 44 S.E.C. 95 (1969); Blyth & Co., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
14. Boston Co. Inst. Investors, Inc., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5068 (Sept. I, 1978), [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,705 (initial decision of SEC ALJ), appeal
pending before the SEC sub nom. Raymond Dirks, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5068 (1979).
With respect to misuse of undisclosed, material market information, see United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979); Oppenheimer &
Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,319 (Apr. 2, 1976), [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,551. See generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, Disclosure of InvestmentAdvice, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 867 (1973); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973);
Koeltl & Longstreth, Market Information Revisited, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 843 (1978); Peskind,
Regulation of the FinancialPress.- A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 14 ST.
Louis U.L. REV. 80 (1969). See also Oppenheimer & Co. (Hechler), SEC 1934 Act Release
No. 15,994 (July 5, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 82,125.
15. SEC v. National Student Mkting Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1051 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 1979).
16. See United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:215

cerning the standards of care applicable to accountants and attorneys
practicing before the Commission. For example, the Commission has recently litigated a public administrative disciplinary proceeding against
Touche Ross & Co.,' 7 one of the "Big Eight" national accounting firms. It
has also recently issued an administrative disciplinary opinion against a
Cincinnati law firm, Keating, Muething & Klekamp,II finding that the law
firm breached applicable professional standards in connection with the
preparation of various SEC filings on behalf of the American Financial
Corporation. Additionally, the Commission is presently adjudicating an
important administrative disciplinary proceeding against William R.
Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr.,' 9 two partners of a prominent New
York law firm, Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty. The Carter-Johnson
case may ultimately have a more profound effect upon the legal practice of
corporate and securities lawyers than the National Student Marketing litigation.2" Undoubtedly, the Keating, Muething & Klekamp case will also
cause securities lawyers to reassess their professional conduct. In light of
these and other recent administrative cases, an analysis of emerging considerations and issues arising in the litigation of SEC administrative enforcement actions appears to be timely.
II.

PRINCIPAL TYPES OF

SEC

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

statutes2'

The federal securities
authorize the SEC to adjudicate a myriad of administrative proceedings. Not all of them, however, are "discipli17. See Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974), 6
72,175. See also SEC v. Touche Ross & Co., 438 F. Supp. 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), at'd,[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,854 (2d Cir.
May 10, 1979).
18. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979),
(1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,124.
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

19. William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (March 7, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (initial decision of SEC ALJ), review granted,
SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
20. See, e.g., Bialkin, Securities Law.- Commission's Latest 2(e) ProceedingProfoundly
DisquietsSecurities Bar, Nat'l L.J., April 30, 1979, at 25, col. 1;Klein, Brown- Wood Decision
Deserves Closer Look, Legal Times of Wash., May 7, 1979, at 32, col. 1.
21. The federal securities statutes encompass: (i) the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); (ii) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1976), as amendedby the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l,
78dd-2, 78m, 78ff (Supp. 1977) and the Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o (Supp. 1977); (iii) the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 (1935 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976); (iv) the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (1939
Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976); (v) the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940
Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-i to 80a-27 (1976); (vi) the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976); (vii) the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (SIPC Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976).

1980]

SEC Administrative Proceedings

nary" in nature.22 Following is a sketch of the principal types of
administrative proceedings litigated most frequently under the four primary statutes - the 1933, 1934, Advisers, and 1940 Acts.
A4.

The 1933 Act

Pursuant to sections 8(d) and (e) of the 1933 Act,23 the Commission adjudicates "stop-order" proceedings involving defective registration statements covering public distributions of securities.2 4 By statute, these
proceedings must be public and have only a single respondent - the issuer
of the particular securities offering. In essence, the stop-order proceeding
is an enforcement action against a piece of paper - the defective registra22. The Commission's adjudicatory functions fall roughly into the following three categories:
The first has been characterized as analogous to a "licensing" function, embracing activities such as registrations of securities under the Securities Act of 1933,
registrations of broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and registrations of investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The Commission exercises its licensing power in a negative manner: by taking no
action if the application is in order. In effect the Commission thus "approves" the
application filed and permits it to become effective.
The second category embraces the so-called "declaration of status" orders by the
Commission, including the granting or denying of exemptive orders, principally
important under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Investment Company Act.
The third category consists of the disciplinary functions performed by the Commission under the various statutes. Here the Commission deals with such matters
as the revocation or suspension of broker-dealer registrations under the Securities
Exchange Act, the issuance of stop-orders and Regulation A suspension orders
under the Securities Act, and the revocation of investment adviser registrations
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Timbers & Garfinkel, supra note 4, at 817-18 (footnotes omitted). For an early discussion of
the SEC's adjudicatory functions, see ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, MONOGRAPH ON THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION,

S. Doc. No. 10, pt. 13, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-97 (1941). See also

SEC's Response to Dawson Committee 1934, printed in

HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., IST SESS., SURVEY AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL AGENCIES 1903 (Comm. Print 1957);
Lane & Blair-Smith, The SEC and the Expeditious Settlement of Disputes, 34 ILL. L. REV.

699 (1940).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d), (e) (1976).
24. See, e.g., Levitz Furniture Corp., SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5266 (June 27, 1976);
Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); Atlantic Research Corp., 41 S.E.C. 733 (1963);
Miami Window Corp., 41 S.E.C. 68 (1962); Ultrasonic Corp., 37 S.E.C. 497 (1957). See
generally Levinson, Administrative Proceduresin Connection with Investigationsand Hearings
Under the SecuritiesAct of 1933, in SECURITIES LAWS & REGULATIONS INSTITUTE 109 (H.
Sowards ed. 1967). See also Stardust, Inc. v. SEC, 225 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1955); Las Vegas
Hawaiian Dev. Co. v. SEC, 466 F. Supp. 928 (D. Hawaii 1979).
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tion statement. It is intended to block the illegal public distribution of a
particular issue of securities, not to discipline individuals or entities.
Regulation A suspension proceedings2 5 are litigated under rule 261 of
the 1933 Act.26 In effect, these suspension proceedings are used to block
an allegedly exempt public offering of securities that is being attempted
through the use of a defective Regulation A offering circular; just as traditional stop-order proceedings are used to block fully registered public offerings when the filed registration statement is defective.27
B.

The 1934 Act

Broker-dealer disciplinary proceedings are litigated pursuant to sections
15(b)(4) and (6),28 as well as sections 15A and 19(h) of the 1934 Act.29
Respondents include not only the entities or persons registered (or attempting to register) as broker-dealers with the SEC but also any persons
"associated" (or attempting to become associated) with a broker-dealer.
The statute gives the SEC discretion to litigate such disciplinary proceedings either publicly or privately.3 °
Administrative proceedings involving certain types of defective 1934 Act
reports or filings 3' are adjudicated pursuant to section 15(c)(4) of the 1934
25. See, e.g., Beneficial Labs, Inc., SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5598 (July 28, 1975);
Bagels, U.S.A., Inc., SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5079 (Aug. 14, 1970); Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., 42 S.E.C. 257 (1964); American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 41 S.E.C. 616 (1963); Delta
Steel Corp., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-4495 (Dec. 3, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,031 (opinion of SEC ALJ).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.261 (1979).
27. Similar suspension proceedings may be, but are with much less frequency, litigated
with regard to public offerings of securities allegedly exempt from registration by virtue of
the provisions of Regulations B (fractional undivided interests in oil or gas rights), E (securities of small business investment companies), and F (assessable stock and assessments
thereon).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3, s(h) (1976). Prior to the 1975 Securities Act Amendments, 89
Stat. 79 (1975), such proceedings were litigated under former §§ 15(b)(5) and 15(b)(7) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5), (7) (1970). See, e.g., Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir.
1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958
(1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Beck v. SEC, 413 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.
1969), afterremand, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970); Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963);
Oppenheimer & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,319 (Apr. 2, 1976), [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,551; Kidder, Peabody & Co., 43 S.E.C. 911 (1968).
See generally Levine, Ferrara & Moylan, supra note 10. See also First Jersey Sec., Inc.,
SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5739 (May 17, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 82,085 (order for public proceedings).
30. See Gellhorn, Adyerse Publicity by AdministrativeAgencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380,
1394-98 (1973).
31. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,223 (Sept. 27,
1979); Spartek, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer
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Act. 32 Only reports filed pursuant to sections 13 and 1513 are covered,

such as annual or periodic reports or registration statements covering overthe-counter or exchange trading. Consequently, absent the consent of the
respondent, defective proxy materials filed pursuant to section 1434 or
ownership reports filed pursuant to section 16," cannot be the subject of
section 15(c)(4) administrative proceedings. Technically, only registrants,
not individuals, can be named respondents in a section 15(c)(4) proceeding. However, individuals have been so named in consent settlements.36
Disciplinary proceedings against national stock exchanges are pursued
under section 19 of the 1934 Act. 37 Disciplinary sanctions imposed by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), stock exchanges, and
other regulatory or quasi-governmental agencies or bodies are reviewable
by the Commission on appeal pursuant to sections 15A, 15B, 17A, and 19
of the 1934 Act.3 8

Summary suspensions of over-the-counter or exchange trading of a security are imposed by the SEC under sections 12(k) and 15(c)(5) of the
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 81,961; Woods Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,337
(Nov. 16, 1978); Teledyne, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,266 (Oct. 23, 1978); Dominion
Bankshares Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,079 (Aug. 21, 1978); Texas Int'l Co., SEC
1934 Act Release No. 14,792 (May 23, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,605; International Tel. & Tel. Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,049 (Oct. 13,
1977); Burlington N., Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 13,480 (Apr. 28, 1977); Federated
Purchaser, Inc., 44 S.E.C. 260 (1970); Crescent Corp., 43 S.E.C. 551 (1967).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o (1976).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1976).
36. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. (Gidden & Peck), SEC 1934 Act Release
No. 12,930 (Oct. 27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,750.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976). See, e.g., San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162
(9th Cir. 1967); San Francisco Mining Exch., 42 S.E.C. 1004 (1966); San Francisco Mining
Exch., 41 S.E.C. 560 (1963).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78o-4, 7 8q-1, 78s (1976). See, e.g., Stix & Co., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 12,760 (Sept. 2, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,722; Samuel A. Sardinia, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,392 (Apr. 29, 1976), [1975-76
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,501; Thomas E. Jackson, SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 11,476 (June 16, 1975), [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,213; Alfred D. Silverman, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11,249 (Feb. 14, 1975); Charles E.
Marland & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11,065 (Oct. 21, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
80,002; Don D. Anderson & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No.
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
8477 (Dec. 26, 1968), affid, 423 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1970). See generally Lowenfels,4 Lack of
Fair Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1979); Poser, Reply to Lowenfels, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 402 (1979); Note, GovernmentalAction and the NationalAssociation of
SecuritiesDealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 585 (1979). See also Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341
(1963); Ripp v. SEC, 591 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1979); Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. AMEX,
452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:215

1934 Act.3 9 Exchange delisting of securities issues is reviewable by the

Commission upon appeal pursuant to section 19 of the 1934 Act.40
Pursuant to the 1934 Act, the Commission also adjudicates "re-entry"
proceedings for individuals, who, having been disqualified from associating with a broker-dealer, attempt to have such disqualifications removed. 4 '
The Advisers Act

C

Disciplinary proceedings concerning investment advisers and persons
associated with investment advisers are adjudicated pursuant to section
203(e) of the Advisers Act.42
D.

The 1940 Act

Disciplinary proceedings and other adjudications concerning investment
companies and persons associated therewith are adjudicated pursuant to
sections 8, 9, and 41 of the 1940 Act.43
39. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k), 780(c)(5) (1976). Prior to the 1975 Securities Act Amendments,
89 Stat. 79 (1975), such summary trading suspensions were imposed pursuant to former §
15(c)(5) and § 19(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(5), 78s(a)(4) (1970). See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103 (1978); Emersons, Ltd., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,320 (Apr. 7, 1976); Government Employees Ins. Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,125 (Feb. 23, 1976); Generics Corp.
of America, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,027 (Jan. 19, 1976); Conrac Corp., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 12,026 (Jan. 16, 1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976). See, e.g., Intercontinental Indus., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 273 (1970),
af'dsub nom. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. AMEX, 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); Lee Motor Prods., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 33 (1969); Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 635 (1967); Magic Marker Corp., 43 S.E.C. 500 (1967); Fifth Ave.
Indus. Corp., 43 S.E.C. 146 (1966); cf. Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,946 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 1979) (unlisted trading privileges).
41. See, e.g., NASD, Inc. (Shaub), 43 S.E.C. 1341 (1967); NASD, Inc. (Edelstein), 43
S.E.C. 479 (1967); NASD, Inc. (Truen), 42 S.E.C. 856 (1965).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976). See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979);
International Research & Mgt. Corp., SEC Advisers Act Release No. 617 (Mar. 6, 1978),
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,547; Delphi Capital Corp., SEC Advisers Act Release No. 403 (Mar. 20, 1974); Schrott, Whitaker & Douglas, Inc., SEC Advisers Act Release No. 260 (Mar. 20, 1970); Mates Financial Servs., 44 S.E.C. 246 (1970);
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 43 S.E.C. 911 (1968); Dow Theory Forecasts, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 821
(1968); Marketlines, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 267, aff'd, 384 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1967); Spear & Staff,
Inc., 42 S.E.C. 549 (1965).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-41 (1976). See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126
(5th Cir. 1979); Kimelman & Co., SEC 1940 Act Release No. 10,595 (Feb. 22, 1979), [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,994; Investors Research Corp., SEC 1940
Act Release No. 10,223 (May 1, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,586; Carl L. Shipley, SEC 1940 Act Release No. 8394 (June 21, 1974), [1973-74 Transfer

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,833; Waddell & Reed, Inc., SEC 1940 Act Release
No. 7384 (Sept. 25, 1972), [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,049;
Steadman Ameri-Fund, N.V., SEC 1940 Act Release No. 7378 (Sept. 22, 1972), [1972-73
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

79,019; Chandler Mgt. Corp., SEC 1940 Act
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E.

Rule 2(e) Proceedings

The SEC adjudicates administrative disciplinary proceedings pursuant
to rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice" against attorneys, accountants,
engineers, and other similar professionals who practice before the Commission or who may have some degree of involvement in securities transactions." Although the securities statutes do not give the SEC explicit
authority to discipline such professionals, the Commission contends that it
Release No. 7331 (Aug. 17, 1972), [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
$ 78,978; First Multifund of America, Inc., 44 S.E.C. 680 (1971); A.V.C. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 134
(1970); Equity Corp., 44 S.E.C. 235 (1970); Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 635
(1967); Corroon & Reynolds Corp., 43 S.E.C. 295 (1967); Bowser, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 277 (1967);
First Nat'l City Bank, 42 S.E.C. 924 (1966); M.A. Hanna Co., 42 S.E.C. 477 (1964); Townsend Corp. of America, 42 S.E.C. 282 (1964).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979).

45. The pertinent literature includes: A. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING AND PRACch. 27, at 18-31 (1972); Bialkin, SanctionsAgainst Accountants, 8 REV. SEC. REG. 823

TICE

(1975); Burton, supra note 4; Fiflis, Current ProblemsofAccountants'Responsibilitiesto Third
Parties,28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975); Garrett, New Directionsin ProfessionalResponsibility,
29 Bus. LAW. 7 (1974); Gonson, DisciolinaryProceedingsand Other Remedies Available to the
SEC, 30 Bus. LAW. 191 (1975); Johnson, supra note 10; Kemp, Disciplinary Proceedingsby
the SEC.Against Attorneys, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 23 (1965); Sommer, Accountants." A
Flexible Standard, I LITIGATION 35 (1975); Sonde, ProfessionalResponsibility-A New Religion, or the Old Gospel?,24 EMORY L. REV. 827 (1975); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws - Some Observations, 68 N.W.U.L. REV. 1
(1973); Wheat, The Impact of SEC ProfessionalResponsibility Standards, 34 Bus. LAW. 969
(1979); Comment, SEC DisciplinaryRules and the FederalSecurities Laws.- The Regulation,
Role andResponsibilitiesof the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969; Jaenicke, The Effect of Litigation on Independent Auditors, Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Research Study
No. 1, at 46-53 (AICPA 1977). Significant adjudications include: Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d
952 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'g Murray A. Kivitz, 44 S.E.C. 600 (1971); SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-73
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1972); Schwebel v.
Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), afl'd, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 927 (1958); Ernst & Ernst, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 248 (May 31, 1978), 6
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,270; Haskins & Sells, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 241
(Feb. 10, 1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,263; Seidman & Seidman, SEC Accounting
Series Release Nos. 196 (Sept. 1, 1976) and 196A (Nov. 18, 1976), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) I1 72,218-218A; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No.
173 (July 2, 1975), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,195; Benjamin Botwinick & Co., SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 168 (Jan. 13, 1975), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,190;
Westheimer Fine, Berger & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 167 (Dec. 24, 1974), 6
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,189; Arthur Anderson & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 157 (July 8, 1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,179; Touche Ross & Co., SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,175;
Emanuel Fields, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407; Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 144 (May 23, 1973), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,166; William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (March 7, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (initial decision of SEC ALJ). See also Morris Mac Schwebel,
40 S.E.C. 347 (1960).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:215

has implicit authority to do so. At least one federal appellate court has
affirmed some degree of this authority.46 Although rule 2(e) disciplinary
proceedings consistently had been adjudicated privately for over 40 years,
the Commission has recently litigated its firstpublic rule 2(e) proceeding.4 7
Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings have become somewhat controversial
recently for at least two reasons. First, SEC Commissioner Roberta
Karmel has taken an entrenched public position that the SEC lacks statutory authority to litigate such disciplinary proceedings.4 8 Second, many
practitioners and commentators believe that, even if the Commission does
possess some degree of inherent or implied power to adjudicate administrative disciplinary proceedings against lawyers and accountants, the Commission is exceeding or misusing whatever power it has by
administratively litigating cases involving conduct not falling within an attorney's or accountant's "practice before the Commission."49
F

A Useful Substitute -

Section 21(a) Public Reports of Investigation

Although not an adjudicatory enforcement tool, the SEC recently has
been using another administrative enforcement-type procedure as a substitute for administrative disciplinary or civil injunctive proceedings in
borderline or marginal cases-the section 21 (a) "public report of investigation" and related section 21(a) "statements." 5 This substitute for traditional enforcement proceedings, however, has become somewhat
controversial. SEC Commissioner Karmel has staked out an absolute po46. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,854 (2d Cir. May 10, 1979). But see Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124
at 81,992 (SEC Commissioner Karmel, dissenting).
47. See Touche Ross & Co., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5079 (Sept. 2, 1976), [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 80,720 (order for public proceedings). See also
Touche Ross & Co., 438 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a5'd, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,854 (2d Cir. May 10, 1979); Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,175.
48. See Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,982 (July 2,
1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124. See also Daley & Karmel,
Attorneys' Responsibilities." Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975).
49. See, e.g., the following amicus curiae briefs filed in the pending Carter-Johnson rule
2(e) case: (i) Sullivan & Cromwell (July 18, 1979) at 13-14; (ii) Michael R. Klein (July 12,
1979) at 10-13; (iii) ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law (July 3, 1979)
at 9-10; and (iv) Arthur F. Mathews (Aug. 7, 1979) at 6-7.
50. Section 21(a) of the 1934 Act states in pertinent part:
The Commission may . . . make such investigations as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated . . . any provision of this chapter, the
rules and regulations thereunder,. . . and may require or permit any person to file
with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as the Commission shall
determine, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investi-
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sition in opposition to the remaining SEC Commissioners, contending that
it is improper to resolve enforcement cases in settlements embracing publication of section 21(a) reports or statements.
Thus, dissenting in Spartek, Inc.5 , Commissioner Karmel stated:
I object to the use of Section 21 (a) as an alternative administrative remedy against persons who allegedly violate the securities
laws. In particular, it should not be used to take administrative
gated. The Commission is authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning any such violations ....
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976).
See Crowell Collier Publishing Co., SEC Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957), [1957-61
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,539; Drayer-Hanson, Inc., 27 S.E.C. 838
(1948); Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Allegheny Corp., 6 S.E.C. 960
(1940); McKesson & Robbins, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940), 5 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,020; SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central
Company (1972), [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,931; SEC Report
of Investigation, In re Disclosures by Registrants Engaged in Defense Contracting, SEC Ad.
Pro. File No. 3-2485 (1972); SEC STAFF REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND
REGULATION OF CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE

(1962). See

generally Marine Protein Corp. Indus. Dev. Revenue Bonds, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
15,719 (April 1I, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,049; Greater
Wash. Inv., Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,673 (Mar. 22, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,032; Spartek, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14,
1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,961; National Tel. Co., SEC
1934 Act Release No. 14,380 (Jan. 16, 1978), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,410; Sterling Drug, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,675 (April 18, 1978),
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,570; Gould, Inc., SEC 1934 Act. Release No. 13,612 (June 9, 1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,077; Burlington N., Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 13,480 (April 28, 1977); Government
Employees Ins. Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,930 (Oct. 27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,750; Statement Submitted by Vance, Sanders & Co.,
Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,746 (April 19, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,058; Statement Submitted by Robert K. Lifton and Howard Weingrow,
SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,665 (March 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP.

(CCH) 82,015;

THE COMMISSION'S PRACTICE RELATING TO REPORTS OF INVESTIGA-

TIONS AND STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,664 (March
21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,014; TRANSACTIONS IN THE
SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: FINAL REPORT (Feb. 5, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,936; SEC STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Aug. 26, 1977), 418 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1;
SEC REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF STIRLING HOMEX CORP. RELATING TO
ACTIVITIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF STIRLING HOMEX CORP. (outside directors

Kheel and Castellucci), SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11,516 (July 2, 1975), [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219; SEC REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ON THE LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. (SEC 1975); PUBLIC INVESTIGATION CONCERNING DISCLOSURES BY
REGISTRANTS ENGAGED IN DEFENSE CONTRACTING (Lockheed investigation) SEC Minute,
(September 11, 1970), [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,905.
51. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,961.
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action against persons not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Exchange Act. I object even more
strenuously to the use of Section 21(a) as an enforcement vehicle
to publicize facts which do not constitute violations of the securities laws. The Commission has express statutory provisions
under which it must proceed to determine whether violations
have occurred and what sanctions should be imposed. Once
those findings are made, the Commission then may publish information about these violations under Section 21(a) for the purposes enumerated therein. Using Section 21(a) instead of
invoking express statutory procedures I believe is improper.5
Commissioner Karmel also dissented from the issuance of a public section 21 (a) statement written by Robert K. Lifton and Howard Weingrow,53
from a contemporaneous SEC interpretive release entitled The Commission's PracticeRelating to Reports of Investigationsand Statements Submitted to the Commission Pursuantto Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,"4 from the section 21(a) statement in Vance, Sanders & Company, Inc. " and from a section 21(a) report in MarineProtein Corporation
52. Id at 81,410 (footnotes omitted).
53. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,665 (Mar. 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) $ 82,015, at 81,559-61:
I object to the issuance of this negotiated statement from two individuals, because I do not believe that publication based on Section 21(a) of the. . . 1934 [Act]
.. . should be used as a sanction to dispose of investigated matters. I am particularly disturbed by such publication where, as here, the Commission could not institute formal administrative proceedings under Section 15(b) of the Act against the
persons who submitted the statement. The facts in the letter do not clearly constitute a violation of the securities laws and the Commission has not concluded a
violation has occurred.
Id at 81,561.
54. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,664 (Mar. 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,014, at 81,557-59:
In my view, publication by the Commission under Section 21(a) of a negotiated
statement by a person under investigation setting forth admissions and undertakings constitutes, in effect, a sanction. Moreover, the publication would not necessarily announce a Commission determination as to whether or not the facts set
forth in the submitted statements constitute a violation of the securities laws. I do
not believe the imposition of a sanction is proper unless the Commission makes
such a determination and then announces it. It is wrong for a government prosecutor to impose sanctions based on factual admissions, as contrasted to violations of
law. If the Commission is unwilling to authorize administrative or injunctive proceedings based on the facts uncovered in an enforcement investigation, it should
exercise its prosecutorial discretion by simply terminating the investigation.
Id at 81,559 (footnotes omitted).
55. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,746 (April 18, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,058, at 81,701-05:
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IndustrialDevelopment Revenue Bonds. 56
Nevertheless, the majority of the Commission's members, as well as its
enforcement staff, continue to recognize and use section
21(a) reports and
57
alternative.
enforcement
important
an
as
statements
III.

DISCIPLINARY NATURE OF

SEC

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

PROCEEDINGS

The most common type of administrative enforcement proceeding adjudicated by the Commission is the 1934 Act broker-dealer disciplinary proceeding. Investment adviser adjudicatory proceedings under the Advisers
Act and investment company disciplinary proceedings under the 1940 Act,
although less frequently used, are comparable to 1934 Act broker-dealer
proceedings. Rule 2(e) proceedings involving attorneys, accountants, engineers, or other professionals who practice before the Commission are similar in many procedural respects. Each of these administrative enforcement
proceedings is disciplinary in nature, embraces the possible imposition of
I object to the publication of negotiated statements based upon Section 21(a)
...to settle an enforcement matter where, as here, no proceeding authorized
under the securities laws has been instituted by the Commission ....
In this case,
the utilization of publication under Section 21(a) to terminate this investigation
was unnecessary and inappropriate because the Commission has express administrative authority to sanction the persons involved....
The Commission's policies with respect to the filings of schedule 13G forms by
an investment adviser to a complex of funds were previously enunciated in a release last year. Any disciplinary sanctions which the Commission believed were
appropriate to impose for the failure of Vance, Sanders ... to file Schedule 13D
forms . . . should have been imposed in a traditional adjudicatory proceeding.
The procedureemployed here encouragestheformulation of regulatorypolicyby way
of the Commission's prosecutorialpowers to the detriment of the Commission's
rulemaking and adudicatoryfunctions.
Id at 81,703 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied).
56. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,719 (Apr. 11, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,049, at 81,685.
57. The Commission's Practice Relating To Reports Of Investigations and Statements
Submitted To The Commission Pursuant To Section 21(a) Of The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,664 (Mar. 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,014, at 81,557-59:
The Commission today affirms its intention to continue its practice of issuing
such [Section 2 1(a)] reports in appropriate instances. . . . [Also], the Commission
will utilize [Section 21(a) statements] where it appears to be appropriate in the
public interest and the special circumstances of the case. Thus, the Commission
may allow persons who have been involved in investigative proceedings, as part of
the process of resolving their involvement in the investigation, to submit statements
in acceptable form with the expectation that the Commission may make the statements public.
Id at 81,557-58 (footnotes omitted).
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severe sanctions, and consequently is "penal" or "quasi-criminal" in effect,
despite the Commission's longstanding argument that its administrative
58
proceedings are "remedial," not "penal.
The disciplinary sanctions that may be imposed against persons and entities in broker-dealer proceedings include: outright revocation of license
(or denial of registration); bar from association with a broker-dealer; suspension of license or association for a period up to one year; the placing of
limitations on the activities or functions of a person or entity; or censure.5 9
Advisers Act and 1940 Act sanctions are comparable.6 ° In contrast, rule
2(e) sanctions are limited to a suspension or bar from practice before the
Commission.6 1
Neither the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act, the 1940 Act, nor the statutory
underpinnings of rule 2(e) gives the Commission statutory authority in administrative disciplinary proceedings to obtain ancillary relief, such as disgorgement or restitution. Ancillary relief, however, is sometimes obtained
by consent in settlement dispositions of administrative disciplinary ac58. Former SEC General Counsel, and now Second Circuit Judge, Timbers has labeled
SEC disciplinary proceedings "quasi-punitive." See Timbers & Garfinkel, supra note 4, at
824. The modem judicial trend is in accord. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d. 1126,
1139 (5th Cir. 1979) ("exclusion from the industry is clearly a penalty"); Collins Sec. Corp.
v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (punitive as well as remedial); Arthur Lipper
Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (revocation has significant penal component). In the trial of the signal Collins Securities case, in
which the writer was trial counsel, the SEC administrative law judge conceded that 1934 Act
broker-dealer administrative disciplinary proceedings were "quasi-criminal" in nature. Cf
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968) (although disbarment of lawyer designed to protect public, it is also a punishment imposed on the individual); Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511, 514-16 (1967) (disbarment is a penalty such that right against self-incrimination attaches and person cannot be punished for invoking it); Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (contrary to the FTC's concept, disciplinary proceedings are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature). But see Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d
276, 277 (5th Cir. 1961) (revocation of broker-dealer registration held not to be a penalty).
59. For example, § 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act states, in part:
The Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or
revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds, on the record after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that such censure, placing of limitations, suspension,
or revocation is in the public interest. . .[and a willful violation or other statutory
disqualification is proven].
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
For an analysis of the sanctioning process in broker-dealer cases, see the trilogy of articles
by Professor Thomforde: Thomforde, Patternsof Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice,42 TENN. L. REV. 465 (1975); Thomforde, supra note 4; Thomforde, supra note

10.
60. See § 203(e) of the Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1976).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979).
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tions.6 2 Moreover, the Commission does not have the statutory power to
impose administrative fines and does not do so even in consent settlements.6 3
Although the Commission has the authority to institute public or private
proceedings under the 1934, Advisers, and 1940 Acts, the overwhelming
majority of such proceedings in the 1970's have been public.'
The initial pleading entered by the Commission and formally commencing the proceeding is the "Order for Proceedings." This order identifies
the respondents and contains a description of the alleged statutory violations to be adjudicated. 65 All procedures for the adjudication, including
62. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,579
(Mar. 20 1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No.
14,149 (Nov. 9 1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 81,365; Government Employees Ins. Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,930 (Oct. 27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,750; Financial Programs, Inc., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 11,312 (Mar. 24, 1975), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $
80,146; Kippen & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,935 (July 30, 1974); Continental Inv.
Corp., SEC 1940 Act Release No. 8556 (Oct. 24, 1974); The First Nat'l Bank of Boston, SEC
1940 Act Release No. 7859 (June 13, 1973); Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
9894 (Dec. I1, 1972), [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,135; Statement Submitted by Robert K. Lifton & Howard Weingrow, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
15,665 (Mar. 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,015. See generaly Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW.
121 (1974).
63. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission, whose organization in many respects has been patterned along the lines of the SEC, does have specific statutory authority
to impose administrative fines. See Commodities Exchange Act, §§ 6(c), 14, 7 U.S.C. §§
13b, 18 (1976). The "Wells Committee" that studied SEC enforcement policies, practices,
and procedures in 1972 recommended that the SEC seek from Congress the authority to
impose monetary fines as administrative sanctions. To date, the Commission has not done
so.

See SEC REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND

PRACTICES 30 (1972), reprinted in A. MATHEWS, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS - 1977 239-321 (P.L.I. 1977). See also Lloyd Sabando, S.A. v.
Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.13, 4.05
(1958); Goldschmid, An Evaluation ofthe Present andPotential Use of Civil Money Penalties
as a Sanction by FederalAdministrativeAgencies in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

896 (1972).

64. For an enumeration of the factors supposedly considered by the Commission and its
Enforcement Staff in determining whether a particular proceeding will be adjudicated publicly or privately, see Internal SEC Staff Memorandum from Stanley Sporkin, then Assistant
Director (Enforcement), Division of Trading and Markets, to all SEC Regional Offices (August 23, 1967), reprintedin Gellhorn, supra note 30, at 1397-98 n.64. For the author's views
as to why all SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings, including rule 2(e) proceedings
should be public, see Letter from A.F. Mathews to SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (May 23, 1972), reprintedin MATHEWS, upra note 63, at 323.
65. For examples of orders for proceedings, see First Jersey Sec., Inc., SEC Ad. Pro.
File No. 3-5739 (May 17, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,085;
Boston Co. Inst. Inv., Inc. (Dirks-Equity Funding), SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5068 (Aug. 24,
1976),[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,729; Touche Ross & Co.,
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the conduct of the hearing, and pretrial and posttrial briefing and motions
practice are governed by the SEC's Rules of Practice.66 An independent
SEC administrative law judge is the adjudicator at the hearing.67
IV.

SEC STAFF BURDENS

The interested division or office of the Commission - typically the Enforcement Division - is the plaintiff in an administrative disciplinary proceeding. As such, it must introduce sufficient proof, judged by the
appropriate standard for weighing and considering the evidence, to establish that each respondent is responsible for one or more violations of law.
In addition to proof of a statutory violation, the interested division must
establish that the violation was "willful" and that it is necessary and appropriate "in the public interest and for the protection of investors" before
a sanction can be imposed against a particular respondent.68
A.

Burden of Proof. "at is The Proper Standard?

Historically, the SEC has applied the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard of proof in the adjudication of administrative disciplinary proceedings. 69 However, in a landmark administrative law decision in 1977,
Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC,7 ° the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that in the adjudication of fraud
charges by the SEC in administrative disciplinary proceedings, where severe sanctions with extremely serious consequences can be imposed, the
more stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard is required.
In Collins, the court was concerned with the inferential, as opposed to
direct, nature of the alleged proof of manipulation:
Although we have confidence that the SEC can utilize inferential evidence in a proper and responsible manner, the fact remains that such evidence is at least somewhat weaker and less
SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5075 (Sept. 2, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,720 (rule 2(e) proceeding).
66.

17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1 to .27 (1979). The Rules of Practice must be distinguished from

the SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1 to .8 (1979), which are much
less detailed and govern the conduct of SEC investigations.
67. See Hearing Examiners Now Called Administrative Law Judges, SEC 1933 Act
Release No. 5311 (Sept. 27, 1972), [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,014.
68.

69.
S.E.C.
S.E.C.
70.

See, e.g., § 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, quoted in part, note 59 supra.

See, e.g., Norman Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967); James De Mammos, 43
333, 337 (1967), af'd mem. (2d Cir., Oct. 13, 1967); Harris, Clare & Co., Inc., 43
198 (1966); Underhill Sec. Corp., 42 S.E.C. 689 (1965).
562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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reliable than direct evidence of violations. In addition, the use of
inferences, which is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an
administrative agency and not a court, can, as in this case, lead to
drastic sanctions which in effect amount to a deprivation of livelihood for the sanctioned parties. 7
Of great concern to the court was the "punitive" or penal effect of the
SEC's so-called "remedial" sanctions.72 Although acknowledging the
SEC's assertion that broker-dealer administrative proceedings are "remedial" in nature, the court nevertheless held that they are also "penal" in
effect:
Such labels are likely to reflect conclusions rather than analyses, and in any event are not determinative. In one sense, both
labels are correct. From the point of view of the public and enforcement agency, the action of the SEC is "remedial." To the
broker removed from his profession the action partakes of "punitive" impact. One would hardly say that removal of a robber
from society should be classed as only "remedial," because it protects ordinary citizens from his probable repetition of the crime.
The clear and convincing standard has been evolved in fraud
cases as a balance - protecting the defrauded, and also protecting one faced with the surcharge of damages imposed for fraud.73
The Collins decision is significant and should have a noticeable effect on
SEC disciplinary adjudications. SEC administrative law judges are now
applying the "clear and convincing evidence" standard and in a few cases
have dismissed fraud charges due to the enforcement staff's failure to sat71. Id at 823. The court added:
The fact that such consequences can flow from an inferential mode of reasoning
exercised by an administrative agency forms in large part our concern over the
standard of proof to which these inferences are to be put. Thus, while we recognize
the need to draw inferences to support allegations of security law violations, we
discern a need to subject such evidence to a standard which will ensure that any
remedial sanctions are imposed only in those circumstances where the evidence is
of such a quality as to make the sanctions appear just and reasonable.
Id
72. Traditionally, the SEC has justified its departure in administrative disciplinary proceedings from more stringent burdens or procedures applicable to judicial proceedings vindicating solely private rights, by labeling the purpose of its administrative proceedings
"remedial" - to protect the public interest, as opposed to "penal" - to punish an individual for past misconduct. See, e.g., Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963); Blaise
D'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1961); Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d
160, 163 (9th Cir. 1956). However, courts are beginning to point out the truly "penal" nature
of SEC administrative disciplinary sanctions. See note 58 supra. See also United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir.), a dbyan equally
divided court 341 U.S. 918 (1950).
73. 562 F.2d at 825.
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isfy the more stringent clear and convincing burden.74 Thus, the Commission can be expected to reduce sanctions in cases where courts remand a
matter to the agency for reassessment in light of the Collins ruling.7" Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently warned the Commission in a post-Collins case, Whitney v. SEC,7 6
that it will not tolerate the Commission's being "overly parsimonious" in
accepting and applying the "clear and convincing" test.77
However, the Collins case is not all encompassing. It purports to require
the clear and convincing standard only in adjudications in which fraud is
charged and the sanctions to be imposed are severe. It does not purport to
apply to all SEC disciplinary actions:
Whether a lesser sanction, say, probation or warning, may be
satisfied with a lesser standard - an approach that would present
some logical difficulties yet seem to harmonize with common
sense - is an issue we need not resolve in this case. Nor do we
insist on the "clear and convincing" standard in other than fraud
cases; our ruling is confined to this case involving the typical circumstantial proof of a fraud case and resulting in the severe sanction of deprivation of livelihood.7"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Steadman v.
SEC,79 recently refused to adopt across-the-board the Collins "clear and
convincing" standard in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings
brought against an investment adviser pursuant to the Advisers and 1940
Acts. 80 Nevertheless, Steadman is important respecting the burden of
proof in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings for two separate reasons: First, it introduces a new "compelling reasons" or "burden ofjustifi74. See, e.g., Allen & Co., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5258 (Aug. 2, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,174, at 82,149 n.7 (initial decision of SEC ALJ).
75. See, e.g., Nasser & Co., Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,347 (Nov. 22, 1978),
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,094, on remandfrom Nasser v. SEC,
566 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf.John P. Decker, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-4976 (Dec. 5,
1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,338 (application of Collins
"clear and convincing" standard when conduct alleged was breach of fiduciary duty).
76. 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
77. The court reprimanded the SEC as follows:
Evidently, however, the Commission is of the view that Collins is either wrong or
inapposite. We disagree. Collins, which we reaffirm today, plainly governs this
case . . . . [T]he Commission has taken an overly parsimonious view of our rationale in Collins; we hold here that any sanction imposed under § 15(b) which
depends on a finding of fraud must be sustained by clear and convincing evidence.
Id at 680-81 (footnotes omitted).
78. Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d at 825 n.32.
79. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979).
80. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
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cation" test for imposition of sanctions by the SEC - a test that is
favorable to respondents and places a stringent burden on the SEC.8 Second, the Steadman court left open the possibility that proof by more than
the traditional "preponderance" test may be required in cases embracing
the type of fraud charges that demand proof of scienter as an element of
the violation.8 2 Thus, the Steadman court highlighted the importance for
defense counsel to address both the burden of proof imposed upon the
SEC staff to establish the particular statutory violations alleged and the
factual showing necessary to support harsh sanctions once a statutory violation has been established.
In Steadman, the court held that the SEC need not prove scienter to
establish violations of subsections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act 8 3 and
subsection 206(2)84 of the Advisers Act.85 When scienter is not required,
these statutory provisions essentially provide for negligence liability even
though they fall within the rubric of what are generally described as "antifraud" provisions of the federal securities laws. Since such a "remedial"
construction of these provisions removes them from the ambit of traditional fraud allegations where intent must usually be proven circumstantially, the court advanced the view that the Collins "clear and convincing"
test was not necessary, and that the traditional "preponderance" test would
suffice.86 There is certainly room within the court's holding in Steadman
for it to require the "clear and convincing" test in cases involving section
81.

603 F.2d at 1139-40.

82. Id.at 1138-39.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2), (3) (1976).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976).
85. 603 F.2d at 1138-39. On the other hand, the court held that the SEC must prove
scienter to establish violations of § 17(a)(l) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(l) (1976),
and § 206(1) of the Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (1976). Id at 1143.
86. The court pointed out:
To the extent that Collins rests on a concern that there are particular risks for a
respondent in a fraud proceeding because the proof is necessarily circumstantial
and inferential, we are not persuaded. In this proceeding, the only fact to which
Steadman points as being based on disputed inferences is his state of mind whether he acted with an intent to defraud. But we have held that scienter is not
an element of a violation of subsections (2) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act or of section 206(2) of the IAA, statutes on which the Commission relies to a
significant degree in this case. These are commonly called "antifraud" provisions,
but the offenses they define are fraud in the broadest "remedial" sense of that term
and require no showing of intent to injure or injury. See SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) .... The facts necessary to establish a violation of these sections - nondisclosure of a material fact - are capable of proof by ordinary direct or circumstantial evidence as in any other
administrative proceeding.
603 F.2d at 1138-39.
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17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act,8 7 rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act,8 8 section 206(1)
of the Advisers Act, 89 and other sections of the federal securities laws that
require scienter.
But the main reason why Steadman is just as important to defense lawyers litigating SEC administrative enforcement proceedings as Collins and
Whitney is the new "compelling reasons" or "burden of justification" test
now applicable in the Fifth Circuit to the imposition of sanctions. The
court explained its reasons for adopting this test as follows:
[Imposing a high burden of persuasion to establish the facts of a
securities-laws violation is not the only means to protect a respondent. We are empowered to set aside Commission orders
that are arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 702, 706
(1976). We subscribe to the common-sense notion that the greater
the sanction the Commission decides to impose, the greater is its
burden ofjustifcation. Where, as here, the most potent weapon
in the Commission's "arsenal of flexible enforcement powers,"
. . . is used, the Commission has an obligation to explain why a
less drastic remedy would not suffice. .

.

. In our view, however,

permanent exclusion from the industry is "without justification in
fact unless the Commission spec fically articulatescompelling reasonsfor such a sanction." '9o

The Steadman court succinctly stated its "compelling reasons" or "burden of justification" test at the close of its opinion: "When the Commission imposes the most drastic sanctions at its disposal, it has a duty to
articulate carefully the grounds for its decision, including an explanation
of why lesser sanctions will not suffice."'"
87. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(l) (1976).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).

89. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(i) (1976).
90. 603 F.2d at 1139-40 (footnote omitted, emphasis supplied).
91. The court mentioned some of the factors which the SEC might look to in justifying
the sanction of bar: (i) facts indicating a reasonable likelihood that a particular violator
cannot ever operate in compliance with the law, see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th

Cir. 1978); (ii) violations so egregious that even if further statutory violations are unlikely
the nature of the conduct mandates permanent debarment as a deterrent to others in the
industry, see Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1009 (1978); c. Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674-75 (6th Cir. 1970) (sanction must be

necessary to deter respondent); and (iii) the factors relevant to the issuance of an injunction
including:
the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the
infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's assurances against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature
of his conduct, and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present opportunities for future violations.
SEC v. Blatt. 583 F.2d at 1334 n.29. See 603 F.2d at 1140.

1980]

SEC Administrative Proceedings

When considering burden of proof and analyzing Steadman, Collins,
and Whitney, a further point is pertinent. Even though other circuits have
not yet squarely addressed the Collins holding, its importance cannot be
minimized since all administrative disciplinary sanctions imposed by the
SEC may be appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit.9 2 Presumably,
because of this the SEC has recently asked Congress to overrule the Collins case in new legislation. 93 Certainly, in Whitney, the District of Columbia Circuit has demonstrated that it will not be sympathetic to
Commission attempts to circumvent the "clear and convincing" requirement.
In Whitney, the Commission contended that the Collins "clear and convincing" standard did not apply because the nine-month suspension in
Whitney was not a "severe" sanction as was the revocation and bar in
Collins, and the "direct" evidence in Whitney had a "naturally greater persuasion" than the "circumstantial" evidence in Collins. The court, however, expressly rejected both supposed distinctions.9 4
The court further cautioned that (i) absent specific enumeration of the factors justifying
permanent exclusion, "To say that past misconduct gives rise to an inference of future misconduct is not enough," 603 F.2d at 1140, and (ii) state of mind, that is, the presence or
absence of scienter, is "highly relevant in determining the remedy to impose. It would be a
gross abuse of discretion to bar an investment advisor from the industry on the basis of
isolated negligent violations." Id at 1140-41.
92. See, e.g., § 25 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976).
93. The SEC filed a memorandum with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in
July 1979 opposing two regulatory reform bills (S. 262 and S. 755) unless they are amended,
in among other respects, to overrule the Collins case by specifically providing that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof shall govern SEC adjudicatory proceedings.
See 513 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) at A-I (1979).
The Collins "clear and convincing" evidence rule probably will not be limited to SEC
proceedings. The question of its applicability to administrative disciplinary proceedings
adjudicated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, for example, has already
been raised. In one pending case, Compania Salvadorena de Cafe, S.A., CFTC Docket No.
79-34, the CFTC Chief Administrative Law Judge has determined to apply the Collins test.
See 518 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (Aug. 29, 1979).
94. The court stated:
These supposed distinctions do not matter ....
Like the revocation in Collins, a
suspension for nine months imposes a serious loss, both as a short-run matter of
foregone business, and, perhaps more grievously, as a permanent injury to reputation. Any supposed difference in this respect is one of degree which we think,
immaterial to the adequate measure of proof. Moreover, despite the presence of
some "direct" testimony in this case, the state of the evidence is hardly unequivocal
and we are reluctant to forego the added assurance of correctness afforded by a
heightened standard of proof.
604 F.2d at 681. The court added, "[W]e intend the word 'fraud' not merely in its common
law sense, but comprehending all violations of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5." Id at 681 n. 19. See
also Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the "clear and convincing evidence" standard has been imposed in hundreds of civil fraud cases).
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Collins, Whitney, and Steadman, read together, demonstrate that modern courts will carefully scrutinize the SEC's imposition of severe sanctions
and will not uphold severe disciplinary penalties upon a tenuous evidentiary basis.
Defendants' counsel, however, should be cognizant of a further aspect of
burden of proof. Despite the fact that Collins and its progeny mandate
proof by "clear and convincing" evidence to support harsh administrative
sanctions, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently held in SEC v. Savoy Industries,Inc.," that in a civil injunctive action the SEC need only prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence.96 In Savoy, the court refused to adopt the Collins "clear and
convincing" test in an injunctive action involving reporting violations of
section 13(d) of the 1934 Act. 97 Whether the court would reach the same
result in an injunctive action alleging fraud is open to question. Nevertheless, under sections 15(b)(4) and (6) of the 1934 Act,98 the SEC can administratively bar or suspend a person from associating with or registering as a
broker-dealer based solely on establishment that the person has been "permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment or decree of any
court of competent jurisdiction . . from engaging in or continuing any
conduct or practice" in connection with any securities activity.99
Conceivably, a person could be first enjoined through application of the
preponderance standard, and then barred by virtue of the statutory disqualifications of sections 15(b)(4) and (6), even though the "clear and convincing" test would have to be satisfied if a direct administrative
disciplinary proceeding had been brought involving the same conduct. If
the courts do not ultimately adopt the "clear and convincing" standard for
injunctive actions, this unfair anomaly could nevertheless be prevented if
appellate courts would apply the Steadman "compelling reasons" or "burden of justification" test whenever administrative disciplinary sanctions
are imposed.'0°
B.

Wilfulness

1. Generally
Over the years the Commission has practically read the "willfulness"
requirement out of the securities statutes in administrative disciplinary
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id at 1168-69.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C) (1976).
See notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.

SEC Administrative Proceedings

19801

proceedings. It has consistently maintained that the word "willful," as
used in the 1934 Act, does not require a finding that the respondent knows
that his conduct violates the law, intends to violate the law, or even has
actual or constructive knowledge that the law is being violated. The Commission must only find that the respondent's conduct is neither unintentional nor inadvertent.'o'
Nevertheless, there is one Commission opinion, InternationalShareholders Services Corp. ,'oe that may be useful to defense counsel in those relatively infrequent cases in which establishment of even the SEC's diluted
concept of willfulness may be tenuous. There, the Commission reversed
an administrative law judge's finding that a broker-dealer willfully violated the registration provisions of section 5 of the 1933 Act 1 3 in connection with an intrastate offering of securities when a section 3(a)( 11)
exemption from registration was claimed." ° The exemption was ultimately unavailable because the issuer, unknown to the broker-dealer, had
made contemporaneous sales to out-of-state residents. The Commission
agreed, therefore, that the broker-dealer, International Shareholders, as
well as the issuer, had violated section 5, but held that the broker-dealer's
violation was not "willful":
Although exemption under Section 3(a)( 11) was lost in this
case, making respondents' sales of the notes a violation, this was
solely caused by the actions of another person, Continental. Respondents were unaware of those actions and had no control over
them. Indeed, even had respondent conducted a reasonable investigation into the conduct of Continental, it appears from the
record that they could not have discovered that Continental was
making sales to out-of-state purchasers because of Continental's
elaborate efforts to create an impression of compliance with the
exemption .

. .

. In these circumstances, a finding that respon-

dents' violations were "willful" would deprive that term of any
significant meaning .

. .

. [I]t follows that respondents' viola-

101. See, e.g., Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965), affg Sidney Tager, 42 S.E.C.
132 (1964). See also A.J. White & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,645 (Feb. 15, 1974),
afl'd, A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619 (Ist Cir. 1977). This administrative definition
of "willful" is far less onerous than the "willful" requirement to sustain a criminal conviction. See generally Mathews, CriminalProsecutions Under the FederalSecurities Laws and
Related Statutes- The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 901, 950-58 (1971).
102. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,389 (Apr. 29, 1976), [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,493.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1976).
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0 5
tions cannot be found "willful.'
Furthermore, after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,' 6 it is doubtful that the courts will sanction application by the Commission of the Tager diluted "willfulness" test in any cases
embracing fraud charges.' °7 More likely, the courts will hold that the
Commission must prove scienter, that is, guilty knowledge, or reckless disregard, rather than mere negligence in order to hold a respondent liable
for fraud violations in an administrative disciplinary proceeding.' 0 8 If so,
proof of "willful" fraud will require either intent to violate the law, or at
least actual or constructive knowledge that the law is being violated.'0 9

2. The Effect of the ProposedFederalCriminal Code
This article does not purport to examine the changes that recent versions
of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code would make in criminal enforcement of the various federal securities statutes. Nevertheless, securities lawyers should be aware of one significant change in one current version of
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code that would substantially affect litigation of SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings. The "Technical and
Conforming Amendments" to S.1437, the Proposed Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, I' would delete the word "willfully" from most civil and
administrative provisions of the federal securities statutes, including section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act."' The reason for this change, urged by the
105. International Shareholders Serv. Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,389 (Apr. 29,
1976), [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,493, at 86,285.
106. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a
private damage action under the antifraud provisions of rule lOb-5 was required to prove
"scienter," which the Court defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," that is, a "conscious deception." Id at 193-94 n.12.
107. Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), was not a fraud case. It involved a violation of the "net capital" rule. See rule 15c3-1 of the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1979).
108. For example, the Second Circuit has suggested that proof of scienter is required in
an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding charging fraud. See Arthur Lipper Corp. v.
SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180-81 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). In private
actions involving fraud, courts require proof of some form of scienter. See, e.g., McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d
569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. Cf.Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 (scienter equated with a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, but recklessness considered a form of intentional
conduct for some purposes). At a minimum, the courts will, in a fraud case, construe the
willfulness test of Tager to be "more or less congruent with Hochfelder's use of scienter."
See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 682 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
110. See, e.g., S.1437 Proposed Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 1761 - Securities Offenses (1978).
1l1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
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SEC, is supposedly to avoid confusion with the culpability standards to be
adopted for criminal provisions in the statutes. Thus, the accompanying
Senate Report states:
At the suggestion of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Committee has dropped the culpability standard from the securities laws providing civil sanctions if the culpability standard
now provided is "willful." The Committee believes that it is necessary to amend the culpability standard in these provisions in
order to avoid the confusion which might result from changing
the "willful" standard in the criminal provisions to "knowing"
without changing the standards in the civil area to indicate the
relationship intended between the level of culpability in the civil
and criminal securities laws. However, the definitions of "reckless" and "negligent" in proposed title 18 would have the effect of
lowering the standards applicable to civil securities laws since
those standards rely on a standard applicable to a "reasonable
person" without regard to the fact that a specialist
in an area like
l 2
securities should meet a higher standard."
Hopefully, if Congress does enact a new federal criminal code, it will
find a better way to harmonize the lesser culpability requirements for civil
and administrative provisions with the more stringent ones of the criminal
provisions of the federal securities laws without providing for such absolute civil and administrative liability through the abolition of the longstanding "willful" requirement.
C

Public Interest

The Commission may impose a broad range of sanctions - as slight as
censure or as severe as revocation of license or bar from the securities industry. The securities statutes, however, require more than simply a finding of a "willful" violation to support the imposition of a sanction. The
Commission must also find that the sanction to be imposed is "in the public interest." The "public interest" finding, therefore, is relevant both to
whether any sanction at all should be imposed," 3 and if so, the degree of
severity the sanction should have in any particular case.
It is difficult to categorize what factors the Commission looks to in making its "public interest" determinations. Professor F. H. Thomforde, Jr., in
112. S. REP. No. 605, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, Part 2, Technical and Conforming Amendments to S.1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1250-51 (1977).
113. Sometimes, no sanction is imposed even though findings of willful violations are
made. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961).
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Patterns of Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice,"4 provides the following analysis:
The Commission's long experience in attempting to apply general principles, therefore, has yielded a series of more specific factors which guide its choice of sanction. Among the factors relied
on by the Commission in determining the public interest are: the
nature of the violation [Richard Bruce & Co., 43 S.E.C. 777
(1968)]; the respondent's prior record [StrathmoreSecurities,Inc.,
43 S.E.C. 575 (1967)]; and reputation [Jay Gershkoff, SEC 1933
Act. Release No. 8505 (Jan. 27, 1969)]; the amount of money involved [Abbott, Sommers & Co., 44 S.E.C. 104 (1969)]; and loss, if
any, to investors [Atlantic Equities Co., 43 S.E.C. 354 (1967)]; the
number of investors involved [Thomas Brown, 111, 43 S.E.C. 285
(1967)]; the geographic scope of the violation [Bateman Eichler,
Hill Richards, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 8333 (June 14,
1968)1; the respondent's age [David G. Baird, 43 S.E.C. 815
(1968)]; experience [Stanley K. Shapiro, SEC 1934 Act Release
No. 8552 (Mar. 12, 1969)]; and current status in the business [Joseph Davis, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 8541 (Feb. 28, 1969)]; and
the respondent's attitude toward the offense including his willingness to reform [Charles Plohn & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No.
8258 (Feb. 13, 1968)]; and, if loss has been suffered, to make restitution [Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968)]."'

Professor Thomforde's listing demonstrates the efficacy of the Commission's "public interest" introductory statement in Cady, Roberts & Co.:16
"All the surrounding circumstances and the state of mind of the participants may be taken into consideration in determining what sanctions
should appropriately be imposed .

.

. ,,,'

Appellate courts will scrutinize the sanctions imposed by the SEC to
determine whether they serve the public interest in a particular case.
When the sanctions are deemed too severe, the court usually will remand
the case to the Commission for reconsideration." 18 Until relatively recently, however, appellate courts were reluctant to alter the sanction themselves - that is, to bypass the Commission in determining what particular
sanction served the public interest in a particular case. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit in Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC," 9 reduced an administra114. 42
115.
116.
117.
118.

TENN

L.

REV.

465 (1975).

Id at 473-74 (footnotes omitted or integrated into text).
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Id at 917.
See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979); Beck v. SEC, 413 F.2d

832 (6th Cir. 1969), on remand, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970).
119. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
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tive sanction from a permanent bar to a one-year suspension without remanding the case to the SEC.' 20 It remains to be seen, however, whether
other reviewing courts will substitute their judgment for that of the specialized agency that supposedly has a peculiar administrative competence for
fashioning appropriate sanctions best serving the public interest.' 2 '
One further point respecting "public interest" considerations will be of
interest to trial lawyers. It is hornbook law that administrative due process
requires that a respondent in an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding be given adequate notice of the charges against which he must defend.
Such notice is ordinarily provided by the order for proceedings, which resembles the complaint in a civil action, or the indictment or information in
a criminal prosecution. Thus, the SEC staff ordinarily would not be allowed to introduce at the hearing evidence of alleged violations not recited
in the order for proceedings. Nevertheless, over the years the Staff has
slipped into a practice of attempting to introduce evidence relating to uncharged violations - not for the purpose of adjudicating those violations
constituting the gravamen of the case but rather to support their "public
interest" burden as to the appropriateness of imposing a severe sanction
for the findings of violations charged in the order.
This practice of adjudicating uncharged violations by clothing them
with a "public interest" veil has recently been severely criticized by the
Commission in InternationalShareholders Services Corp.122 There, in a
footnote, the Commission admonished the staff as follows:
Under the heading "Public Interest" the staff asked the administrative judge to find that "It is in the public interest to note that
Registrant and Jenkins conducted little, if any, examination of
the financial condition and business operation of Continental
. . .prior to soliciting customers to purchase their securities...
120. The Lpper court, in effect, overruled the majority view of the Second Circuit's
holding in Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940), on remand 12 S.E.C. 100 (1942), af'd,
134 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1943), and instead adopted Judge Swan's dissenting view that a reviewing court had the power to "modify" SEC imposed sanctions. Judge Friendly stated in
Lipper:
Reviewability of sanctions would seem to be authorized by application of the Administrative Procedure Act ... the enactment of which adequately explains why
Wright's suggestion that an agency's discretionary choice of sanctions cannot be
altered has not been followed .... Given our power to review SEC penalty determinations, our auhority [sic] to limit such sanctions in appropriate cases seems
necessarily to follow.
547 F.2d at 183-84.
121. Cf.Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1978) (even if reviewing court has
the power to modify a Commission sanction, it should not be exercised in the instant case).
122. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,389 (April 29, 1976), [1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,493.
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and those companies are now in bankruptcy resulting in default
on payments to investors . . . ." But for the reasons stated in
part III of this opinion, respondents' investigation of Continental's finances and Continental's bankruptcy were wholly outside
the framework of the order for proceedings. If the staff thought
that it had a case in these areas, it should have touched on them
in its pleading. Or, having failed to do so the first time around, it
should have amended that pleading to raise fraud and quasifraud issues. But since the staff did not do that and since the
order for proceedings does not even hint at fraud in any sense,
the staffs efforts to sneak fraud charges into the proceedings via
the back door of "public interest" was grossly improper. IN
Despite the InternationalShareholdersServices opinion, SEC administrative law judges still permit from time to time the Enforcement Staff to
prove the appropriateness of a sanction based upon evidence of statutory
violations not charged by the Commission itself in the order for proceedings. 124
V.

THE HOCHFELDER SCIENTER STANDARD IN

SEC

ADMINISTRATIVE

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court
held that in an SEC civil injunctive action alleging antifraud violations
under the Advisers Act, the SEC need not prove scienter nor injury in
order to establish a fraud cause of action justifying the imposition of injunctive relief.126 At least since CapitalGains, in both injunctive actions
and administrative disciplinary proceedings, the SEC and its Enforcement
123. Id at 86,288 n.19.
124. See, e.g., Allen & Co., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5258 (Aug. 2, 1979), [1979 Transfer

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,174, at 82,149 (initial decision of SEC ALJ).
125. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
126. Justice Goldberg framed the issue in the case as follows:
[Wihether Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operated "as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client," intended to require the Commission to establish fraud and deceit "in their technical sense,"
including intent to injure and actual injury to clients, or whether Congress intended a broad remedial construction of the Act which would encompass nondisclosure of material facts.
375 U.S. at 185-86.
He went on to comment later that:
It would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisers Act. . . for us to
hold . . . that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which
operates "as a fraud or deceit," intended to require proof of intent to injure and
actual injury to clients.
Id at 191-92.
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Staff have asserted, in effect, that negligence is fraud under the antifraud
provisons of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act' 27 and section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 of the 1934 Act.' 28 However, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 the
Supreme Court, in a fairly restrictive opinion, held that in an implied private damage cause of action under the antifraud provisions of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, a plaintiff must prove "scienter" on
the part of the defendant. "Scienter" was defined as involving "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."'131 On its surface the Hochfelder opinion left open the question "whether scienter is a
necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5."' 3 1 Post-Hochfelder decisions 132 in the federal appellate
courts are not in agreement as to whether scienter will be required to be
33
proven by the SEC in a rule lOb-5 injunctive action.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q(a) (1976).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1979).
129. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
130. Id at 194 n.12.
131. See id
132. Most post-Hochfelder courts have held that the SEC need not prove scienter in civil
injunctive actions alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See, e.g., SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1978); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1432 (1979); SEC
v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1978). But see Steadman v. SEC, 603
F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). Nor have courts required proof of scienter in connection with
violations of the registration provisions of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). See,
e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
For district court decisions after Hochfelder requiring the SEC to prove scienter in rule
IOb-5 injunctive actions, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1979), see, e.g., SEC v. Randell (Mumford),
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,362 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1386 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148,
1171 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978); SEC v.
Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afr'don other grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977).
The pertinent literature includes: Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Actions. A Reappraisalin Light of Hochfelder, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 769 (1976); Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under
Rule lob-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977); Elsen & Lupert,
Scienterfor Injunctions, 10 REV. SEC. REG. 925 (1977); Harkleroad, supra note 3; Lowenfels,
Scienter or Negligence Requiredfor SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b) andRule lOb-5: A
FascinatingParadox,33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Maher & Blasi, Lessonsfrom Ernst & Ernst
- Enforcement Proceedingsand the Uncommon Law of 0b-5, 82 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1977);
Ruder, FactorsDetermining The Degree of CulpabilityNecessaryfor Violationsof the Federal
Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 571 (1975);
Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) after Ernst&
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977).
133. Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (proof of scienter required in

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:215

Courts are just beginning to address the question whether the SEC enforcement staff must prove scienter to establish rule lOb-5 antifraud
charges in administrative disciplinary proceedings against broker-dealers
pursuant to section 15 of the 1934 Act or similar charges in Advisers Act,
1940 Act, and rule 2(e) proceedings.
In pre-Hochfelder cases, the Commission had held that proof of scienter
was not required in administrative disciplinary proceedings. 3 4 After
Hochfelder, the SEC General Counsel suggested that the newly articulated
rule lob-5 scienter requirement could be circumvented in rule 2(e) administrative disciplinary proceedings. 35 However, Judge Friendly, in the Arthur Loper case, assumed without deciding that the Hochfelder "scienter"
standard does apply to SEC administrative disciplinary adjudications:
The [Hochfelder] Court said nothing about whether scienter is a
necessary element in disciplinary actions under § 15. These actions share with damage suits the quality of visiting serious consequences on past conduct, even though they also have a
remedial effect. They thus differ from injunctive proceedings, the
objective of which is solely to prevent threatened future harm,
although unlawful conduct is necessary - if not always sufficient
- to demonstrate the reality of this threat. We therefore assume,
arguendo, without deciding, that the Hochfelder
culpability stan136
dard applies in disciplinary proceedings.
But this portion of the Liper opinion, persuasive as it indeed may be, is
137
only dicta. No appellate court yet has squarely decided this issue.
rule lob-5 case) with SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, No. 79-66, 48
U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1979) (proof of scienter not required). Both the defendant and
the SEC requested the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in the Aaron case. The SEC's brief
contains an excellent synopsis of the conflicting district and appellate court decisions on the
scienter issue. See Brief for Certiorari of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Aaron
y. SEC, No. 79-66, 3253 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1979).
134. See, e.g., Haskins & Sells, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 73 (Oct. 30, 1952)
(rule 2(e) proceeding against accountants).

135. See, e.g., SEC General Counsel Memorandum to SEC Chairman Hills (June 8,
1976), reprintedin

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT,

app.

I, at 1472 n.2 (1976); SEC General Counsel Memorandum to SEC Chairman Hills (Aug 27,
1976), reprintedin

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT,

app.

I, at 1508 (1976).
136. Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 1009 (1978). In support of his assumption, Judge Friendly cited the following passage
267-68 (1965): "Revocation, indeed, seems often to be used as a sanction not so much to control the respondent as to
from L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

warn others, and thus it has a significant 'penal' component, even though the courts may
choose to mask its character by calling it a 'civil' remedy." Id
137. Some appellate courts have skirted the issue. See, e.g., Edward J. Mawod & Co. v.
SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977). And at
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In Steadman v. SEC, 3 8 however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit indicated that scienter will be required in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings charging rule lOb-5 violations.' 3 9 In
Steadman, the court squarely held that proof of scienter was required in
SEC administrative disciplinary actions charging violations of section
17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act." 4 In so doing, the court referred to the fact that
the language in section 17(a)(1). 4 is traditional fraud language, almost
identical to the language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 14 2 and a portion
of rule lOb-5.1 43 The court also noted that both the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder,'44 a private damage action, and its own court in SEC v.
Blatt, 45 an SEC civil injunctive action, held proof of scienter to be required in rule lOb-5 actions.
In the Collins case,' 4 6 when confronted with the scienter issue in a rule
lOb-5 administrative disciplinary proceeding, the court noted its importance but deferred its resolution by remanding the case to the Commission
to give the agency the opportunity to express its views. The SEC, to date,
has not reconsidered the Collins case. In light of the Collins remand, the
court also remanded a subsequent case, Nassar & Co., Inc.14v.SEC,147 to
the Commission for reconsideration inlight of Hochfelder.
It is expected that regardless of what the SEC does in its remand opinion
in Collins, the District of Columbia Circuit and other federal courts of
appeals will eventually adopt Judge Friendly's Arthur Lipper approach
and the approach apparently embraced by the Fifth Circuit in Steadman
and squarely hold that proof of scienter is required with respect to tradileast one appellate court has assumed that the Hochfelder scienter standard applies to disciplinary proceedings adjudicated by the National Association of Securities Dealers. See
Buchman v. SEC, 553 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1977).
138. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
140. 603 F.2d at 1143.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
144. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
145. 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
146. Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d at 826-27.
147. 566 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
148. Upon remand in Nasser, the SEC suggested that the Hochfelder scienter standard
does not apply to SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings involving rule lob-5 charges
but dodged the issue and held that even if it did apply, scienter had been adequately established. See Nasser & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,347 (Nov. 22, 1978), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 81,904. See also Steadman Sec. Corp., SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 13,695 (June 29, 1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,243, rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979).
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tional antifraud charges in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings.
If this occurs, it will be important for litigators to discern what does and
does not constitute "scienter" in the context of an administrative disciplinary proceeding.
The Hochfelder court defined "scienter" as "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"' 4 9 and as "knowing or intentional misconduct."' ° However, the Hochfelder court left open the question of whether reckless behavior would suffice to meet the scienter test.
Since "reckless disregard" has, in criminal mail fraud and securities fraud
cases, traditionally been held to constitute constructive knowledge of fraud
sufficient to satisfy the scienter or specific intent requirements of these
crimes, 15 reckless behavior should ultimately be held by the appellate
courts to suffice to meet whatever scienter requirements are eventually
found applicable in both SEC civil injunctive actions and SEC administra52
tive disciplinary proceedings.1
149. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
150. Id at 197.
151. For example, in United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964), Judge
Friendly commented:
We think that in the context of § 24 of the Securities Act as applied to § 17(a), the
Government can meet its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to facts he had a duty to see . . . or recklessly stated as facts things of
which he was ignorant. . . . In our complex society the accountant's certificate
and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake
of law or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made them.
But Congress equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out as
members of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on
a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen
or have represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess.
Id at 862-63.
152. See, e.g, Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 642 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,916 (2d Cir. June 27, 1979); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson
v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 106 (1978); Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15
N.E.2d 416 (1938); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
With respect to the so-called remedial fraud charges - § 17(a)(2), (3) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2), (3) (1976) and § 206(2) of the Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976)
- proof of a negligent violation will probably suffice. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d
1126, 1131-34 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Judge Leventhal's comments in his concurring opinion in the Nassar
remand are pertinent in this regard:
Even assuming that a scienter is needed for revocation of registration, that does not mean that what is required is the kind of
subjective deceit that Ernst [Hochfelderl held to be required in an
action for damages. As the Commission points out, a brokerdealer may be guilty of intentional misconduct if he deliberately
commits certain acts even if he doesn't know they are forbidden
by the Act or regulations. In other words, there is no requirement of specific intent that includes a specific element of knowledge of the pertinent rule of law ....
It may be that the SEC will conclude that scienter for purposes
of this kind of discipline must include intentional violation of a
duty specifically imposed by a Commission rule or regulation,
and also, and perhaps necessarily, include conduct amounting to
gross recklessness when53the Commission has imposed a duty to
make a careful check.1
Judge Leventhal seems to invite the Commission to adopt a watereddown scienter test for administrative disciplinary proceedings that may not
resemble at all the "guilty knowledge" scienter known to the common law.
Whatever definition the courts ultimately adopt for "scienter" in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings involving traditional fraud charges
- whether phrased in terms of guilty knowledge or reckless breach of duty
- one would expect that mere negligence will not suffice to constitute scienter and that good faith will always be a defense to traditional fraud
54
charges. 1
153. 566 F.2d at 794-96. The writer is reminded of the comments of SEC Enforcement
Chief Stanley Sporkin when he first rationalized the landmark Hochfelder decision as follows - "If they want scienter, it's no problem - we'll give them scienter!" If in the eyes of
the SEC and its staff, negligence can constitute fraud, then, afortiori,negligence can constitute scienter! As Humpty Dumpty pointed out to Alice "in a rather scornful tone" in Lewis
Carroll's, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (St. Martins Press, 1977):
"When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more
nor less . . . . The question is . . . which is to be master - that's all."
Id. at 130. See also Langer Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 524 F.2d
1337, 1339 (7th Cir. 1975).
154. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (Sunstrand
formulation of recklessness makes it clear, as did Hochfelder, that negligence, whether gross,
grave or inexcusable, cannot serve as substitute for scienter); cf. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92
F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937) (issue is whether defendants had an honest belief that statements
made by them were true. If they did have that belief, whether reasonable or unreasonable,
they are not liable). See also Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 642 (1978); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Discovery or Lack Thereof

In Villani v. NYSE,' 55 Judge Lasker characterized the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "model of procedural due
process."' 156 Consequently, he initially determined that in stock exchange
disciplinary proceedings, the demands of administrative due process required the exchanges to grant respondents pretrial discovery rights. Upon
rehearing,"5 7 Judge Lasker was informed by the New York Stock Exchange that the SEC affords respondents in its administrative disciplinary
proceedings virtually no formal pretrial discovery rights. Accordingly, he
modified his first Villani opinion and did not judicially impose traditional
15 8
civil discovery concepts upon stock exchange disciplinary proceedings.
Judge Lasker's Villani opinion was affirmed on other grounds by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 59 It is important
to note, however, that dicta in the appellate opinion suggests that the court
may have ordered the discovery embraced by Judge Lasker's initial decision if the respondent had not in the meantime obtained such discovery.' 60
Although the SEC traditionally informs a respondent of the charges
against him so that he may attempt to prepare a defense, the Commission
has historically maintained that a respondent is not entitled as a matter of
right to pretrial discovery of evidence.16' The Administrative Conference
of the United States does not agree with the SEC's views in this regard and
has for years consistently advocated broadened discovery in SEC adminis155.
156.
157.
158.

348 F.
Id at
367 F.
Id at

Supp. i185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1192.
Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1125. Judge Lasker stated:

Were we to write on a clean slate, we might well adhere to our prior ruling since, as
a matter of equity, we think a strong argument exists that a person subject to the

possibly devastating result of disciplinary action, which may well cause loss of reputation and income, should be entitled to inspect the documents in the'hands of his

accuser .... We find considerable merit in the proposition that "Probably no
sound reason can be given for failure to extend to administrative adjudication the
discovery procedures worked out for judicial proceedings."
Id (quoting, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 589 (1958 ed.)), as quotedin Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 28, 29 (1959). Judge Lasker

also cited Judge Irving R. Kaufman's view that there is an absence of any meaningful discovery procedures in most administrative agencies, a defect that should be corrected. See
Kaufman, Have AdministrativeAgencies Kept Pace With Modern Court Developed Techniques
Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD.L. BULL. 103, 114 (1959).
159. See Sloan v. N.Y.S.E., 489 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1973).
160. Id at4.

161. See, e.g., Charles M. Weber, 35 S.E.C. 79 (1953); Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238
(1935).
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trative disciplinary proceedings.16 2 Unfortunately, such recommendations
have mostly been ignored by the Commission and opposed by its enforcement staff. This lack of formal pretrial discovery rights remains one of the
low points in the otherwise fair SEC administrative adjudicatory procedures.
As a result of continued criticism from the bar, 163 and in response to
recommendations of the "Wells Committee,"1 64 the SEC did amend its
Rules of Practice to encourage a modest amount of informal pretrial discovery. Thus, rule 8(d) was amended in 1972 to provide for prehearing
conferences
for the purpose of clarifying and simplifying issues and otherwise
facilitating or expediting the proceeding. . . . [T]he hearing officer. . . may in his discretion. . . order a party, including the
interested division, to furnish where practicable any or all of the
following: an outline of its case or defense; the legal theories
upon which it will rely; the identity of the witnesses who will
testify on its behalf; and copies of or 65a list of documents which it
intends to introduce at the hearing.
The rule is deficient in several respects. First, the granting of discovery
is within the discretion of the administrative law judge; a respondent has
no absolute right to discovery. Second, a respondent cannot discover prior
to trial the investigative transcripts of testimony, memoranda, or statements of interviews of the prospective witnesses the staff will call. Finally,
in the
prior to trial, a respondent cannot discover exculpatory material
66
hands of the staff that is unlikely to be introduced at trial.'
162. See, e.g., Discovery in Agency Adjudication, Recommendations and Reports of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, January 8, 1968 - June 30, 1970, Recommendation No. 21 (1971).
163. See, e.g., Letter from A.F. Mathews to SEC's Advisory Committee on Enforcement
Policies and Practices (May 23, 1972), reprintedin MATHEWS, supra note 63, at 323, 334-39.
164. See Wells, Cohen & Demmler, SEC Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies andPractices(June 1, 1972), reprintedin MATHEWS, supra note 63, at 239, 244,
287-92.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d) (1979) (emphasis supplied).
166. Rule 11.1 of the SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.11.1 (1979), codifies the
Jencks rule, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), for the purposes of administrative disciplinary proceedings by providing:
After a witness called by the attorney for the interested Division of the Commission has given direct testimony in a hearing, any other party may request and obtain the production of any statement, or part thereof, of such witness pertaining to
his direct testimony, in the possession of the Division, subject, however, to the
limitations applicable to the production of witnesses' statements under the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500.
The Commission has never adopted the exculpatory evidence production rule of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),and Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). Indeed, in virtu-
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It is doubtful that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 167 can be
used by a respondent to achieve pretrial discovery from the staff not other68
wise provided by the Rules of Practice. For example, Merrill Lynch'
was unsuccessful in its attempt to use the FOIA for discovery purposes in
the administrative litigation of the Scientic Controls 6 9 case. Steadman

Security Corp.170 was
equally unsuccessful in a 1940 Act disciplinary pro7
ceeding against it.' '
Investigatory materials generally will be discoverable from the SEC and
its staff by any member of the public pursuant to the FOIA after completion
of the SEC's enforcement actions.'72 However, a respondent in an SEC
administrative disciplinary action generally will not be allowed to use the
FOIA as a discovery device to obtain intragovernmental documents not
otherwise available through traditional administrative discovery procedures.
ally every case that an administrative law judge has sustained the staff's refusal to grant a
respondent pretrial discovery, or indeed discovery during trial, of such data as witness lists,
exculpatory evidence, transcripts of testimony or witness statements, the Commission has
sustained the denial of production, and the courts have generally refused to reverse the
Commission's rulings in this regard. However, the Commission and the courts, in ruling on
such procedural points, have never espoused the view that denial of discovery is the better
course of action; rather, in each case they have merely found that in the particular circumstances, the failure to accord respondents full discovery did not so taint the proceedings as to
constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Haight &
Co., Inc. 44 S.E.C. 481, afd, No. 71-637 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285
(1970), aj'd, 446 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1971); Armstrong, Jones & Co., 43 S.E.C. 888 (1968),
ajf'd,421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 958 (1970); Harris Clare & Co., 43 S.E.C.
198 (1966); Hayden Lynch & Co., 43 S.E.C. 25 (1966).
167. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
168. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC FOIA Release No. 42 (Jan.
26, 1976) (order denying request); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. SEC,
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,566 (D.D.C. May 28, 1976) (court
denied motion to enjoin SEC evidentiary hearing until disposition of FOIA claim).
169. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,149
(Nov. 9, 1977), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,365.
170. See Steadman Sec. Corp. v. SEC, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,735 (D.D.C. Jan 25, 1973). See also Anton v. SEC, No. 75-M-611 (D.Colo.
1975).
171. See Steadman Sec. Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 13,695 (June 29, 1977), [197778 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,243.
172. See, e.g., Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972); Commercial Envelope Mfg.
Co. v. SEC, 450 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1971); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467
(D.D.C. 1972); First Nat'l City Bank, SEC FOIA Release No. 36 (Nov. 4, 1975) (SEC
granted public release of Wells Committee submissions as well as investigative transcripts);
Jung Ja Malandris, SEC FOIA Release No. 8 (May 29, 1975); Frank J. Abella, Jr., SEC
FOIA Release No. 2 (Apr. 24, 1975). See generally Frankhauser & Belman, The Right to
Information in the Administrative Process. 4 Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 AD. L. REV. 101 (1966); Peloso, Discovery of SEC Transcrts, 10 REV. SEC. REG.
829 (1977).
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The principal difference in pretrial procedures between an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding and a federal court civil action like an
SEC civil injunctive action, is that in the administrative proceeding the
respondents are virtually barred from taking discovery depositions. The
SEC staff can and usually does take exparte investigative depositions of
most prospective witnesses, including the respondents, prior to the institution of the administrative proceeding. However, by virtue of rule 15 of the
SEC Rules of Practice, 73 a respondent in an administrative preceeding,
can take depositions, not for discovery, but only to preserve the testimony
of a witness who will not be able to appear personally at trial. Yet, even
for this purpose, the respondent does not have an absolute right to take
depositions. It is within the sole discretion of the administrative law judge
or the Commission to grant or deny a request for such depositions. In
practice, depositions are seldom allowed. Even if a deposition is allowed,
it cannot later be introduced into evidence at the hearing unless the proponent establishes, pursuant to rule 15(f), one of the following:
(1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the
United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness
was procured by the party offering the deposition; (3) that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment; (4) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interests of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open hearing, to allow the deposition
74
to be used.'
B. Right To Counsel- No Right To Appointed Counsel
Rule 2(b) of the SEC Rules of Practice accords a respondent the right to
be represented by counsel of his choice.' 7 5 However, unlike some federal
agencies,"' the SEC takes the position, which has been upheld by appellate courts, that an alleged indigent has no right to be provided appointed
77
counsel by the SEC in administrative disciplinary actions.
173.
174.

17 C.F.R. § 201.15 (1979).
17 C.F.R. § 201.15(0 (1979).

175. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(b) (1979).
176. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has provided appointed counsel to

indigents in its administrative disciplinary proceedings. See American Chinchilla Corp.,
FTC Docket No. 8774 (Dec. 23, 1969).
177.

See, e.g., Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991
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C. Multiple Representation. Possible Conflicts of Interest
Under the SEC rules relating to investigations, the staff has the power to
"sequester" an attorney from representing multiple witnesses involved in
an SEC investigation. 178 No such comparable sequestration rule is contained in the SEC Rules of Practice that govern litigation of administrative
disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, counsel must always be aware of
the possibility of conflicts of interest stemming from representing multiple
179
clients in a single adjudicatory proceeding.
The multiple representation issue arose in the litigation of an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. in the Scientic Controls Corp. case.' 8 ° The Commission
brought the case against Merrill Lynch and forty-nine of its research department employees and salesmen. The SEC's Division of Enforcement
formally moved to preclude Merrill Lynch's outside legal counsel from
additionally representing most of the firm's employees named as respondents.' 8 ' The staff claimed that the close relationship between counsel and
the brokerage firm presented actual and potential conflicts of interest to
the detriment of the employees-respondents. For example, Merrill Lynch
might attempt to defend itself by pointing to the alleged primary culpability of and possible concealment by some of its employees. Alternatively,
the employees might try to defend by blaming management.
The SEC administrative law judge refused to preclude the law firm from
representing multiple respondents because the enforcement division was
(2d Cir. 1965); Norman Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 852 (1968); David T. Fleischman, 43 S.E.C. 518
(1967); A.T. Brod & Co.,43 S.E.C. 289 (1967).
178. See Rule 7(b), SEC Rules Regarding Formal Investigative Proceedings, 17 C.F.R. §
203.7(b) (1979).
179. See, e.g., SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. De Berry, 487
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966); E.F. Hutton & Co. v.
Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969); United States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aifd, 359 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the FoundationforSuccessful Disposition of Subsequent
Civil, Administrative and Criminal Proceedings,24 EMORY L.J. 567, 577-84 (1975); Sonde,
The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws.- Some Observations,
68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1973).
180. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,233
(June 22, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,416 (order for public
proceeding).
181. See Summary of Brief of SEC Division of Enforcement, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 34329 (Sept. 26, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,535, at 83,467.
Apparently, the law firm had represented most of the respondents when they appeared as
witnesses in the underlying investigation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-4329 (Dec. 6, 1973), [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,608, at 83,633.
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unable to establish that a conflict would necessarily occur. The judge nevertheless conditioned such representation upon fulfillment by the law firm
of a procedure designed to elicit the informed consent of each respondent.
The procedure encompassed the judge's transmittal to each respondent of
a copy of his order describing the staff's conflict claims and the law firm's
rebuttal, and the granting to each respondent of the opportunity to read
the transcript of oral argument on the staff's motion as well as all briefs
82
and other pleadings shedding light upon the problem.'
D. Inferencesfrom a Ffth Amendment Plea
Trial counsel should be aware of the dangers arising from a plea by a
client in an SEC investigation or administrative disciplinary action of the
182. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-4329 (Dec. 6,
1973), [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,608. The administrative law
judge stated:
The conclusion reached in this order is that if the decisions of the individual respondents to retain Brown Wood as their counsel are informed decisions, such representation may be continued. Accordingly, this order is being directed to each
individual respondent to assure that he is substantially apprised of the arguments
on both sides of the issue, and that his decision with regard to the selection of
counsel, whether now re-affirmed or changed, is made with such knowledge ...
This rather unusual procedure wherein the presiding officer of a tribunal communicates directly with respondents who are represented by counsel is adopted as
the most expedient way to obtain informed decisions within a prescribed time
limit, and concomitantly to begin to move the case forward. . . . [T]he decision
seems to concede that where it is not clear that a conflict of interests will occur
between two or more clients of an attorney, the informed consent of the client or
clients whose interests more likely would suffer in the event a conflict should develop, can provide justification for the continuation of multiple representation, as
here. This is the position reached in this order.
Id. at 83,630.
In a recent civil injunctive case, SEC v. IU Int'l Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,594 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1978), Judge Oberdorfer pointed out a possible
conflict of interest by corporate defense counsel:
The Court takes note of the possible conflict of interest, pointed to by the SEC
and IU's counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, which may arise if the latter is called
upon to testify before the SEC or another body. The circumstances suggest that
the Canons of Professional Responsibility will require at least a limited withdrawal. However, a hearing to consider this matter will be scheduled by the order
which the Court will enter in the event that the matter has not been earlier resolved
voluntarily.
Id. at 94,530 n.2.
In another recent case a federal bankruptcy judge found that the Mudge, Rose law firm
had a conflict of interest when it represented simultaneously Westgate-California Corp. and
U.S. Nat'l Bank of San Diego in the SEC investigation of financier C. Arnholdt Smith. See
In re Westgate-California Corp. v. Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander, Bankruptcy Nos.
74-413, 74-414, 74-1079, 74-1246, 74-2271 (Dec. 29, 1978).
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
While no adverse inferences can be drawn in a criminal prosecution
from a fifth amendment plea or from a failure by the defendant to testify
in his own defense,' 8 4 the SEC sometimes draws or seeks to have drawn
such adverse inferences in civil and administrative disciplinary proceedings.' 85 The rationale for so doing, like the "required records doctrine"
exception to a fifth amendment plea, 186 seems to be as follows: when one
chooses to do business in a heavily regulated industry and Congress has
decided that the public interest requires a federal regulatory agency to
have access to information from participants in that industry, then the refusal to provide requested information - whether by way of assertion of a
fifth amendment plea or otherwise - provides the basis for drawing an
inference that if the information had been provided, it would have been
adverse to the person who refused to provide it.

183. U.S. CONST. amend V. See generally Elsen, Securities Law Investigations, 2 REV.
SEC. REG. 873 (1969); Morrison, The Fi/th Amendment DiscolinarySanctionsin the Securities Industry Undercut the Constitutional Right to Remain Silent. The Author Suggests an
Accommodation, 3 REv. SEC. REG. 949 (1970).
184. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). However, the prosecution may attempt to use a prior fifth amendment plea for cross-examination purposes in a criminal trial
if the defendant testifies in his own defense. Compare United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1973),and United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
197 1),with United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974),andJohnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1973). See generally Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial
Testimony by Proofof Post-Arrest Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940 (1975).
185. See, e.g., SEC v. Stewart, 476 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1973); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1969); N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961); SEC v. Gilbert, 79
F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Nicholas J. Nickolaou, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,210 (Sept.
18, 1979); Strathmore Securities, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 575 (1967), affd, 407 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir.
1969); James De Mammos, 43 S.E.C. 333 (1967); J.A. Winston & Co., 42 S.E.C. 62 (1964).
See generally Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Discriminationin
Private Civil Litigation: A CriticalAnalysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121 (1972); Noonan,
Inferencesfrom the Invocation of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination,41 VA. L. REV. 311
(1955); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U.
CHI. L. REV. 472 (1957); Comment, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incriminationin Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976);
Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477, 478 (1st Cir. 1977).
186. Pursuant to the "required records doctrine," when a business is affected with a public interest and Congress by statute mandates recordkeeping by participants in that business,
even personalbooks and records relating to the business must be made available for inspection by regulatory agencies, despite the participant's personal fifth amendment privilege.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The "required records doctrine" applies to SEC
regulated broker-dealers and investment advisers. See SEC v. Olsen, 354 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1965). See also United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Mahler, 254 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Olsen, 243 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
There is, however, a suggestion in See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967), that the Supreme
Court may not adhere to the "required records doctrine" as espoused in Shapiro the next
time it confronts the issue.
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In light of recent Supreme Court cases holding that a person cannot be
sanctioned civilly or administratively, much less criminally, solely by virtue of asserting his privilege against self-incrimination," 7 it is doubtful
whether the Supreme Court would condone the SEC's imposition of a disciplinary sanction against a broker-dealer, investment adviser, or professional such as an attorney or accountant solely by virtue of assertion of the
fifth amendment plea.
E. Is There An Applicable Statute of Limitations?
The federal securities statutes contain relatively short statutes of limitations for private damage actions pursued under express causes of action in
the statutes. 88 Even with respect to implied private damage causes of action pursuant to rule lOb-5, the courts apply either the comparable state
Blue Sky Law statute of limitations or the analogous state common law
fraud statute of limitations.' 8 9 Similarly, a five-year statute of limitations
governs all criminal prosecutions under the federal securities laws.' 90
Nevertheless, the SEC contends that no statute of limitations governs its
administrative disciplinary proceedings. For example, in David G. Baird&
Co., ' some of the violative conduct had occurred over five years prior to
institution of the action by the Commission. In a minute order in that
case, the SEC stated in substance that it recognized no statute of limitations in its administrative disciplinary actions. The Commission had previously taken the same position in a minute order in Thomson &
McKinnon, 192 and subsequently reasserted this view in Black & Company,
Inc. 19 This view allows the Commission to litigate from time to time
particularly stale or aged charges. For example, in the Kivitz case, 194 the
charges were four years and eight months stale when the order for pro187. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Seealso United States v. Covington, 395
U.S. 57 (1969); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S.
85 (1968); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
188. See, e.g., § 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
189. See, e.g., Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
191. 43 S.E.C. 815 (1968).
192. 35 S.E.C. 451 (1952).
193. SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-3460 (July 12, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,921 (opinion of SEC ALJ Markun which contains as Appendix B the
unpublished memorandum opinion in Thomson & McKinnon).
194. 44 S.E.C. 600 (1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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ceedings was entered. The alleged violative activity occurred in October,
1964, and the Commission did not commence the rule 2(e) disciplinary
proceedings until June 12, 1969. Similarly, in D.H.Blair & Co. , 19 many
of the charges were several years stale at the time the Commission instituted disciplinary proceedings.
A persuasive argument, however, can be made that the five-year statute
of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976), 196 or a comparable laches rationale should be applied to SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings. Although an SEC administrative law judge rejected this argument in Black &
Company, Inc.,197 the case was never appealed to the courts.
If crucial witnesses have died or otherwise become unavailable over a
lengthy period of time during which the Commission and its staff have
unjustifiably delayed institution of disciplinary proceedings, a compelling
case for application of the time bar of laches might arise.' 98 At least one
federal appellate court has suggested that, in the appropriate circumstances, the equitable doctrine of laches could operate to time bar an SEC
administrative disciplinary proceeding.' 99
F

The Quality of the Evidence

Rule 14(a) of the SEC Rules of Practice relating to "Evidence" states, in
part, that the "hearing officer shall receive relevant and material evidence,
rule upon offers of proof and exclude all irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious evidence." 2" Nothing in the rule requires evidence to be
"competent." Indeed, the Commission has traditionally held that it is appropriate in an administrative proceeding to admit any
evidence having some logical relevance even if it has only limited
or slight probative value, and even though it might be inadmissible before a jury because too remote or conjectural to be properly
evaluated by lay triers of fact . .. and it has been judicially
195. 44 S.E.C. 320 (1970).

196. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976) provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for
the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when
the claim first accrued.
See H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of Treasury, 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965).
197. SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-3460 (June 12, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) T 79,921 (initial opinion of SEC ALJ).
198. Cf.United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965) (indictment for criminal violation of 1933 Act dismissed where prosecution's delay amounted to negligence and
defendants were prejudiced by loss of prospective witnesses).
199. See Russell Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1979).
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stressed that a hearing examiner should normally admit all evidence that "can conceivably throw any light upon the contro-

versy.,,2o01

Since evidentiary rules in an SEC administrative proceeding are not as
strict as those in comparable or parallel civil and criminal proceedings in
federal district court, defense counsel must be alert to protect against the
SEC's use of unreliable evidence.
In reversing a rule 2(e) disciplinary sanction imposed by the SEC
against an attorney, the District of Columbia Circuit commented in Kivitz
202

V. SEC:

[I]t is abundantly clear that such evidence as to Kivitz was hearsay which went far beyond merely permissible circumstantial application . . . . [W]e find Kivitz saddled by adverse evidence
which never should have been received against him. His alleged
complicity was being established from the very testimony, the admissibility of which we reject for it had never been connected up
to him. The Supreme Court has pointed out that "men [are not]
to be convicted on unsworn testimony of witnesses - a practice
which runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal
system is founded. 20 3
In reversing a sanction imposed by the SEC in a broker-dealer administrative proceeding in Klopp v. SEC, 2 4 the Sixth Circuit pointed out:
Generally, where it is correct to do so, the courts yield to the
expertise of the members of administrative agencies. However,
where the plain issue is whether Klopp or his accusers told the
truth, we recognize no special expertise in the Commission ....
The Commission has the right also to draw inferences which we
must accept, iflegitimate. Under Section 25(a) of the Act of 1934
. . . it is provided that "the finding of the Commission as to the
facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
" Obeying that rule, we cannot conscientiously find that
.
the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence
when the entire record is reviewed.20 5
G. Character Witnesses
The Klopp and Kivitz cases underscore the importance in SEC adminis201.
202.
203.
204.
S.E.C.
205.

Clinton Engines Corp., 41 S.E.C. 408, 411-12 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'g Murray A. Kivitz, 44 S.E.C. 600 (1971).
Id at 960.
427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), reu'g Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis (Klopp), 43
1042 (1969).
Id at 460-61 (emphasis in original).
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trative disciplinary proceedings of character witness testimony, which the
appellate courts found crucial in both cases.2 °6 Since the Commission
must tailor its sanction to comply with public interest criteria, character
witness testimony can constitute a crucial underpinning of a respondent's
trial strategy. In this respect, trial of the administrative proceeding resembles criminal litigation much more than routine civil litigation.2" 7
H. Use of Investigative Transcrpts
In preparing to litigate an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding, it
is often difficult to discover prior to trial the nature of the bulk of the
evidence the staff will rely upon at trial. However, defense counsel can
usually assume that the staff will rely, at least in part, upon extensive investigative transcripts of testimony gathered from witnesses, and perhaps
respondents, in the staff's private, exparle investigation that typically precedes institution of the administrative proceeding.2" 8
Admissions contained in these investigative transcripts may be introduced against a respondent.20 9 The administrative law judge may admit
206. In Kivitz, the court noted:

[Slome seven character witnesses attested to the excellent professional reputation of
Kivitz. During his eighteen years at the bar there had never been a complaint
about his conduct in any respect. Some might say that the good moral character of
an attorney has no special bearing on his life pattern until it becomes a point at
issue, but it then may become controlling ...
[Clourts have long been cognizant
of the significance in human experience of good moral character. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said that under some circumstances "a man's reputation may
be sufficient, by itself, to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt." We think the Sixth
Circuit put it just about right in Klopp v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
427 F.2d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1970). There the court noted that an exemplary life
"will stand a man in good stead when he is accused of shabby or criminal conduct
which he denies, and when he is cast in a contest against accusers whose own lives
present nothing special to support assertions of integrity. Character witnesses affirmed Klopp's good life and reputation until he fell afoul of the SEC." So here.
475 F.2d at 960-61 (footnotes omitted).
207. Character witness testimony, for example, was an important part of the defense
strategy in other cases such as Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Beck v. SEC, 413 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1969), after remand, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970); and
AmSwiss Int'l Corp. (Glenn Woo), SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-4733 (Sept. 8, 1976), [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,721 (initial opinion of SEC ALJ), affd sub
nom. Glenn Woo, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 13,011 (1976), aff'd, 590 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 50 (1979).
208. See Mathews, supra note 179, at 589-90.
209. See, e.g., International Research & Mgt. Corp., SEC Advisors Act Release No. 617
(Mar. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,547. Nevertheless, an
admission by a corporate agent in an SEC investigative deposition will not be admissible
against the corporation in subsequent litigation if the corporation's counsel was not present
at the investigative deposition of the agent. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39,
43 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976).
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into evidence as part of the staffs direct case complete investigative transcripts of witnesses, subject only to the respondent's right to call the witness later for pertinent cross-examination.2 "' Often, investigative
transcripts will be used for impeachment or other cross-examination purposes when the respondent takes the stand. Sometimes, when a witness's
recollection is exhausted, the commission will receive into evidence prior
investigative transcripts containing that witness's testimony. 2 1, Indeed,
pursuant to the De Sisto rationale,2 12 admissions in investigative transcripts may be received as affirmative evidence even though a respondent
or witness testifies to the contrary at trial.2 13
VII.

DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY:

DUTY TO SUPERVISE,

CONTROLLING PERSONS PROVISIONS, AND THE RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE

In administrative disciplinary proceedings, the Commission often attempts to hold broker-dealers and their principals liable for statutory violations of their subordinate employees under one or more of the following
legal theories: failure to exercise reasonable supervision;2 14 the controlling
persons provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts;2" 5 and the common law doctrine of respondeatsuperior.2 6 These three theories of derivative responsibility provide a vehicle for the Commission to hold one person responsible
for the violations of other persons under circumstances in which the Commission is not able to establish secondary liability pursuant to otherwise
210. See SEC v. Vesco, 358 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (transcripts may be
introduced in connection with SEC motion for preliminary injunction). See also Strathmore
Sec., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 575 (1967), aft'd, 407 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (use by the SEC of
respondents own books and records).
211. See, e.g., Robert A. Podesta, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,209 (Sept. 18, 1979).
212. United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
213. See, e.g., Allesandrini & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,466 (Oct. 31, 1973).
214. See § 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976). See also Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 43 S.E.C. 1042 (1969); Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811
(1965); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
215. See § 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78t(a) (1976). See also Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
216. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359
(6th Cir. 1970), arf'g Armstrong, Jones & Co., 43 S.E.C. 888 (1968); Black & Co., Inc. (R.W.
Pressprich & Co.), SEC Ad, Pro. File No. 3-3460 (July 12, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,921 (initial opinion of SEC ALJ).
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applicable conspiracy 2 17 or aiding and abetting 2 18 principles.2 1 9
The "duty to supervise" theory stems primarily from section 15(b)(4)(E)
of the 1934 Act,2 20 which permits sanctions where a broker-dealer "has
failed to reasonably supervise" a subordinate employee who commits
a violation. 22 ' The "controlling persons" theory is also statutorily
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The criminal conspiracy doctrine applies as well to civil
and administrative securities cases. See, e.g., SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F.
Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1970), af'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971); Petit v. American Stock
Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); H.L. Greene Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Since the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, 78 Stat. 565
(1964), pertinent subsections of § 15(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976), specifically
contain "aiding and abetting" language. Moreover, the criminal aiding and abetting doctrine applies as well to civil and administrative securities cases.

See RESTATEMENT OF

TORTS § 876 (1939). See generaly SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1034, 1316 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1974); Stead v. SEC, 444 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir), cert. denied,404 U.S.
1059 (1971); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1970),
af'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F.
Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), af'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1969);
SEC v. J.P. Howell & Co., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1962), af'd, 330 F.2d 958 (3d Cir.
1964); SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Sutro Bros. & Co., 41
S.E.C. 443 (1963); Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461 (1946). See also Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), modified, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,525 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 642 (1978); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir.
1977); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 85, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1973).
219. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972). See generally Ruder, Aiding andAbetting, 7 REV. SEC. REG. 882 (1974). See also
Markham & Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act - Respondeat
Superior,Aiding andAbetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27 EMORY L.J. 1115 (1978).
220. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act states in pertinent part:
(4) The Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or
revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds [such sanction] is in the
public interest and that such broker or dealer ....
(E) . . . has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations
another
.
person who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject
to his supervision. For the purposes of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be
deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other person, if- (i) there have
been established procedures, and a system for applying such procedures, which
would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any
such violation by such other person, and (ii) such person has reasonably discharged
the duties and obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and system were
not being complied with.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976).
221. The statutory duty to supervise was first added to the 1934 Act as then § 15(b)(5)(E)
in the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, 78 Stat. 565 (1964). The provision became the
currently effective § 15(b)(4)(E) in the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, 89 Stat. 79 (1975).
Prior to 1964, the SEC had developed a case law "duty to supervise" principle through ad
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based. 2 2 Section 15 of the 1933 Act22 3 provides that anyone controlling a
person liable under section 11224 or 12225 shall also be liable "unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe
in the existence of the facts by reason of which liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist."'22 6 Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act 227 creates similar controlling person liability but contains a slightly different defense. It
provides that the controlling person will be liable "unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act
or acts constituting the violation ...

228

Respondeat superior, on the other hand, is a common law agency doctrine that triggers liablity without fault.22 9 It holds a principal strictly liable for the acts of an agent under certain enumerated conditions.2 3 °
Unlike the "duty to supervise," or the "controlling persons" provisions,
a good faith effort to comply with the law is not a defense to the imposition
of respondeat superior liability upon an otherwise innocent principal for
the statutory violations of an agent or employee. Because of this severe
liability-without-fault aspect of respondeat superior, an important issue
arises in litigation against broker-dealers: if a broker-dealer employer or
hoc administrative adjudication. See, e.g., Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 917 (1960); R.H.
Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), a'd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 31 S.E.C. 494 (1950).
222. See Gottesman, Brokers' Derivative Liability" Does Supervision Make A Difference?,
41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 181 (1974); Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1019 (1973); Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts." Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1345 (1978). See also Annot., 38 A.L.R. Fed. 725
(1978); Annot., 32 A.L.R. Fed. 714 (1977).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1976).
228. Id.
229. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See generall Annot., 32
A.L.R. Fed. 714 (1977).

230. Section 219 of RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY

(1958) sets forth the following

doctrine of respondeat superior:

(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
/
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a nondelegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.
See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY

§§ 261-262 (1958).
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principal can establish reasonable supervision and good faith, thereby
avoiding "failure to supervise" and "controlling person" liability, will
there nevertheless be respondeat superior liability as a result of statutory
violations committed by an agent or employee? The existing case law is
confused. The answer may depend upon both the court of appeals that
reviews the case and whether the cause of action is pursued in the context
of a private damage action, an SEC civil injunctive action, or an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
apply the strict liability principle of respondeatsuperior in private damage
actions involving broker-dealers."' In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for
the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that the controlling persons
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts preclude respondeatsuperior liability
in private damage actions.2 32 The law in the Second Circuit in this respect
is unsettled, 233 and the Courts of Appeals for the First, Tenth, and District
234
of Columbia Circuits have yet to develop this area.
Dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw,235 Justice Douglas, with the concurrence of Justice Blackmun, ap231. See, e.g., Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Carras v. Bums, 516
F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Lewis v.
Walston & Co., Inc. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F.
Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.
1970).
232. See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Gould
v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942, cert. dismissedafter settlement, 393 U.S.
801 (1968). In its amicus brief the SEC argued that the controlling persons provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts did not preclude respondeat superior liability in an employer-employee
situation. The SEC further argued that traditional agency principles placed liability upon
the principal if the agent possessed actual, apparent, or ostensible authority or otherwise
acted within its agency powers. Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae, Kamen & Co. v. Paul H.
Aschkar & Co., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
233. In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.19 (2d Cir. 1978), modified, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,525, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 642
(1978), the Second Circuit sidestepped "the rather thorny controlling person - respondeat
superior issue." But see Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
234. Some of the circuits have applied respondeatsuperior or other general agency principles in cases arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976). See,
e.g., Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Mgt. Co., 586 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1978).
However, commodities cases are neither persuasive nor conclusive precedent for securities
cases. Unlike the 1933 and 1934 Acts, § 2(a)(l) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §
4 (1976), contains an express respondeat superior liability provision. See Markham & Meltzer, supra note 219, at 1125.
235. 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973).
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peared to approve of the application of respondeat superior and similar
agency principles, as well as section 20(a) controlling persons principles, to
broker-dealers in private damage actions:
Rodman's liability for the acts of its partner, William Rothbart, are [sic] indisputable under § 20(a), as they are [sic] under
general principles of agency. But liability cannot be confined to
those formally authorized to act in the firm's behalf, for such a
rule would constrict the common-law principles of apparent authority, a construction inconsistent with the broad remedial purpose of the legislation. The purpose of the Act is to expand, not
restrict, the public's remedies.
. . . Rodman must be responsible for Jordan's acts even under
general agency principles - which do not require even that the
principal benefit from the apparent agent's fraud. Restatement
(Second) of Agency §§ 261-262. Agency principles have been applied to find liability on facts almost identical to those here
236

Nevertheless, by denying certiorari in the case, the Supreme Court has left
confused "the rather thorny controlling person - respondeat superior issue" in private damage actions against broker-dealers.2 37
Although inadequately rationalized in the applicable opinions, judicial
treatment of duty to supervise, controlling persons liability, and respondeat
superior in SEC civil injunctive actions has differed somewhat from such
consideration in private damage actions. For example, in SEC v. Lum's,
Inc. (Lehman Bros.) ,238 the district court refused to impose rule lOb-5 liability in an "inside" information case on the broker-dealer defendant on a
respondeat superior rationale in circumstances where the broker-dealer
was able to prove adequate supervision under section 15(b)(5)(E) of the
1934 Act and therefore good faith.z39
In Lum's, the SEC contended that in its civil injunctive actions seeking
remedial, prophylactic relief, respondeatsuperior liability was appropriate
and neither proof of adequate supervision under section 15(b)(5)(E) nor
good faith under the controlling persons provisions of section 20(a) of the
1934 Act should preclude holding the broker-dealer (employer-principal)
liable for the violative acts of its employee-agent. The court held, however, that imposition of liability without fault against broker-dealers was
236. 414 U.S. at 929-30 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
237. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48 n.19 (2d Cir.), modified,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,525, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 642 (1978).
238. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
239. Id at 1064-65.
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not appropriate. 240 Judge Tyler commented:
To hold Lehman liable on a theory of respondeat superior
would . . . do violence to the legislative intent underlying the
[1934] Act. . . . Insistence upon a standard of respondeatsuperior would result in the imposition of absolute liability upon broker-dealers in this context. Even in [SEC] enforcement
proceedings I believe there should be at least negligent conduct
required before the imposition of liability.24 The jurisdiction of the
SEC under § 10(b) is not without limits. '
Thus, Lum's appears to support the following propositions: respondeat
superior will not be applied against broker-dealers in SEC injunctive enforcement proceedings; the controlling persons provisions of section 15 of
the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act will be applied, but "good
faith" will be a defense; and lack of knowledge of or participation in the
employee's violation and proof of adequate supervision under current section 15(b)(4)(E) will constitute the type of proof of "good faith" that will
242
preclude liability for violative conduct of employees and agents.
Some commentators contend that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc. ,243 implic240. Id at 1062. It is interesting to note that broker-dealers fare better in this respect
than corporate issuers. Thus, Judge Tyler did hold the principal defendant, Lum's Inc., a
corporate issuer, liable for the acts of certain of its agents, officers, and employees, on traditional agency principles:
In general, courts have held a corporation-issuer liable on agency principles for
what can be deemed the corporate acts of its principal agents without much discussion, and it seems to me that this is the appropriate analysis - if only because it is
difficult to conceive of a corporation acting in any other way than by its managing
officers and directors. On this basis I conclude that Lum's is ... liable for the
violations of § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5.
Id at 1061.
241. Id at 1063-64. Judge Tyler further commented:
The primary duty owed by a broker-dealer to the public is to supervise its employees in an adequate and reasonable fashion ....
But to recognize more stringent standards for the exercise of control by a broker-dealer over its salesmen does
not require the imposition of absolute liability upon the former for every violation
of the latter. In fact, it would seem that the regulatory goals of the Commission
could at least be substantially achieved by the enforcement of this duty, rather than
by the attempt to read a nonexistent insurer's liability into the statute for brokerdealers. Every violation of Rule lOb-5 by a salesman does not necessarily imply a
breach of the employer's duty to supervise.
Id at 1064.
242. Cf SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1975) (employer not secondarily liable on theory of respondeat
superior when not charged with knowledge or when employees were not acting within scope
of employment).
243.

515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
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itly rejected the Lum's rationale that section 20(a) precludes relief against
broker-dealers under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior in SEC civil injunctive actions. 2 " This view is probably incorrect. In Management Dynamics, the court did hold a broker-dealer firm (A.J. Carno, Inc.) liable for
the violations of its vice-president in charge of trading (Nadino) under
general agency principles. The court held that the controlling persons provision of section 20(a) expanded rather than restricted the scope of liability
under the 1934 Act and that it was not intended to be the "sole measure"
of employer liability. 245 However, the court did not address the Lum's
opinion. Additionally, while applying general agency principles, the court
superior
did not purport to adopt necessarily a concept of strict respondeat
2 46
proceedings.
enforcement
SEC
in
broker-dealers
for
liability
Actually, Lum's and Management Dynamics can be reconciled. In
Lum's, the corporate issuer was held liable for the acts of its chief executive officer (Chasen) since corporations can only act through their managing officers and directors. There was no suggestion in Lumr's, however,
that the corporation would have been held liable on a respondeatsuperior
rationale for the acts of every corporate employee. In Management Dynamics, A.J. Carno, Inc., the broker-dealer firm, was also a corporation,
and Nadino was a high level executive officer. Holding the broker-dealer
corporation liable on an agency theory for the corporate acts of its highlevel executives is a far cry from holding the broker-dealer liable on a
244. See, e.g., Markman & Meltzer, supra note 219, at 1124.
245. 515 F.2d at 812. The court noted, however, that "liability in the employment con-

text is a vastly different situation from the liability of individual outside directors, which is
properly measured only under the 'controlling person' provision. See Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc)." Id at 813 n.8.
246.

The court commented:

We need not decide today whether the entire corpus of agency law is to be imported into the securities acts for all purposes. We hold only that, in the circumstances of this case, the SEC in this enforcement action was entitled to an

injunction against Carno because of Nadino's trading activity. As vice president in
charge of trading, Nadino occupied a prominent position within the company. By
virtue of his position he was able for months to submit fictitious quotations on MD
stock in the firm's name in the pink sheets. The misleading appearance of activity
in MD stock thereby created was in significant measure a consequence of the employment relationship, which not only afforded Nadino the opportunity to submit
the misleading quotations, but identified the firm as their source. The apparent
authority exercised by Nadino makes it appropriate to enjoin Carno from violation
of the anti-fraud provisions. We stressagain, however, that we intimate no view as to
other cases which may involve lesser employees, actions for damages, other agency
principles, or respondeat superior, which may be broader than the apparentauthority
involved here. Such cases may involve entirely different policy considerations that

are best consigned to future resolution.
Id at 813 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied).
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respondeat superior basis for the acts of all its employees including all of its
salesmen.
A subsequent Second Circuit decision, SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc. ,247
demonstrates that the Lum's rationale was not abrogated by Management
Dynamics. In Geon, the court refused to enter an SEC-requested injunction against a broker-dealer (Edwards & Hanly) on a respondeat superior
theory for violations by one of the firm's employees (Rauch) who was a
registered representative in a branch office. The Geon court acknowledged
that the Lum's decision was wrong to the extent that it implied a brokerdealer could be liable for its employee's acts only as a controlling person
under section 20(a). 248 This is so because a broker-dealer can also be liable for failing to supervise, and failing to supervise is not necessarily a lack
of good faith triggering section 20(a) controlling person liability.2 49 However, in Geon, the court specifically found that Edwards & Hanly had adequately supervised its employees, and refused to apply the liabilitywithout-fault respondeat superior rule advocated by the SEC.25 °
While denying injunctive relief on a respondeat superior basis in the civil
injunctive action, the court in Geon did acknowledge, without purporting
to either adopt or reject the rule of some circuits that respondeat superior
liability will be imposed against broker-dealers in private actions for recision or damages. 251' The Geon court also noted, without accepting or rejecting, the SEC practice in its administrative disciplinary proceedings of
disciplining broker-dealers for the willful acts of employees on a respon247. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
248. Id at 54.
249. Id See also SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811-13 (2d Cir.
1975).
250. 531 F.2d at 54. The court commented:

Management Dynamics, according to the Commission, points in the direction of
imposing liability on E & H on the basis of the principle of respondent superior

even though E & H did not fail reasonably to supervise. That argument, however,
is based on a significant extension of Management Dynamics, an extension which,
at least in this context, we decline to make. . . . To say that an injunction must
issue against a brokerage firm whenever one could have been issued against a registered representative significantly overreads Management Dynamics. As the carefully qualified approach of the case makes clear, the fact that use of common law

agency concepts may be appropriate in some circumstances does not mean that we
should import them where this will not further the policies of the securities acts.

Id
251. The court stated:
It is true that courts have used agency principles to impose liability for recision
or damages on brokerage firms, in suits brought by persons in privity, in circumstances similar to those here present. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623-24
(5th Cir. 1973) (sale of unregistered stock, within scope of employment); Fey v.
Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051-53 (7th Cir. 1974) (churning). See also Johns
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deal superior rationale, even in the absence of a finding of inadequate supervision.2 52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in SEC v.
First Securities Co. ,253 held a broker-dealer liable for the violations of its
president on four separate theories, three of them rooted in the 1934 Act.
The case had originated as an SEC civil injunctive enforcement action, but
the issue for decision involved a claim for money damages by a customer
after the firm had been placed into an equity receivership as a result of the
SEC injunctive action. z54
The court first applied the traditional agency principle that a principal is
liable for the acts of its agent committed with apparent authority.2 55 Relying upon Blackburn v. Witter,z5 6 the court then found that the personal
acts of the agent were nevertheless within the scope of his agency relationship on behalf of his employer. 257 This finding was, in essence, an application of respondeat superior. Second, relying upon Hawkins v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,2 58 the court found that the firm had controlling person liability under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act 2 59 for the violations committed by its president.2 60 Third, the court held the firm liable as
Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,416
U.S. 916 (1974) (fraudulent misrepresentations).

ld at 54-55.
252. Id at 55 n.21. There is an important evidentiary point in Geon that is useful to
defense counsel in "supervision" cases. The court held that implementation of stricter supervisory procedures at a later point in time cannot be used as evidence that prior procedures were deficient. Id at 52. See also Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975);
FED. R. EVID. 407.

253. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).

254. The president of First Securities had murdered his wife and committed suicide,
leaving a suicide note revealing that the firm was bankrupt because of his thefts that had
been concealed by spurious escrow accounts. Id at 983.
255. Id. at 985. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 261-262 (1958).
256. 201 Cal. App. 2d 518, 19 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1962).
257. 463 F.2d at 986.
258. 85 F. Supp. 104, 122-23 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
260. In refuting the good faith defense of § 20(a), the court pointed out:
"[T]o satisfy the requirement of good faith ... it is necessary for the [controlling
person] to show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent the injury
suffered," Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and "that
failure of the controlling person to maintain and diligently enforce a proper system
of internal supervision and control constitutes participation in the misconduct and
the violation will be deemed to have been committed not only by the controlled
person, but also by the controlling person who did not perform the duty to prevent
it." Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on othergrounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
463 F.2d at 987.
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an aider and abettor of its president's violations. 261 Fourth, the court held
the firm liable for failing to comply with rule 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.,2 62 relating to
263
supervisory procedures and recordkeeping.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in SEC v.
Coffey, 264 albeit a case not involving a broker-dealer defendant, has taken
a rather extreme position respecting the controlling persons provision of
section 20(a). In Coffey, the court was faced with the question of whether
the chief executive officer (King) of an issuer-corporation (King Resources) was liable for the violations of a financial vice-president (Coffey).
Without addressing respondeat superior specifically or agency principles
generally, the Coffey court held squarely that "section 20(a) of the 1934
Act may not be relied upon by the SEC in an injunctive enforcement action., 265 The court reached this outright proscription by analyzing the
provisions of both section 20(a) and section 20(b) of the 1934 Act 266 and
determining that the SEC was not a "person" within the meaning of section 20(a). 267 The SEC, therefore, could 8only proceed on a controlling
26
persons theory pursuant to section 20(b).
The Coffey court did not address whether the corporate entity itself, as
opposed to its chief executive officer, could have been liable on a respon26 I.
Id Among other cases, the court relied upon Buttery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969),and Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
262. 463 F.2d at 988.
263. See, e.g., Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally
Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member. Liabilityfor Violations of Stock Exchange

Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120 (1970). See also authorities cited in Markham & Meltzer,
supra note 219, at 1156-57 n.214.
264. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
265. Id at 1318.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), (b) (1976).
267. The court stated:
Section 20(b) of the 1934 Act provides for the unlawful actions of controlling persons, and the SEC may only seek injunctions against unlawful actions. . . .Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act makes a controlling person liable "to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable." As a matter of legislative interpretation,
we hold that the SEC is not a person under section 20(a), since section 20(a) was
meant to specify the liability of controlling persons to private persons suing to vindicate their interests. Section 20(b) sets forth the standard of lawfulness to which a
controlling person must conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to the SEC or
criminal prosecution.
493 F.2d at 1318.
268. Id The court noted that:
Under section 20(b), there must be shown to have been knowing use of a controlled
person by a controlling person before a controlling person comes within its ambit.
Without such a restriction, every link in a chain of command would be personally
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deal superior rationale. It did note in a passing footnote, however, that
secondary liability is sometimes "imposed upon corporations whose agents
commit
violations, under the traditional concept of respondeat supe''26 9
riOr.

In SEC v. Savoy Industries,27 ° a case not involving a broker-dealer defendant,2 7 ' the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the inconsistencies in the Lum's, Management
Dynamics, and Coffey cases.27 2 Although the court appeared to be willing
to recognize section 20(a) controlling persons liability in a SEC injunctive
action, it could not properly address the issue due to insufficient development of the record by the lower court.2 73
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
or Tenth Circuits have not dealt squarely with the application of respondeal superior or controlling persons liability of broker-dealer firms in SEC
274
civil injunctive actions.
However, application of these theories of secondary or derivative liability in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings against broker-dealer
275
firms has been long promoted by the SEC and accepted by some courts.
The Commission has consistently held that good faith or reasonable supervision is not necessarily a defense in a broker-dealer administrative disciplinary proceeding and that a broker-dealer does have both controlling
criminally and civilly liable for the violations of inferior corporate agents. This
was not the congressional intent in enacting section 20(b).
Id
269. Id at 1316 n.27. In support, however, the court cited a private damage action, Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), af'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
270. 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
271. The Savoy case concerned the liability of an individual (Zimmerman) and did not
involve asserted respondeat superior liability of a broker-dealer firm or a corporate issuer.
See 587 F.2d at 1161-62.
272. Id at 1169-70.
273. Id at 1170.
274. At least one additional district court has applied respondeat superior liability to a
broker-dealer in an SEC injunctive action. See SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assocs., 386 F.
Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); cf. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance
Corp., 458 F. Supp. I110 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aftd, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,916 (2d Cir. June 27, 1979); Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 885 (D. Conn. 1976) (application of respondeat superior in private damage action).
See also SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1975).
275. See, e.g., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 958 (1970); Black & Co., Inc. (R.W. Pressprich & Co.), SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 33460 (July 12, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,921 (opinion
of SEC ALJ).
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person and respondeatsuperior liability.27 6
Illustrative of the SEC's position is Black & Co., Inc.,277 in which the
administrative law judge expressly rejected the respondent's contentions
that respondeatsuperior and controlling persons liability were inapplicable
to administrative disciplinary proceedings. 278 R.W. Pressprich & Co., the
broker-dealer respondent in Black & Co., did not appeal the administrative law judge's initial decision to the Commission or to the court of appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
not had the opportunity to pass upon the respondeat superior issue in the
context of an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted the issue in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc. ,279 it disposed of the case on
other grounds. Indeed, the only court of appeals to decide the issue
squarely was the Sixth Circuit in Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC.28 °
There, the court expressly upheld the SEC's right to sanction a brokerdealer in administrative disciplinary proceedings for the willful violation
of the securities laws by its agents based upon the doctrine of respondeat
28
superior. 1
It is clear that if a broker-dealer breaches its duty to supervise under
section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act, the firm may incur liability for the
violative acts of its agents and employees in three separate forums: an
SEC administrative disciplinary action; 28 2 an SEC civil injunctive action;z 83 and a private damage action. 284 It is unclear, however, except perhaps in the Sixth Circuit, whether a broker-dealer that can prove adequate
supervision under section 15(b)(4)(E) and good faith under section 20(a)
will be liable without fault under the agency law principle of respondeat
276. See, e.g., SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Tenn.
1973); Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 470, 479 (1963); Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911
(1961); H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 837 (1948).
277. SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-3460 (July 12, 1974), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,921 (opinion of SEC ALI).
278. Id. at 84,382-83.
279. 531 F.2d 39, 55 n.21 (2d Cir. 1976).
280. 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 958 (1970).
281/ Id at 361-62.
282. See, e.g., Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1978); Richard L. Feldman, SEC
1934 Act Release No. 10,530 (Nov. 29, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,626.
283. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus. Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Lum's (Lehman Bros.), 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
284. See, e.g., Delporte v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 548 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977);
Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1978).
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superior for its employees' violations in an SEC administrative disciplinary action.
In an appropriate case, however, defense counsel should be able to convince the courts to reject the application of respondeatsuperior liability liability without fault - in SEC administrative disciplinary actions. In
any event, defense counsel should be aware of the ramifications
of "the
285
rather thorny controlling person - respondeat superior issue."
VIII.

SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Prior to 1975, the 1934 Act did not expressly authorize a broad range of
flexible sanctions in an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding. Either a registrant or a person associated with a registrant could be censured,
suspended for a period not exceeding one year, or barred.2 86 The 1934
Act, as amended in 1975, now specifically authorizes the Commission to
place limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of a brokerdealer or any person associated or seeking to become associated with a
285. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 48 n.19 (2d Cir. 1978),
modified, 11978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,525, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
642 (1978).
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1970).
During the 1960's, the enforcement staff began to deal with disciplinary cases in
which censure was deemed too lenient, and across-the-board suspension of registration or suspension from association with a broker-dealer was deemed too severe.
For example, a three-month suspension of broker-dealer registration based upon
activities of an officer or manager would injure directly the remaining innocent
employees of the registrant. Furthermore, when the prohibited activities occurred
in only one branch office, a sanction curtailing activities in every office of a national broker-dealer firm would constitute overkill. Consequently, despite the absence of express statutory authorization, in consent settlements in the last fifteen
years, the enforcement staff has designed various tailormade sanctions in an effort
to fit the sanction to the particular violation. By designing innovative and individualized sanctions, the enforcement staff enabled the Commission to dispose of the
bulk of its disciplinary actions in consent settlements, rather than pursuing fullscale litigation.
Mathews, .4.L.L ProposedFederalSecurities Code. PartXV- Administration andEnforcement, 30 VAND. L. REV. 465, 497 (1977)(footnote omitted).
Thus, in consent settlements, often only certain portions of firm's business activities were suspended. Revised supervisory and operating procedures were required.
Limitations were imposed with respect to the types of business activities in which
an individual could engage. Profits earned on certain activities were donated to
charities. Restitution to injured investors was accomplished.
Id at 497 n. 192. See also Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. 121 (1974); Sporkin, Statements in Quotes. .4Regulator Responds, in
THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1979, at 100-04 (Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Accounting Lecture, at Bernard M. Baruch College (December 18, 1978)).
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87

broker-dealer.1
In the overwhelming majority of SEC enforcement actions, a consent
settlement is the most effective disposition for the clients involved. 88 This
is particularly true when the enforcement action is an administrative disciplinary proceeding in which the staff possesses maximum flexibility in tailoring an appropriate sanction to fit the peculiarities of a particular case.2 89
Since an injunction may trigger a host of direct and indirect statutory
disqualifications, 290 defense counsel may find it advantageous to negotiate
a consent settlement in an administrative disciplinary proceeding rather
than risk litigation of a civil injunctive action .2z9 Although the securities
statutes do not provide for ancillary relief in administrative disciplinary
proceedings, by offering restitution, disgorgement of profits, or other types
of repayment or reimbursement, a respondent may be able to achieve settlement with a less severe sanction than otherwise would be negotiable.2 92
287. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976).
288. See Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations."Laying the Foundationfor
Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and CriminalProceedings,24 EMORY L.J. 567 (1975).
In representing witnesses in SEC investigations, and particularly in attempting
to bring an investigation to a timely conclusion by negotiating a consent settlement
in some type of formal enforcement action to be instituted, counsel must be cautious to maintain that important sense of credibility with the SEC and its Staff.
Vigorous, alert representation of a client in the investigatory stage, including preparation of a forceful Wells Committee Submission, coupled with astute negotiations in an atmosphere of complete credibility, should, in the view of the writer,
lead to a satisfactory settlement of the overwhelming majority of a securities attorney's enforcement cases, rather than pursuit of lengthy, expensive, arduous and
usually harmful litigation.

Id at 634. See also A.

MATHEWS, NEGOTIATING

SEC

CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS AND

(1979).
289. For a helpful article in this regard, see Thomforde, supra note 10.
290. See Mathews, Liability of Lawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW.
105, 142-46 (1975).
291. See, e.g., Hycel, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,981 (July 20, 1978), [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,676; Government Employees Ins. Co., SEC
1934 Act Release No. 12,930 (Oct. 27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,750; Ampex Corp., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,736 (Aug. 25, 1976), [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,699; Jo M. Ferguson, SEC 1933 Act Release
No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974); Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 157
(July 8, 1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,179; Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,175.
292. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 12,930 (Oct.
27, 1976), [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,750; Financial Programs,
Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11,312 (Mar. 24, 1975), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,146; Kippen & Co., Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,935 (July 30,
1974); Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 9894 (Dec. 11, 1972), [1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,135.
TACTICS FOR SETTLING CIVIL INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS
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Often a consent settlement proposal more likely will be accepted if the
respondent agrees to adopt new internal procedures designed to help prevent a recurrence of the violations charges.29 3 With regard particularly to
consent settlements of rule 2(e) proceedings against accounting firms, the
SEC has recently required "peer review" provisions whereby the
respondent firm's procedures are inspected, reviewed, and commented
upon by designated professionals outside the firm.2 94
One further aspect of consent settlements concerns whether the legal
principles articulated by the Commission and its enforcement staff will
serve as stare decisis or persuasive precedent in future actions, notwithstanding that such principles did not evolve in a traditional adversary proceeding. When complex legal issues have been fully litigated in SEC
administrative enforcement proceedings, courts will sometimes defer to the
SEC's administrative expertise and adopt the legal principles the SEC
deems appropriate.2 95 Consent settlements fare about as well as fully liti293. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC 1934 Act Release Nos. 15,537, 15,538 (Jan. 30,
1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,938; Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 10,565 (Dec. 19, 1973); Faberge, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release
No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973), 11973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,378; Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
294. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 248 (May 31, 1978), 6
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,270; Haskins & Sells, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 241
(Feb. 10, 1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,263; Seidman & Seidman, SEC Accounting
Series Release Nos. 196 (Sept. 1, 1976), 196A (Nov. 18, 1976), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,218-218A. See generally Burton, supra note 4.
295. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977). The Court
in Collins stated:
A reviewing court is also to be guided by the "venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong .. " RedLion BroadcastingCo.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). "[Clontemporaneous construction is entitled to
great weight. . . even though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than
in litigation." FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959). The Commission's
• ..determination . . . rested "squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the
product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). In rejecting the
conclusion of the Commission, the Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment
for that of the agency charged by Congress with that responsibility.
Id at 54-57.
But see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). In Sloan, the Court stated:
Nor does the existence of a prior administrative practice, even a well-explained
one, relieve us of our responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent
with the agency's statutory authority .... "[Tihe courts are the final authorities
on issues of statutory construction" ... and "are not obligated to stand aside and
rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsis-
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gated matters; sometimes the courts rely upon them as precedent, 296 and
sometimes they do not.297
IX.

RES JUDIC4T4 AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL CONSIDERATIONS

The collateral estoppel effect of SEC civil injunctive judgments was recently decided in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore.2 98 In Shore, the Court
overruled the contrary court of appeals precedent of Rachal v. Hil

99

and

held that a plaintiff in a private damage action may, in some circumstances, make "offensive" use of the findings of fact made by the court
against a defendant in a parallel SEC civil injunctive action through the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 3 ' The Court sanctioned such use of collateral estoppel in a private damage action where a defendant is ordinarily
entitled to a jury trial even though he is never entitled to a jury trial in an
SEC civil injunctive action. Thus, in some circumstances, a defendant in a
private damage action may be precluded from relitigating before a jury the
same issues that were decided against him in a parallel, nonjury SEC civil
injunctive action.3° '
tent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying
a statute." NRLB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). Volkswagenwerk v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 292 (1968). And this is just such a case - the
construction placed on the statute by the Commission, though of longstanding, is
... inconsistent with the statutory mandate .... And our clear duty in such a

situation is to reject the administrative interpretation of the statute.
Id at 118-19.
296. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court stated:
Steadman's attack on the precedential value of Provident [44 S.E.C. 442 (1970)] is
without merit. Although that opinion was issued in connection with an offer of
settlement, the Commission's construction of the securities laws in settled cases as
well as litigated ones is entitled to great weight.
Id at 1136 n.15.
297. See, eg, United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp. 993 (C.D. Cal. 1972), where the
court refused to rely upon the SEC opinion in connection with the administrative consent
decree in Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963), and stated:
This administrative decision cited by the Government resulted from a stipulation
by the broker that the Commission could make findings as permitted by law and
impose an appropriate penalty. . . . In essence, the cited S.E.C. decision is in the
nature of an uncontested opinion which did not result from adversary . . . advocacy of the applicable law. Absent more persuasive legal authority. . . this Court
is unable to permit a jury to convict a defendant of felony violations under 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
Id at 1008.
298. 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979).
299. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
300. 99 S.Ct. at 651-52.
301. For more complete discussions of the Court's opinion in Shore, see Kaminsky, CollateralEstoppel and Jury Trial Rights, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 945 (1979); Pickholz & Brodsky,
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On the other hand, consent injunctive decrees generally do not contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor are they required to. Consent
injunctions in SEC enforcement actions, therefore, would not have a res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect in a parallel private damage action.30 2
But consent orders in an SEC administrative proceeding may have collateral estoppel ramifications. Although there do not appear to be any
opinions elaborating upon the possible resjudicataand collateral estoppel
effects of SEC administrative disciplinary orders, 30 3 at least since United
States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. ,30 it has been generally recognized that federal courts may give collateral estoppel effect to administrative findings. Thus, the Supreme Court's Shore rule may also apply to
fully litigated SEC administrative proceedings.30 5
An open area concerns consent decrees in SEC administrative disciplinary actions. Unlike consent injunctive decrees without findings, in a settled administrative order the Commission must make a finding of "willful
violation" of the law, notwithstanding that the decree contains the boilerplate "without admitting or denying" language. In order to protect against
unforeseen collateral estoppel consequences arising from such required
finding, counsel in administrative settlements should condition their client's consent upon inclusion of express language in the settlement that30it6
shall not have resjudicata or collateral estoppel effect in other actions.
An Assessment of CollateralEstoppel and SEC Enforcement ProceedingsAfter ParklaneHo-

siery Co. v. Shore, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 37 (1978).
302. For a discussion of the criteria applicable to the question of whether a consent injunctive decree is admissible into evidence as an admission in a criminal prosecution, see
United States v. Cook, 557 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v.
United States, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978). For comparable considerations in a private damage
action, see Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976). But a
consent injunctive decree under the registration provisions of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1976), will not, pursuant to collateral estoppel, prevent the SEC from filing a subsequent injunctive action against the same defendant on the same facts alleging fraud violations. See SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 96,536 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1978).
303. In one reported case, the court without explanation, refused to grant collateral estop-

pel effect in a private damage action to a previous SEC administrative disciplinary consent
settlement (based upon stipulated facts). See Pitofsky v. Brucker, 291 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
304. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).

305. See Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 301, at 56-59.
306. See United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); James, Consent
Judgmentsas CollateralEstoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1959); Note, CollateralEstoppelby
Judgment, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 647 (1952); Note, The CollateralEstoppelEffect ofAdministrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 65 (1977). See also

Concrete Materials of Ga., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1971); Purvis v. Great Falls

Catholic University Law Review

X.

[Vol. 29:215

ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

The enforcement net of the SEC was expanded significantly when Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).3 ° 7 The
statute's title, however, is misleading. The FCPA's proscriptions and requirements apply to wholly domestic concerns as well as to multinational
business entities with foreign activities, and it regulates many business
practices that are not necessarily corrupt.3 ° 8
The FCPA has two principal aspects. First, section 103309 and section
104310 proscribe certain corrupt payments by issuers or domestic concerns
to or on behalf of foreign governmental or political officials. Second, section 102"' sets forth extensive book and recordkeeping, and internal accounting controls requirements for SEC-registered issuers. The FCPA
provides for enforcement of its provisions through criminal prosecution by
the Department of Justice and through civil injunctive action by the SEC
(with respect to issuers) and by the Department of Justice (with respect to
domestic concerns). However, the question has been raised whether the
SEC may enforce the FCPA, particularly the book and recordkeeping and
internal accounting controls provisions of section 13(b)(2),143 12 through liti3
3 13
administrative proceedings.
gation of section 15(c)(4)
To date, the SEC has not instituted any administrative enforcement proceedings in FCPA cases.3 15 However, in 1978 in the Hycel case, 3 16 involvBldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 266 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont. 1967); Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline

Corp., 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Kaminsky, supra note 301.
307. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
See H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (conference committee report). See
generally Best, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, II REV. SEC. REG. 975 (1978); Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus. LAW.

623 (1979); Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 242 (Feb. 16, 1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,264.
308. See A. LEVENSON, A. MATHEWS & H. PITT, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT OF 1977: Do You KNOW THIS ACT COVERS DOMESTIC BUSINESS ACTIVITIES? (1978);
Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, HARV. BUS. REV. 32 (Jan.-Feb. 1979).

309.
310.
311.
312.

15
15
15
15

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§§ 78dd-I, ff(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
§ 78dd-2 (Supp. 1 1977).
§78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977).
§ 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977).

313. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976).
314. See, e.g., Block & Barton, AdministrativeProceedingsto Enforce the Foreign Corrupt
Practices.4ct, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 40 (1979).

315. In one recent consent settlement in a rule 2(e) administrative disciplinary proceeding, however, the SEC disciplined a lawyer who, as general counsel to a public corporation,
engaged in "improper professional conduct" by participating in the corporation's payment
of secret, unrecorded political contributions to candidates for public office in the Bahamas.
See Mary Jane Melrose, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5388 (May i, 1978), [1978 Transfer

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

81,578.

316. Hycel, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,981 (July 20, 1978), [1978 Transfer
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ing undisclosed

corporate perquisites, in a section 15(c)(4) consent

settlement the Commission criticized an issuer's inadequate system of internal controls, caused the issuer to undertake to establish and maintain
adequate internal controls, and made reference to the internal controls
provisions of newly amended section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act.3 17
Moreover, both the former 3 18 and present 31 9 General Counsel of the
SEC have suggested that administrative disciplinary proceedings pursuant
to section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act could be utilized for enforcement of the
FCPA. In light of Hycel and the publicly expressed views of high-level
SEC staff members, one can reasonably expect that in future enforcement
cases against corporate issuers involving foreign or domestic questionable
payments, undisclosed corporate perquisites, or other financial activities
not properly recorded in the issuer's books and records, disposition by consent settlement in administrative section 15(c)(4) proceedings will be an
available option in appropriate circumstances. One can further expect that
in such settlements, in addition to correcting the issuer's deficient filings,
the enforcement staff will require ancillary relief by undertakings that will
Binder]

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

(CCH)

81,676.

317. The Commission stated:
Because of Hycel's past lack of an adequate procedure for authorizing, reviewing
and verifying the business purpose of expenses of Moran and others, it is appropriate that Hycel establish a procedure whereby such expenditures are authorized,
reviewed and verified by persons who are independent of the persons submitting
the requests for reimbursement . . . . The adoption of appropriate procedures is
particularly important in view of the recent enactment of Section 13(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act, which provides that all reporting companies must make and keep
books, records and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer, and devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that stated objectives, with respect to execution of transactions, recordation of transactions, and access to assets, are achieved.
Id at 80,730.
318. Former SEC General Counsel Harvey Pitt has stated:
Well, I think that the basic thing to bear in mind is that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been built into the Securities and Exchange Act, at least as it affects
publicly held issuers . . . . In this context the legislative history makes quite clear
. . . that the normal panoply of Commission enforcement remedies. . . even administrativeproceedings, were available.
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977 and the Regulation of Questionable Payments, supra
note 307, at 629 (emphasis supplied).
319. Present SEC General Counsel Ralph Ferrara speculated that § 15(c)(4) administrative proceedings, which seek to remedy particular violations of the book and recordkeeping
and internal accounting controls provisions of new § 13(b)(2), could become increasingly
important in the SEC's enforcement program. See 451 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-I
(May 3, 1978).
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ensure that independent audit committees establish and implement systems of internal accounting controls and book and recordkeeping sufficient
to achieve compliance with section 102 of the FCPA.3 2 ° As one commentator has noted, a principal focus of enforcement of the FCPA by the Commission may be corporate directors:
[B]ased on past enforcement investigations in which the SEC
has reviewed the performance of the board of directors, it is to be
expected that the directors of a company - especially those serving on the audit committee - will bear a share of the blame and
liability arising out of violations of the act by their company.
Having pushed so hard for the general establishment of audit
committees, the SEC will not be hesitant in seeing that they are
active in reviewing management's compliance with the recordkeeping, internal controls, and antibribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.321
XI.

EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED FEDERAL
SECURITIES CODE

Under the leadership of Professor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School,
the American Law Institute, with substantial assistance of the interested
committees and sections of the American Bar Association, spent over a
decade developing a proposed Federal Securities Code (Code).322 Negoti320. Codified as § 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977). See
generally SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,046 (D.D.C. May 1977) (consent injunction); Hycel, Inc., SEC 1934 Release No. 14,981
(July 20, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,676.
In 1978, then SEC General Counsel Harvey Pitt opined that § 13(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976), supplemented by the new requirements of § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977), by implication authorizes the SEC to adopt rules requiring public
companies to establish independent audit committees. See Memorandum of SEC General
Counsel (March 2, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,535. To
date, the SEC has proposed no such rule and it is unlikely that the Commission will do so.
However, the SEC has recently passed two rules under the FCPA, which together have been
labeled Regulation 13B-2. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13b2-1, -2 (1979). See generally Promotion
of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices; Final Rules, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
15,570 (Feb. 15, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959. The
Commission has also published for comment, but not yet promulgated, additional proposed
rules that would amend form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1979), Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-i to -12 (1979), and Regulation 5-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 (1979), to require a statement of management respecting compliance or noncompliance with the internal accounting
controls provisions of § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977). See Statement of
Management on Internal Accounting Control, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,772 (Apr. 30,
1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,063.
321. Baruch, supra note 308, at 50.
322. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as
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ations are presently being conducted with the SEC to determine whether
the Commission will support legislative enactment of the Code. It is,
would affect litigation
therefore, worthwhile to note briefly how the Code
323
of SEC administrative enforcement proceedings.
Sections 1808 through 1817 of the Code govern the adjudication of administrative proceedings by the Commission.3 24 Under the Code, the SEC
generally would be able to litigate the same types of administrative disciplinary proceedings now pursued under the 1934, Advisers, and 1940 Acts
against broker-dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, and
persons associated or seeking to become associated therewith. 325 Similarly, the SEC could pursue comparable administrative proceedings respecting defective registration statements as it presently pursues in 1933
Act "stop-order" proceedings,3 26 and respecting deficient annual, periodic,
or other reports as it presently pursues in 1934 Act section 15(c)(4) proceedings.327

The Code does not squarely address the issue of whether the SEC
should be allowed to continue to pursue administrative disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, accountants, and other independent professionals as it presently does pursuant to rule 2(e) of the SEC Rules of
See generally Lowenfels, The Case Against the ProposedFederalSecurities Code, 65 VA. L. REV. 615 (1979); ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
ALl ProposedFederalSecurities Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 345 (1978); Symposium, The American
Law Institute'sProposedFederalSecurities Code (pt.1), 30 VAND, L. REV. 311 (1977); Symposium, The American Law Institute's ProposedFederalSecurities Code (pt.2), 32 VAND. L.
REV. 455 (1979). See also Mathews, supra note 286.
323. The purposes of the PROPOSED CODE are threefold:
PROPOSED CODE].

(1) simplification of an inevitably complex body of law in the light of some four
-decades of administration and litigation; (2) elimination (so far as possible) of duplicate regulation; and (3) reexamination of the entire scheme of investor protection with a view to increasing its efficiency and doing so, in President Roosevelt's
words, "with the least possible interference to honest business."
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at XV (footnote omitted).
324. Id. at 663-82.
325. See id §§ 1809, 1815, at 667, 674; notes 28-43 and accompanying text supra. See

also Mathews, supra note 286, at 496-99, 507-08.
The PROPOSED CODE also provides for SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings
against (i) self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges, the N.A.S.D., and registered clearance agencies and their members or related persons, PROPOSED CODE, supra note
322, § 810, at 671-72; (ii) transfer agents, id § 1811, at 672-73; (iii) registered securities
information processors, id. § 1812, at 673; and (iv) mutual service companies, id. § 1816, at

675. See also Mathews, supra note 286, at 506-08.
326. See, e.g.,
companying text
327. See, e.g.,
companying text

PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1808(d), at 664; notes 23-24 and acsupra. See also Mathews, supra note 286, at 493-96.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1808(c), at 664; notes 31-36 and acsupra.
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Practice.3 28 The Code does not proscribe such proceedings, nor does it
expressly sanction them. The Code's silence in this regard, however, was
intentional. The drafters left to the federal courts the decision whether,
absent a specific legislative grant, the SEC possesses an inherent, implied
power to administratively discipline independent professionals, such as attorneys and accountants, who practice before it.329
Under the Code, the Commission would retain the right to require and
to publish reports of investigation or investigative statements comparable
to 1934 Act section 21(a) reports and statements.3 3 ° Section 1806(d)(3) of
the Code, however, contains a new provision designed to protect individual rights from unreviewable adverse governmental publicity:
If it is practicable to do so, a person who is or will be the subject
of adverse publicity as a result of Commission action [conducting
a public investigation or publicly disseminating a report of investigation or investigative statement] shall be given . . .(A) a reasonable opportunity to state his position on the record in the
investigation . . . , and (B) advance notice of the publication
. . .together with a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response
in advance of the publication.3 3 '
Professor Loss has commented that this new provision "is addressed to
the peculiar problem of the subject of an investigatory report who is without a judicial remedy or even a judicial defense. ' 332 This provision reflects
the sensitivity that historically the courtS, 333 and more recently the Admin328. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
329. In the accompanying notes, Professor Loss describes the controversy over rule 2(e)
and whether it should be legislatively condoned or proscribed:
This draft goes back to present law ... that is to say, it remains silent, neither
enlarging nor diminishing whatever implicit authority the Commission has....
All this reflects a good deal of tension among members of the securities Bar,
some of whom question the wisdom of giving disciplinary authority to a
prosecutory body and suggest that the SEC's traditional claim to have that authority has had a tendency on occasion to stifle vigorous representation of'clients ....
In view of the level of controversy, silence seems the least imperfect course.
§ 500(b), (d)(2) (1976).
330. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1806(c), (d), at 656-57; notes 50-57 and
accompanying text supra. See also Mathews, supra note 286, at 484-87.
331. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 657.
332. Id
333. See, e.g., SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D.D.C. 1948) (it is a well recognized principle of administrative law that investigations ought not to be so conducted that
harmful publicity will be used in lieu of sanctions provided by law); cf.Silver King Mines,
Inc. v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666 (D. Utah 1966) (injunction imposed against SEC for publicizing misleading press release respecting charges in pending civil injunctive action).
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 643-45. See also 5 U.S.C.
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istrative Conference 33 4 have demonstrated for the need to adequately protect persons from unfair injury by adverse agency publicity.
Under the Code, imposition of any administrative disciplinary sanction
must be "in the public interest or for the protection of investors., 335 Thus,
the Code abandons the troublesome and confusing term "willful," substituting the standards of "scienter" and "without reasonable justification or
excuse" in connection with imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions. 33 6 Although the term "scienter" is defined, 337 discerning what the
phrase "without reasonable justification or excuse" means under the Code
may be just as confusing as determining the meaning of "willful" under
existing law.3 38
The Code does not purport to deal with the burden of proof applicable
to administrative disciplinary proceedings. It neither adopts the traditional "preponderance of the evidence" standard, nor the "clear and convincing" standard of the Collins and Whitney cases. 339 Nor does it deal
with the "compelling reasons" or "burden of justification" test of the
Steadman case applicable to imposition of sanctions.34 °
The Code grants the SEC neither the authority to impose monetary fines
as an administrative sanction nor the authority in administrative disciplinary proceedings to order such ancillary relief as restitution, disgorgement,
or rescission. 34 '
Section 1809 of the Code3 4 2 closes to some degree a loophole in the pres-3
34
ent statutory framework embraced by section 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act.
334. See

ADVERSE PUBLICITY, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE'S RECOMMENDATION

73-

8, 1973); E. GELLHORN, ADVERSE PUBLICITY BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (April
15, 1973) (report prepared for Compliance and Enforcement Committee of the Administra1 (June

tive Conference of the United States); Gelihorn, supra note 30, at 1394-93.
335. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1804(b), at 645, which applies generally to
all Commission order-entering; notes 113-24 and accompanying text supra.

336. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1809, at 667-68; notes 101-12 and accompanying text supra.
337. "Scienter" is defined as follows:
A person makes (or. . .causes or gives substantial assistance to the making of) a
misrepresentation with "scienter" if he knows that he is making a misrepresentation (or a misrepresentation is being made) or acts in reckless disregard of whether
that is so.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 229.50, at 154-55.
338. Compare id § 299.34, at 144 with id § 287 note (5)(c), at 114-15. See also Mathews,
supra note 286, at 499.
339. See notes 69-78, 92-100 and accompanying text supra.
340. See notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.
341. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 500.
342. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 667-70.

343. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1976).
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Since the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act, the Commission has only
been able to administratively discipline "any person associated, or seeking
to become associated, with a broker or dealer." 344 From 1964 to 1975,
however, the Commission had a much broader power: it could administratively discipline "any person," even though the person was not a securities professional or in any way associated with a broker-dealer.3 45 "This
statutory framework enabled the Commission to speak out administratively in an adhoc adjudicatory context in important areas of the law, even
or associated persons were not inin instances in which broker-dealers
3 46
volved in the prohibited conduct.
The SEC's present more restrictive authority raises a question whether
the Commission may adjudicate disciplinary proceedings against a person
who was associated with a broker-dealer when violations occurred but who
terminated such association before administrative disciplinary proceedings
were begun and is not seeking to become associated again with any broker-dealer.3 47 Section 1809 succeeds in closing a substantial part of this
loophole by allowing the Commission to proceed administratively against
any person who was associated with a broker-dealer at the time of the conduct alleged to be in violation of the law. 348 However, the Code does not
close the loophole all the way: it does not grant the SEC its 1964-1975
power to adjudicate administrative disciplinary proceedings against a person who has violated the statute but who has never been associated with a
broker-dealer, investment adviser, or investment company.34 9 One way to
correct this would be to provide the SEC, either in the Code or in separate
legislation, with some flexible form of administrative "cease and desist" or
comparable power that would reach "any person" or at least a broader
class of persons than present section 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act or proposed
section 1809 of the Code.35 °
The Code's treatment of secondary liability, including the doctrines of
aiding and abetting, conspiracy, controlling persons provisions, respondeat
superior, and duty to supervise,3 5 is interesting and quite important. Even
though the Supreme Court has not yet specifically determined whether and
344. Id
345.

See § 15(b)(7) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C § 78o(b)(7) (1970).

346. Mathews, supra note 286, at 501; cf. Investors Mgt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971) (tippee
situations).
347.

See Mathews, supra note 286, at 501.

348.

PROPOSED CODE,

supra note 322, at 667.

349. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 502.
350. See notes 383-411 and accompanying text infra. See also Mathews, supra note 286,

at 502-03.
351. See notes 214-85 and accompanying text supra.
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to what extent the criminal law doctrines of aiding and abetting and conspiracy apply to civil and administrative enforcement of the federal securities laws,3 52 the Code contains broad aider and abettor provisions
applicable in both the civil and administrative contexts.353 The Code also
contains a "controlling persons" provision comparable to the existing
1933354 and 1934315 Acts provisions, but makes it applicable only to civil
damage actions and other private actions.356 SEC injunctive actions
357
would be governed under the Code by common law agency concepts,
disciplinary proceedings would be governed by the
and administrative
358
duty to supervise.
Under present law, section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act,3 59 if a
subordinate commits a statutory violation and if the broker-dealer firm or
its supervisory personnel have failed reasonably to supervise the
subordinate, either by reason of not establishing reasonably adequate supervisory procedures or not adequately implementing them, then both the
broker-dealer firm and the supervisory personnel may be administratively
disciplined for failure reasonably to supervise.36 °
The burden of proof of the underlying statutory violation, however, [is] on the SEC's Enforcement Division. Thus present and
prior provisions of the 1934 Act have not made a failure to supervise unlawful per se; rather the statute has provided that a supervisory person or registrant may be sanctioned administratively
only when the failure to supervise contributes to the commission
of a statutory violation by a subordinate.3 6 '
The Code has a more stringent "duty to supervise" provision. Section
1809(a)(5) makes the failure to supervise per se a ground for imposition of
a disciplinary sanction without the necessity of proof that a subordinate
committed a statutory violation. 362 Furthermore, whenever the enforcement staff establishes that a subordinate has committed a violation under
352. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court stated: "We
nor the
need not consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate ...
elements necessary to establish such a cause of action." Id at 192 n.7.
353. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 2006(c)(1), at 746-47; id § 1724(b), at 61314.

354. See § 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C § 77o (1976).
355. See § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
356. See

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

PROPOSED CODE,

supra note 322, § 1724, at 611-13.

See id § 1724 note 2(b), at 612-13.
See id § 1809(a)(5), at 668, See also id § 1724 note 2(b), at 613.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976).
See notes 220-21 and accompanying text supra.
Mathews, supra note 286, at 504 (footnotes omitted).

362. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 668. The term "failure to supervise" is defined

in id § 1809(d), at 669.
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the Code, contrary to existing law, the burden shifts and the supervisors
and the registrant have the burden of proving reasonable supervision.36 3
Nevertheless, the Code's harsher "duty to supervise" concept is offset by
its rejection of respondeatsuperior liability for brokerage firms in administrative disciplinary contexts when adequate supervision is proven.36 4 Pursuant to section 1809(c), 365 if the subordinate who commits a statutory
violation is an associate or employee "whose functions are solely clerical,
ministerial, or in areas not subject to regulation under this Code,, 3 66 then
the SEC can sanction only the individual
even if the firm has failed to
367
supervise reasonably the employee.

368
The procedural framework for all SEC administrative adjudications
is provided in section 1817 of the Code. 369 A discussion of the important
administrative law concepts covered by this provision and governing the
Commission's rule-making and order-entering functions is beyond the
scope of this article. One historically sensitive area, however, is appropriate for comment: whether SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings

should be adjudicated in a public as opposed to a private forum. 37 0 Most

of the securities statutes give the Commission discretion to adjudicate disciplinary proceedings either publicly or privately; 37 1 the recent trend has
been to opt for public proceedings. Many private practitioners argue that
all such proceedings should be private.37 2 In 1964, the American Bar Association formally recommended that all such proceedings be private unless the Commission determines, after a private hearing, that investor
protection requires a public proceeding.3 73 On the other hand, the writer,
concededly representing a minority view in the securities bar, has always
advocated that, like trials in the federal courts, all SEC administrative dis363. See id § 1809(b)(2), at 668. See also Mathews, supra note 286, at 505.
364. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 505.
365. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 668.
366. Id
367. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 505.
368. The PROPOSED CODE will not affect most of the practice and procedure issues discussed at notes 155-213 and accompanying text supra.
369. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 675-82. See also Mathews, supra note 286, at
508-18.
370. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 514-18. See also Gellhorn, supra note 30, at 1395
n.55.
371. See, e.g., § 22 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78v (1976); § 41 of the 1940 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-40 (1976); § 212 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-12 (1976).
372. See, e.g., Freeman, Adminstrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891, 896-97 (1967);

Freeman, A Private Practitioner's View of the Development of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 18, 24 (1959).
373. 89 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 135 (1964).
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374
ciplinary proceedings should be adjudicated in a public forum.
Section 1817(e) of the Code3 75 reserves to the SEC the discretion to determine when an administrative disciplinary proceeding should be public
and when a proceeding should be private, except that contrary to existing
law, section 1817(e)(1) provides that an adjudicatory proceeding "shall be
public when all the respondents so request."376
One of the more significant provisions of the Code, also beyond the
scope of this article, is section 181 8,3 7 concerning judicial review.3 7 8 Importantly, a person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission may obtain review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which
he resides or in the District of Columbia Circuit.3 79 In light of the Collins
and Whitney cases, 38° the District of Columbia Circuit is a particularly
appropriate forum in which to contest harsh SEC administrative disciplinary sanctions.
Legal literature both favorable3 81 and in opposition 3 81 to legislative enactment of the Code is now being disseminated. Congressional enactment
or rejection of the Code, however, will have little, if any, effect upon practice, procedure, and strategy that defense attorneys will employ in defendNevertheless, the
ing SEC administrative enforcement proceedings.
thumbnail analysis provided above of the Code's treatment of SEC administrative proceedings may provide some basis for a better understanding of
the implications of some of the provisions and principles of existing law.

XII.

PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE CEASE AND DESIST REMEDY

Under the present statutes, the SEC may litigate administrative disciplinary proceedings against only certain classes of persons or entities: issuer
registrants under the 1933 Act, issuer registrants under the 1934 Act, broker-dealers and persons associated or seeking to become associated therewith under the 1934 Act, and comparable classes of persons and entities
374. See Letter from A.F. Mathews to SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (May 23, 1972), reprintedin MATHEWS, supra note 63, at 323.

375. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, at 681.
376. Id (emphasis supplied).
377. Id at 682-89.
378. See Mathews, supra note 286, at 519-33.

379. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 322, § 1818(a), at 682; cf. § 25(a)(1) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C § 78y(a)(l) (1976) (aggrieved party may appeal final Commission order to
either D.C. Circuit or circuit in which he resides).
380. See notes 69-78, 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
381. See, e.g., W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLO(1979).
382. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 322.

SURE
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under the Advisers and 1940 Acts.3 83 On the other hand, the Commission
can litigate civil injunctive actions against "any person" who is engaged in
or about to engage in violative conduct. 384 Consequently, the injunctive
remedy has been the SEC's most frequently utilized enforcement
weapon.3 85 Some commentators contend that the injunctive remedy has
been overused and perhaps abused.3 86
The following are arguable abuses by the Commission of the injunctive
enforcement remedy:
(1) It names too many persons as defendants in cases where it
has strong proof against central defendants but tenuous proof
against others more peripheral to the violative acts;
(2) It attempts to regulate professionals such as attorneys and
accountants through use of the injunctive remedy just as though
they were broker-dealers or investment advisers, even though
Congress has never authorized the Commission's direct regulation of such professionals;
(3) It attempts to hold defendants liable for antifraud violations on a mere negligence standard;
(4) It sometimes pursues stale cases where there is no equity for
an injunction, where the effect of the lawsuit is really a public
"branding" rather than a fair attempt to enjoin reasonably anticipated future statutory violations; and
(5) It forces defendants to accept - primarily in consent settlements - novel forms of ancillary relief which the Congress has
never specifically authorized the Commission to seek.387
Such possible abuses must be considered against the backdrop of the
SEC's recent dismal record in having the Supreme Court accept its
strained statutory interpretations 388 and the severe statutory disqualifica383. See notes 23-43 and accompanying text supra.
384. See, e.g., § 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); § 21(d) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
385. A sampling of available statistics over the last 25 years demonstrates the following:
fiscal year 1955 - 23 injunctive actions instituted and 19 injunctions granted against 43
defendants; fiscal year 1966 - 56 injunctive actions instituted and 50 injunctions granted
against 181 defendants; fiscal year 1977 - 166 injunctive actions instituted and 336 injunctions granted against 715 defendants. See Levine, How SEC Will Continue to Use Consent
Decrees, Legal Times of Wash., June 5, 1978, at 16-17.
386. See, e.g., Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunctions."It's Time to Give the Commission
an Administrative Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 345 (1979). See also Letter
from A.F. Mathews to SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices
(May 23, 1972), reprintedin MATHEWS, supra note 63, at 349-50.
387. Mathews, supra note 386, at 347-48.
388. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniels, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978); Santa Fe
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tions and other adverse consequences that may be triggered by an injunc389
tion, whether entered by consent or after full litigation on the merits.
The Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed the SEC's overuse or
abuse of the injunctive remedy 390 although its attention may be focused on
the issue in the pending Aaron case. 3 91' But district courts and courts of
appeals recently have been applying tougher standards in SEC injunctive
actions, declining to impose injunctive relief in a significant number of
fully litigated cases.3 92 Judge Friendly, in SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical
Securities, Inc. ,33 noted that the courts no longer consider the SEC injunctive remedy a "mild prophylactic,"3'94 the label ascribed to the remedy
by both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in the 1963 Capital
Gains case.39 5

Moreover, Judge Friendly commented that "the current

judicial attitude toward the issuance of injunctions on the basis of past
violations at the SEC's request has become more circumspect than in earlier days."3' 96 Indeed, since the Supreme Court has recently held in ParkIndus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). But see E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
389. For a listing of statutory disqualifications and other direct and indirect consequences of an SEC injunctive decree, see Mathews, supra note 290.
390. The Supreme Court has considered only two SEC injunctive cases in the past 20
years. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). For a securities law injunctive case in which the SEC was
not a party, see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
391. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,48 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1979) (No. 79-66).
392. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d. 785 (9th Cir. 1979), affg SEC v.
Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC v. Koracorp, 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 588 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1970); SEC v. Wills, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,321 (D.D.C.
Feb. 11, 1978); SEC v. Randell, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,362
(E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Continental Advisors, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
96,489 (D.D.C. June 29, 1978); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1191
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'dsub nom. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
393. 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
394. Id at 99.
395. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), rev'g 306 F.2d
606 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc).
396. 574 F.2d at 99.
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lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,3 97 that facts established in an SEC injunctive

action, albeit without a jury trial, may have a collateral estoppel effect in
parallel and subsequent private damage actions, the direct and indirect
effects of an injunctive action are now much harsher than they were a few
years ago when, pursuant to Rachal v. Hill,3 98 there was no danger of collateral estoppel.
What the SEC needs today to alleviate this problem is a new, flexible
administrative remedy applicable to any person - or at least to a broader
class of persons than available existing administrative remedies reach that can in fact serve as a "mild prophylactic." An administrative cease
and desist enforcement remedy would provide such an enforcement
weapon. The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code 3 9 9 presently contains no such provision. When the Code is introduced in Congress, consideration should be given to adding a provision
granting the SEC a new administrative cease and desist enforcement remedy.
The SEC staff has for some time felt that a new administrative remedy
would serve the enforcement interests of the Commission while accommodating persons entwined in SEC enforcement problems. 4" The SEC,
however, probably has not proposed legislation to obtain a new administrative remedy because the securities bar and the investment community
appear to oppose an expansion of the Commission's enforcement weapons. 40 1 Nevertheless, a new remedy along the following lines is worthy of
discussion:
The administrative remedy should be much broader than Section 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act, and should allow the Commission
to name as defendants any registrant or issuer that makes 1933 or
1934 Act filings with the SEC, or anyperson associatedwith such a
registrant or issuer, including officers, directors and employees.
The remedy would encompass the opportunity of notice, hearing,
trial before an administrative law judge, and appeal to the full
Commission and ultimately to the courts of appeals. The principal sanction would be an administrative cease and desist order
397. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
398. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
399. See note 322 supra.

400. See, e.g., Pitt (then SEC General Counsel), Federal Securities Litigation - A Government Perspective, Speech to ALI-ABA Course of Study on Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws (Feb. 4, 1977).
401.

Indeed, opponents of the PROPOSED CODE single out a supposed increased SEC

power and authority as one of the principal bases for their opposition. See, e.g., Lowenfels,
supra note 322, at 617.
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restraining a respondent from doing any act that would cause a
registrant's or issuer's SEC filings to be false, misleading, incomplete, untimely or otherwise delinquent, or an analogous
mandatory administrative order compelling a respondent to take
necessary affirmative acts to assure compliance with the filing requirements. The remedy would extend to all filings and reports
including proxy soliciting materials. It would also extend to such
nonfiling provisions as the books and records and internal controls provisions of Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, newly added Section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act. Thus,
it would be broader than present Section 15(c)(4) proceedings
both in range of respondents - individuals would be included and in conduct and filings covered.4 °2
SEC staff members have suggested that any new remedy should include
forms of ancillary relief so that minor cases, such as nonegregious inside
information cases, could be settled administratively by way of disgorgement of unfair profits without the accompanying stigma of a harsh courtimposed injunctive decree.40 3 Without explicit statutory authority, the
SEC nevertheless has been very successful in convincing the courts 4to
grant all sorts of innovative ancillary relief in civil injunctive actions. 1
Obviously, if no ancillary relief were available in the administrative forum, the Commission would probably continue to overuse and abuse the
injunctive remedy in order to have a chance to pursue ancillary relief.
Consequently, the Commission should be granted a limited authority to
seek ancillary relief in connection with an administrative cease and desist
remedy: "Perhaps by having Congress specifically consider ancillary relief, and by specifying the range and scope of such available relief in the
statutes themselves, the SEC's gradual encroachment upon the internal
management of corporations would be somewhat retarded., 4 5 The SEC
should not, however, be given civil fining powers similar to those Congress
has given to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.40 6
402. Mathews, supra note 386, at 353-54.
403. See, e.g., Statement Submitted to Comm'n in Connection with Non-Public Inquiry
into Certain Transactions, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,665 (Mar. 21, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,015 (§ 21(a) statement).
404. See, e.g., Farrand, supra note 3; Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Relief in
SEC Level /Civil] Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975).
405. Mathews, supra note 386, at 354.
406. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 6(c), 14, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13b, 18 (1976). Stanley
Sporkin, the SEC's innovative Enforcement Chief, has advocated that "consideration should
be given to establishing qualifications for corporate directors with the SEC or another
agency having authority to disqualify a person from so acting where he has failed to discharge his responsibilities." See Speech of Stanley Sporkin, 402 SEC. REG. & L. REP.(BNA)
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A further advantage of a cease and desist order is that it could fairly be
used in stale cases where the statutory violations are not continuing and
where there would be no "equity" for an injunction. Publicity would be,
and is, a very effective sanction, and if not misused, can be an important
weapon in the SEC's arsenal of sanctions: "The administrative adjudication and publication of past violations - with the Commission setting
standards in ad hoc administrative enforcement proceedings where a clear
exposition of the basis for any theory of violation would be set forth would be far superior to unexplained lawmaking by consent injunctive decree." 4 7 A five-year statute of limitations, however, should be imposed on
such administrative adjudications. It would be senseless to adjudicate,
solely for publicity, violations more than five years stale.
The opponents of granting the SEC a more flexible administrative enforcement remedy point to the lack of absolute discovery rights in SEC
administrative litigation 4 8 and the possible institutional bias of SEC administrative law judges.4 9 There is, of course, a way to alleviate such concerns, that is, to grant either to both the SEC and the respondent, or maybe
even solely to the respondent, an absolute right of removal of any such
administrative enforcement proceeding to the federal courts. Stanley
Sporkin, the SEC's ingenious Enforcement Director, has raised this approach for consideration even though he has neither publicly endorsed nor
opposed any particular type of proposed new administrative enforcement
remedy. Indeed, understandably he has vigorously denied there has been
any abuse or overuse of the injunctive action, and has articulated why, in
his view, the SEC's enforcement program embracing ancillary relief in the
injunctive forum is one of the most effective protectors of the public interest at the federal level.41 °
If the federal securities laws are going to be codified, or even if they are
not, the SEC should be given a new, relatively moderate administrative
at G-1, (May I1,1977). Such power would turn the SEC into a federal corporations com-

mission with direct regulatory powers over the fiduciary performance of corporate directors
and would most likely be vigorously opposed by the corporate community and the securities
bar. Seegenerall, Lowenfels, supra note 322, at 629 & nn.70-71. A better approach toward

achieving directors' sensitivity to their fiduciary and federal securities laws obligations appears to be the "jawboning" approach of SEC Chairman Harold Williams. See H. Williams, The Role of Inside Counsel (Oct. 4, 1979) (speech before the 17th Annual Corporate
Counsel Institute, Chicago, Illinois), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

82,318.
407. Mathews, supra note 386, at 354-55, (citing Cohen & Rabin, supra note 4).
408. See notes 155-74 and accompanying text supra.
409. See Mathews, supra note 386, at 356 n.49.

410. See, e.g., Sporkin, supra note 286. See also Levine & Herlihy, SEC Enforcement
Actions, 10 REV. SEC. REG. 951 (1977).
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enforcement tool that would eliminate what is perceived by some as an
overuse and abuse of the present, very harsh civil injunctive remedy. 1'
XIII.

RAMIFICATIONS FOR LAWYERS OF RECENT AND PENDING RULE
2(E) DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In recent years, pursuant to the so-called "market access theory, 4 12 one
aspect of the SEC's enforcement program has embraced the development
of criminal,4 13 civil,4 14 and administrative4 15 enforcement cases against
lawyers.4 16 National Student Marketing, in the civil injunctive forum, remained the signal case involving the professional conduct of corporate and
securities lawyers throughout most of the 1970's.' 7 However, in the National Student Marketing litigation to date, clear standards for measuring
411. See H. Kripke, THE SEC

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH

OF A PURPOSE 47-51 (1979). See also Klein, .4 Response on SEC Consents - Process Is
Corrupting.411,Legal Times of Wash., June 26, 1978, at 20.
412. See Sporkin, supra note 286.
413. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976); United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Weiner,
479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v.
Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
414. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1432
(1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp. (Homans), 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. (Schiffman), 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers (Ezrine), 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Frank, 388
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. (Meyer, Schauer, and
Lord, Bissel & Brooks), 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Geotek (Lempert), [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,520 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. (Epley and White & Case), [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp. (Katz), 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-73 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1972); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer
Corp. (Caldwel), [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,232 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 5, 1971); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp. (Gartenberg), 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
415. See, e.g., Richard D. Hodgin, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 6131 (Sept. 27, 1979); Jo
M. Ferguson, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974); Emmanual Fields, SEC 1934
Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,407, affid without opinion, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Murray A. Kivitz, 44 S.E.C.
600 (1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Paul M. Kaufman, 44 S.E.C. 374 (1970);
Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960). See also Schwebel v. SEC, 153 F. Supp. 701
(D.D.C. 1957), aft'd, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Mary Jane Melrose, SEC 1934 Act
Release No. 14,720 (May 1, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,578; MacLaughlin & Stern, Ballen & Miller, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 11,553 (July 25,
1975); Irwin L. Germaise, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7, 1971).
416. See Mathews, supra note 290.
417. See, e.g., Cheek, supra note 9; Koch, supra note 9. See also K. BIALKIN & H. PITT,
LIABILITIES OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER: THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING CASE (Law Journal Seminars Press 1979).
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the outer limits of the scope of professional responsibilities of securities
lawyers have been set by the settlements negotiated,"' the district court
420
opinions upon motions, 4 19 or the trial on the merits.
Two recent administrative disciplinary proceedings involving lawyers one of which is currently on appeal to the Commission - demonstrate
that without waiting for the courts to lead the way, the Commission intends, through ad hoc adjudication of administrative proceedings, to set
standards of professional responsibility for corporate and securities lawyers.
A. The Keating, Muething & Klekamp Case
In Keating,Muething & Klekamp,42 pursuant to a rule 2(e) 42 2 settlement
disposition, the Commission administratively sanctioned a Cincinnati law
firm (KMK) simultaneously with the institution and settlement of a major
civil injunctive action against one of KMK's large corporate clients, certain of the client's officers (including the former senior partner of the law
firm), and a present partner of KMK who was also a director of one of the
client's principal subsidiaries. 4 3 The law firm's client, American Financial Corporation (AFC), and its subsidiary, American Financial Leasing
and Services Company (AFLS), had made untrue statements of, and omitted to state, material facts in SEC filings related to significant transactions.
The Commission found:
Because of KMK's involvement with AFC and its subsidiaries,
including the participation of various partners in certain of the
subject transactions, service by partners of KMK on the Board of
Directors of two significant subsidiaries which participated in
many of the transactions, and the firm's preparation or'review of
the subject filings with the Commission, KMK knew or should
have known of the material misstatements and omissions in
418. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. (Epley and White & Case), [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977).
419. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. (Katz), 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975);
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
420. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. (Meyer, Schauer, and Lord, Bissel &
Brook), 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1051 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18,
1978).
421. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,124.
422. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979).
423. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,982. Keating, the

founding partner of KMK, left the firm in 1972 to become AFC's executive vice-president
but "continued to have a significant influence over the practice of the firm as it related to
AFC and its subsidiaries until 1976." Id at 81,982 n.5.
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AFC's and AFLS' filings with the Commission.4 24
In the first series of inadequately disclosed transactions, labelled the
"Klekamp Transactions," AFC's principal officers, during 1972, purportedly purchased $1.7 million worth of AFC common stock in the open market for Klekamp, a partner of KMK and a director of AFLS, with funds
advanced by AFLS. 4 25 Klekamp, who claimed he had arranged initially
only for advances and stock purchases totalling $600,000, was engaged primarily in representing AFLS and other AFC subsidiaries in leasing,
financing, and real estate matters. When Klekamp discovered the extent
of the transactions and advances, he did not immediately question them.
By 1974, Klekamp had encountered severe personal financial difficulties.
Consequently, AFC's principal officer, Lindner, supposedly relieved
Klekamp of his debt to AFLS, then amounting to over $1.3 million, in
return for Klekamp's surrender of the AFC shares whose market value
had fallen to approximately $422,000. The disclosure of the Klekamp
transactions in the annual reports of AFLS and AFC and in the proxy
statements of AFLS was wholly inadequate and patently violative of the
applicable disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act. In addition, the Klekamp
transactions and related circumstances26 were not disclosed in a 1933 Act
4
registration statement filed by AFLS.
While KMK attorneys prepared the inadequate filings, Klekamp, who
was aware of all the facts, never disclosed the pertinent facts to his law
partners and associates. Another KMK partner learned the principal facts
from Klekamp in 1975, but he too failed to advise the attorneys preparing
427
the SEC filings of the information he had obtained.
The second series of inadequately disclosed transactions related to nondisclosures in SEC filings of AFC's and AFLS' activities designed to assist
Lindner in having an investment company [UDFIC], owned by him and
his brother, sell a bank it owned to an unrelated third party [ANB]. The
sale could not be consummated until a large number of "out of area" loans
on ANB's books - including loans made to various partners and associates of KMK and to an investment partnership consisting of KMK partners and associates - were eliminated from ANB's loan portfolio.
Keating and the UDFIC controller caused AFLS and another AFC subsidiary, Provident Bank, to purchase approximately $3 million of ANB's
"out of area" loans in order to facilitate Lindner's desire to have UDFIC
424. Id at 81,982.
425. Id. at 81,982-83.
426. Id at 81,983-84.
427. Id at 81,984.
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sell ANB to the third party.428
The Commission criticized AFC's and AFLS' failure to disclose in their
respective annual and periodic SEC filings, as related party transactions,
the fact that two AFC subsidiaries had purchased the loans from a bank
owned and controlled by the president and chairman of the board of AFC
to enable him to sell his bank. After describing the involvement of KMK
attorneys in various aspects of the transaction,4 29 the Commission criticized the attorneys as follows:
Despite the involvement by various members of KMK in the
bank sale transaction and loan takeovers . . . , KMK failed to
accumulate the information concerning these transactions which
was known by the members of the firm, and convey it to the
member of the firm who was preparing AFC's and AFLS' filings
with the Commission. Those members of the firm preparing the
filings with the Commission relied on representations by AFC's
and AFLS' management concerning related party transactions,
and did little, if any, independent verification of the facts on their
own. The ANB transaction was not disclosed as a related party
transaction in AFC's or AFLS' filings with the Commission.4 3 °
The third series of inadequately disclosed transactions involved loans at
preferential terms by Provident Bank to various friends and associates of
Lindner and Keating, including officers and directors of AFC and its subsidiaries, relatives of such officers and directors, and certain KMK attorneys. AFC's SEC filings improperly represented that Provident's loans to
the officers and directors of AFC were made "in the ordinary course of
business, and on substantially the same terms as similar loans to unrelated
third parties."4 3 The filings failed to disclose any of the preferential loans
to officers and directors of AFC's subsidiaries, and other friends, associates
and relatives of Lindner and Keating. The Commission criticized this aspect of the law firm's conduct as follows:
428. Id
429. Id.at 81,985. The Commission described the attorneys' involvement as follows:
Several partners and associates of KMK were aware of the loan takeovers . ...
Various attorneys at KMK participated in the preparation and review of the legal
documents relating to the sale of ANB, including the sale agreement. In addition
. ..KMK served as counsel for UDFIC and ANB in the transaction which resulted in the sale of ANB. Further, one of the partners of KMK served on the
Board of Directors of Provident and another partner of KMK served on the Board
of Directors of AFLS. Several partners and associates of KMK and the KMK
investment partnership had loans at ANB which were purchased by Provident and
AFLS pursuant to the loan takeovers.
Id (footnote omitted).
430. Id
431. Id at 81,986.
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Various partners of KMK had knowledge of some of the loans to
the Lindner associates and friends, including their own loans,
and knew of the terms of such loans which, in certain respects,
were preferential. Such information was not conveyed to members of the firm who prepared AFC's filings with the Commission. The persons at the firm preparing the filings relied on
representations by AFC's and Provident's management that such
loans were made in the ordinary course of business and on comparable terms as with unrelated parties, and did not take sufficient independent steps to determine whether they could rely on
such representations.43 2
The fourth series of inadequately disclosed transactions involved the
"Sci-Tek Leases." AFLS had entered into various sale and leaseback arrangements with an unrelated computer-data processing company, SciTek, Inc., and also made loans to Sci-Tek. Thereafter, AFLS sold various
participations in the Sci-Tek leases to Provident and three other UDFICLindner owned banks. When Sci-Tek subsequently encountered financial
difficulties, AFLS renegotiated the leases, received a renegotiation fee of
$382,000, and divided the fee among AFLS, Provident, and the other related banks in a manner significantly disproportionate to their respective
lease interests. The facts and circumstances concerning the Sci-Tek leases,
the lease participations, and the disproportionate allocation of the renegotiation fee, which resulted in the UDFIC-Lindner owned banks receiving
an excessive portion of the fee, were not disclosed as required in forms S-1
and 10-K and proxy materials of AFC and AFLS. Neither were other
loan transactions between AFLS and one of the banks, arranged for the
benefit of another Lindner bank, disclosed as required in pertinent SEC
filings. Once again, the KMK firm was held responsible for these omissions as a result of the collective knowledge of its partners, including one
partner who was a director of Provident.43 3
The fifth series of inadequately disclosed transactions involved various
432. Id.
433. Id. at 81,986-87. The law firm's involvement was as follows:
Various partners and associates of KMK were involved in the preparation and
review of the lease documents . . . and were involved in the renegotiation fee.
Further, certain attorneys at KMK were in possession of information concerning
the renegotiation fee and the indemnification agreements entered into by AFLS
and AFC. In addition, one partner of KMK served on the Board of Directors of
Provident, and another served on AFLS' Board. Thus, several attorneys at KMK,
on a collective basis, had knowledge of all the material facts relating to the Sci-Tek
transaction. Despite this knowledge, this related party transaction was omitted
from AFC's and AFLS' filings with the Commission.
Id at 81,987.
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loan and other transactions by Provident Bank designed to assist Lindner's
investment partnership, UDFIC, in selling a bank it owned to a third
party. The KMK firm was again held liable for nondisclosure of these
significant related party transactions in AFC's SEC filings on the basis of
the collective knowledge of its partners, including the partner who was a
director of Provident.4 34
The last inadequately disclosed transaction was a $600,000 business fee
paid to Keating by AFC for his role in the sale by AFC of the Cincinnati
Enquirer to a third party in 1975. The fee was paid through KMK to
Keating and was initially improperly booked and treated by AFC as a
legal expense. The fee was properly disclosed a year later in AFC's proxy
materials.4 35
Even though the law firm agreed to a consent settlement of the case and
the issues were not resolved in the traditional adversary trial context, the
Commission's decision in Keating, Muething & Klekamp generated three
opinions: a majority opinion, a concurring opinion by Chairman Williams, and a dissenting opinion by Commissioner Karmel. The majority
opinion addresses some of the standards of professional conduct the Commission deems applicable to securities lawyers preparing SEC filings for
public companies. The dissent does not deal with the professional standards espoused by the majority but instead argues that the Commission
has no legal authority to adjudicate administrative disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The concurring opinion rebuts the dissent on the jurisdictional issue.
It would be difficult to take issue academically with the professional
standards espoused by the majority. There is no question that the facts in
the case evidenced egregious conduct, and the substantive legal principles
espoused in the context of such extreme facts are sound.
KMK derived from fifty to eighty percent of its billings from representation of AFC and its subsidiaries. Almost every member of the firm participated in representing the AFC complex. Many firm members were
familiar with, and participated in, various aspects of the business of AFC
and its subsidiaries. Additionally, two partners each sat on the boards of
directors of two major AFC subsidiaries.43 6
The majority opinion indicates that the knowledge of a partner will be
imputed to all other partners and to the law firm itself. More importantly,
such imputable knowledge includes not only information acquired in the
434. Id at 81,987-88.
435. Id at 81,988.
436. Id
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partner's capacity as a lawyer in pursuit of the legal business of the law
firm but also information acquired in the partner's capacity as a director in
pursuit of the corporate business of the client.43 7 The majority does not,
however, take sides in the current debate over whether lawyers should
serve on the boards of directors of corporate clients.43 8 Nor does the majority suggest that the lawyer-director is the "deputy" of the law firm,
thereby triggering law firm liability with respect to the business decisions
made in the law partner's capacity as corporate director. 4 39 But the majority does establish a professional duty of a law firm preparing SEC filings
for a corporate issuer to gather and disclose all material facts known to
each member of the firm regardless of the source or circumstances of such
knowledge. 44
Nevertheless, the professional standards espoused, under the circumstances of the case, appear quite sound. But it is Commissioner Karmel's
dissent that has made Keating, Muething & Klekamp a cause celebre. Prior
to becoming a member of the SEC, Commissioner Karmel had publicly
criticized the Commission's adjudication of administrative disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers pursuant to rule 2(e)." In Keating,Muething
& Klekamp, Commissioner Karmel, the most significant philosophical dissenter in the history of the SEC, repudiates the assertion that the Commis437. Id at 81,988-89.
438. See, e.g., Hawes, Should Counsel to a Corporation be Barredfrom Serving as a Director?-A Personal View, 1 CORP. L. REV. 14 (1978); Mundheim, Should Code of Professional
Responsibility Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporationsfor Which They Act as
Counsel?, 33 Bus. LAW. 1507 (1978); Lawyers as Directors, 30 Bus. LAW. 41 (1975); Note,
Should Lawyers Serve as Directors of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel?, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 711.
439. For discussions of the deputization theory, see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 40810 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta, 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1969).
440. The Commission expressed this duty as follows:
A law firm has a duty to make sure that disclosure documents filed with the
Commission include all material facts about a client of which it has knowledge as a
result of its legal representation of that client. The Commission does not believe it
should dictate to law firms how they should structure their internal procedures to
assure that the knowledge possessed by their members and associates is made
available to those lawyers in the firm responsible for drafting disclosure documents. But it is clear that substantial additional procedures were required here, for
the Commission concludes that KMK failed to carry out its professional responsibilities with regard to the above described filings of AFC and its subsidiaries,
when, despite its extensive representation of AFC and the knowledge of the members of KMK relating to material transactions, it did not have a system which
assured that the knowledge of the members of the firm was communicated to the
persons responsible for preparing disclosure of material information - which was
within the firm's knowledge - was made.
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,989 (footnote omitted).
441. See, e.g., Daley & Karmel, supra note 48; Karmel, supra note 9.
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sion has any statutory jurisdiction to pursue rule 2(e) proceedings against
lawyers in an enforcement context." 2
Commissioner Karmel carefully analyzes the respective roles of lawyers
and accountants vis-a-vis the Commission, the express statutory provisions
in the federal securities laws relating to accountants, and the lack of comparable express statutory provisions relating to lawyers. She acknowledges
the direct holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Touche
Ross & Co. v. SEC 43 that rule 2(e) is valid with regard to disciplining
accountants and rationalizes the correctness of the holding on particular
statutory language.'"
However, she rejects the dicta in Touche Ross that would validate rule
2(e) with respect to lawyers."45 Commissioner Karmel sets forth very co442. Commissioner Karmel stated:
The Commission's authority to promulgate Rule 2(e) is tenuous at best. Since
the Commission's program is in aid of its prosecutorial, rather than its rule making
or adjudicatory functions, I view it as an invalid exercise of power, particularly
where, as here, it is directed at a law firm partnership for conduct which was the
basis of an injunction brought by the Commission against an individual partner of
the firm and others ....
As a general policy matter, I believe that it is repugnant to our adversary system
of legal representation to permit a prosecutorial agency to discipline attorneys who
act as counsel to regulated persons. The frequently made distinction between the
lawyer as an adversary versus the lawyer as an advisor cannot and should not be
made by an agency with significant prosecutorial responsibilities.
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,992 (Commissioner Karmel,
dissenting).
443. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,854 (2d Cir. May 10, 1979).
444. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,993. See also R.
Karmel, The Need for Nexus in the Disciplining of Accountants, Remarks to District of
Columbia Chapter, American Society of Women Accountants, in Washington, D.C. (Nov.
7, 1979).
445. Commissioner Karmel explained:
In my opinion, Rule 2(e) is an invalid exercise of the Commission's authority. I
recognize that I am not writing on a clean slate, but until the question of the Commission's authority to discipline attorneys is validated by the United States
Supreme Court or the Congress, I believe the validity of Rule 2(e) will not be free
from doubt. I also recognize that the Commission has brought numerous 2(e) proceedings against attorneys, and that unless the courts or Congress abrogate the
rule, the Commission, unfortunately, is unlikely to rescind it. Accordingly, I advocate that the Commission at least confine proceedings against attorneys under Rule
2(e) to cases in which an attorney has improperly conducted himself while personally representing clients before the Commission. Further, the misconduct should
thwart the Commission's ability to function or should obstruct administrative justice. In no case, I believe, should the Commission invoke an equivocal administrative remedy like Rule 2(e) to discipline attorneys for conduct which does not
directly threaten its administrative processes. To do so, is tantamount to setting
professional standards for the practice of law.
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,995.
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gent arguments why: (i) "it is repugnant to our adversary system of legal
representation to permit a prosecutorial agency to discipline attorneys who
act as counsel to regulated persons";" 6 (ii) the Commission has neither the
mandate nor expertise to set professional or ethical standards for lawyers;" 7 (iii) the Commission cannot legally set qualifications for attorneys
practicing before it;" 8 (iv) a lawyer "should not be subject to the severe
penalty of disbarment or suspension except upon clear and convincing evidence of intentional wrongdoing";" 9 and (v) rule 2(e) proceedings against
lawyers, if they are to be pursued at all, should be narrowly confined "to
cases in which an attorney has improperly conducted himself while personally representing clients before the Commission," - that is, "the misconduct should thwart the Commission's ability to function or should
obstruct administrative justice. '
The last point set forth above is perhaps the most valid: "In no case...
should the Commission invoke . . . Rule 2(e) to discipline attorneys for
conduct which does not directly threaten its administrative processes. To
do so, is tantamount to setting professional standards for the practice of
45
law." I
In his special concurring opinion, SEC Chairman Williams attempts to
defuse Commissioner Karmel's dissent by relying heavily on the Touche
Ross dicta and, in a relatively low-key manner, by citing rather boilerplate
rationales for the Commission's assertion of inherent or implied power to
administratively discipline attorneys.4 52 The underpinning of Chairman
Williams' concurring opinion seems to be that, since the Commission has
pursued rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys for over forty years without a court proscribing the remedy, the remedy must be statutorily valid.
But in Sloan v. NYSE, 4 53 the Supreme Court, in rejecting the Commission's interpretation of its statutory ten-day trading suspension powers that
had gone unchallenged since 1944, soundly rejected any such rationale:
Nor does the existence of a prior administrative practice, even a
well-explained one, relieve us of our responsibility to determine
whether that practice is consistent with the agency's statutory authority . . . . [T]he construction placed on the statute by the
Commission, though of long standing, is . . . inconsistent with
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id at 81,992.
Id
Id See also 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976).
Id. at 81,995 n.21.
Id at 81,995.
Id
Id. at 81,989-92 (Chairman Williams, concurring).
436 U.S. 103 (1978).
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. And our clear duty in such a situa-

tion is to reject the administrative interpretation of the statute. 5 4
Until the Supreme Court squarely addresses rule 2(e), its jurisdictional
underpinning will remain uncertain. Perhaps the pending Carter and
Johnson455 case will eventually reach the Supreme Court and provide the
vehicle for resolving these important administrative law issues. Commissioner Karmel, whether ultimately right or wrong, has boldly brought
these issues into the public arena for discussion and debate.
B.

The Carter-JohnsonCase

In 1978, the Commission filed a civil injunctive complaint against Sheldon L. Hart, the former Chairman of the Board, President, and Treasurer
of National Telephone Company, Inc. (National); three other National officers; and Price, Waterhouse & Co., National's auditors.45 6 The injunctive
complaint alleged violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions
based upon nondisclosure in National's SEC filings, shareholder letters,
and press releases of serious financial problems of National prior to its
bankruptcy. All of the defendants except Hart consented to imposition of
an injunctive order by settlement. Hart continued to litigate the case.4 57
Simultaneous with filing the injunctive action, the Commission published a section 21(a) public report of investigation, National Telephone
Co., Inc.458 The section 21(a) report criticized the role of National's
outside directors in failing to keep National's shareholders adequately informed on a timely basis of National's deteriorating financial condition
and set forth the views of the Commission respecting the duties of outside
directors.
In June, 1978, the Commission instituted a private rule 2(e) disciplinary
proceeding against William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr., partners
in the prominent New York City law firm, Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell &
Petty, that had been National's outside counsel with respect to the SEC
filings that formed the basis of the injunctive complaint and the section
21 (a) report. Carter and Johnson were charged with: violating, and aiding
454. Id at 118-19.

455. See William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (March 7, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (initial decision of SEC ALJ), review granted,
SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
456. See Litigation Involving Price Waterhouse & Co., SEC Accounting Release No. 238
(Jan. 16, 1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,260.

457. Id See also SEC v. Hart, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,454
(D.D.C. May 26, 1978) (denial of Hart's motion to dismiss, motion for a more definite statement, and motion to transfer).
458. SEC 1934 Act Release No. 14,380 (Jan. 16, 1978).
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and abetting violations of, the antifraud and reporting provisions of the
1934 Act in connection with National's allegedly false SEC filings, shareholders letters, and press releases; lacking "the requisite qualifications to
appear and practice before the Commission in the representation of
others"; "lacking in character and integrity"; and having "engaged in unethical and improper professional conduct. 4 59
After full trial before an SEC administrative law judge, an initial decision was publicly rendered, finding both Carter and Johnson responsible
for statutory violations and for knowingly engaging in unethical and improper professional conduct.4 6 °
National was in the business of designing, leasing, installing, and maintaining telephone systems. It had substantial cash needs to finance equipment and installation costs, which were recoverable in lease payments over
the duration of long-term leases. Pursuant to an April 30, 1974 credit
agreement with major banks, by September, 1974, National owed its banks
over $15 million. As National's financial condition deteriorated, it was
required to negotiate an amended credit agreement with the banks which
closed on December 20, 1974 and contained substantial restrictions on National's operations. One of the significant provisions related to a
mandatory "lease maintenance plan" (LMP) which was intended to be
triggered by any default under the amended credit agreement and which,
in effect, would constitute a "wind-down" plan terminating all National's
sales activities, converting the company into solely a service organiza* 461
tion.
On or about December 20 Hart had informed Carter that he
did not want the LMP to be publicized or filed with the Commission because he was concerned about the effect the LMP would
have on National's sales personnel if its nature became known.
Carter, after reading the LMP, advised Hart that the LMP would
have to be filed with the Commission if it were an exhibit to the
amendment to the credit agreement as had been contemplated.
However, Carter told Hart that the LMP need not be filed with
the Commission and publicized if it were not an exhibit but
rather was merely referred to in the amendment. Thereupon, this
change was made in the amendment and the LMP was deleted as
an exhibit. Before the close of the December 20 meeting, Carter
also reviewed and rewrote a press release which National had
459. William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (March 7, 1979), 11979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175, at 82,165.
460. Id at 82,168-69.
461. Id at 82,169-72.
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provided to him to be issued by National to announce the closing
of the amended credit agreement.46 2
The alleged misconduct of Carter and Johnson, as found by SEC administrative law judge Tracy, can be grouped into four general categories:
1. Failure by Carter in the December 20, 1974 press release, which he
prepared for National, to cause adequate disclosure of:
(a) the substantial limitations placed on National's operations by the
amended agreement;
(b) the nature of the LMP, its material effect on National's operations, and the likelihood that National would be required to implement the
LMP within several months; and
(c) the fact that National's earlier predictions of growth were unlikely
to be met, due to National's critical cash position and the limitations
placed on its growth by the amended agreement.4 63
2. Failure by both Carter and Johnson to take steps to correct misleading statements in a December 23, 1974 National letter to shareholders,
which contained rather bullish statements of National's financial condition
and business prospects. The letter, however, "did not refer to the LMP, its
nature, its material effect on National's operations, or the likelihood that
National would be required to implement the LMP within several
months. 46 4
3. Failure by Carter adequately to disclose, in a January 8, 1975 form 8K he prepared for National covering the month of December, 1974, "material facts concerning the LMP and the material effect which the LMP's
probable implementation would have on National's operations. '"465
462. Id. at 82,172.
463. Id. at 82,173.

464. Id at 82,173. Carter and Johnson had advised National not to issue any public
statements respecting the amended credit agreement without first clearing them with Brown,
Wood. National mailed the December 23, 1974 shareholders letter without so clearing it,
but Carter and Johnson learned of the letter and its contents on or about December 27, 1974.
Id
465. Id at 82,174. The ALJ explained:
Respondents argue that the order does not allege that the omission of the lease
maintenance plan as an exhibit rendered the December 8-K false and misleading.
This is true. What the order does allege is that omitted disclosure of material concerning the LMP, among other things, made the 8-K materially false and misleading. When the LMP was omitted as an exhibit it became necessary to adequately
describe the LMP either in the 8-K or in the amended agreement. Although, as
respondents say, the lease maintenance plan is referred to in several places in the
amendatory agreement, nowhere is there a description as to just what it is, or what
effect its implementation would have on the company.
If. . . the publication of the LMP would have destroyed employee morale, it is
equally probable that it would have affected investors' decisions. It would seem to
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4. Failure by both Carter and Johnson to alert National's board of directors that management was making false and misleading disclosures and
concealing material facts in National's SEC filings, press releases, and letters to shareholders concerning the nature of the LMP, the requirement for
its implementation, its drastic effect on National's business operations, and
National's precarious financial condition.46 6
The administrative law judge specifically found that Carter and Johnson, apart from responsibility for statutory violations, engaged in unethical
and improper professional conduct by failing to go directly to National's
board of directors when Hart disregarded or evaded their disclosure advice.
It is concluded that respondents failed to carry out their professional responsibilities with respect to appropriate disclosure to all
concerned, including stockholders, directors and the investing
public, of the material facts described herein, and thus knowingly
engaged in unethical and improper professional conduct, as
charged in the Order.467
Severe sanctions were imposed against the respondents - a one-year suspension from practice before the Commission against Carter, and a similar
nine-month suspension against Johnson.4 6
Both Carter and Johnson have appealed the case to the Commission,
and the matter is presently subjudice. The issues in the case are significant
follow that if the LMP contained material information which would be important
to employees, that it would likewise be a material fact for investors to know in

making a decision. It would appear that stockholders should get the same consideration as employees.
Id at 82,175.
466. The ALJ's specific conclusion in this regard is instructive:
[Carter and Johnson] were on notice of Hart's callous disregard for complying with
securities regulations and his complete indifference to respondents' advice . ...
The record is replete with incident after incident where the respondents advised,
both orally and in writing, of the need for disclosure of National's financial condition, all of which were ignored. There are numerous incidents previously spelled
out in this decision which show that respondents either should have been on notice
or actually were on notice of the fact that their advice was being disregarded.
These incidents should have, at the least, served as red flags to alert respondents to
some course of action which would have prevented the violations found herein.
However, the record shows that rather than taking steps to see that the violations
did not occur, the respondents participated and assisted in misrepresenting and
concealing material information about National from its security holders and the
public from May 1974, to May 1975.
Id. at 82,179.
467. Id at 82,183.
468. Id at 82,187.
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ones and have captured the interest of the bar.4 69 Prior to analyzing the
issues, however, two significant factors concerning this pending appeal
should be noted. First, at the request of the SEC General Counsel, Commissioner Karmel disqualified herself from participation in the case.4 7 °
requested
Second, for one of the few times in its history, the Commission
471
the filing by any interested person of amicus curiae briefs.
Amicus curiae briefs have been filed on behalf of six persons or organizations. 47 2 The amici briefs, together with the briefs of Carter and Johnson and the SEC General Counsel's Office, collectively raise directly or
indirectly the following issues respecting the Commission's litigation of administrative disciplinary proceedings against lawyers pursuant to rule 2(e)
as an enforcement tool:
statutory authority to litigate rule
1. Does the Commission have implicit
47 3
2(e) proceedings against lawyers?
469. See note 20 supra.
470. See Hager, Karmel Out In Key Carter-Johnson Discipline Case, Legal Times of
Wash., July 30, 1979, at 1. See also Request for Comments on Petition Concerning Disclosure of Relationships Between Attorneys and Registrants, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,045
(July 25, 1979) (separate statement of Commissioner Karmel).
471. See Order Permitting Filing of Briefs by Amici Curiae, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
15,724 (Apr. 19, 1979).
472. See amicus curiae briefs of (i) Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n (July 12, 1979), (ii)
Committee on Securities Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York (July 17,
1979), (iii) Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Ass'n (July 3,
1979), (iv) Michael R. Klein (July 12, 1979), (v) Sullivan & Cromwell (July 18, 1979), and
(vi) Arthur F. Mathews (August 7, 1979), William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464
(Mar. 27, 1979).
Sullivan & Cromwell also filed a Reply Brief amicus curiae (November 6, 1979) responding to some of the arguments profferred in the answering brief of the General Counsel (October 15, 1979).
473. The SEC General Counsel's brief argues that it is "beyond cavil" that the Commission has implicit statutory authority to discipline lawyers pursuant to rule 2(e) and cites the
following cases in support: Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
96,854 (2d Cir. May 10, 1979); SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
REP. (CCH)
Fields v. SEC, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
2, 1972); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), affdon other grounds, 251
F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958); cf. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Koden v. Department of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Brief of SEC General Counsel at 4 n.4,
William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
Sullivan & Cromwell's amicus curiae reply brief, however, persuasively refutes the General Counsel's rather cavalier reliance on such indirect, unpersuasive precedent by proffering
four arguments why rule 2(e) as applied to lawyers is invalid: (1) The SEC's general
rulemaking authority in section 23(a)(i) - pursuant to which rule 2(e) was promulgated is limited to promulgating regulations for the discharge of express statutory responsibilities
and to making "housekeeping" rules. Rule 2(e) falls in neither category. Cf Wallach v.
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2. Can the Commission adjudicate in the first instance in a rule 2(e)
proceeding alleged violations of the federal securities laws by a lawyer? If
so, may any alleged statutory violations - regardless of the context and
circumstances in which they arise or occur - be adjudicated in the administrative disciplinary proceeding? Or must the statutory violations occur in
the course of the attorney's "practice before the Commission?" 4'74
3. Can the Commission adjudicate violations of, or noncompliance
with, professional and ethical standards? If so, may any alleged breaches
- regardless of the context and circumstances in which they arise or occur
- be adjudicated in the administrative disciplinary proceeding? Or must
the professional or ethical breach occur in the course of the attorney's
"practice before the Commission?" Moreover, must the Commission apply only the professional and ethical standards espoused by state and federal courts and bar associations, or may the Commission itself set
additional ethical and professional standards for securities lawyers?47 5
SEC, 202 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1953); (2) 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1976) precludes using rule 2(e)
against securities lawyers "since there is no 'federal securities bar,' that is a recognized and
definable branch of the legal profession practicing 'securities law,' subject to the Commission's special oversight"; (3) The express enforcement provisions in the 1934 Act that reach
lawyers - civil injunctive action and criminal prosecution - preclude an implied enforcement action against lawyers. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975); (4) Fundamental policy considerations militate against allowing a regulatory agency
to litigate professional disciplinary proceedings against lawyers who represent as clients
those persons and entitities whom the agencies directly regulate. Regulation of the bar
should be left to the courts and the states. Cf. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). Reply Brief.4micus Curiae of Sullivan & Cromwell at 7, William R. Carter, SEC
Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
474. The Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York argues that rule 2(e) should not be used as an "alternative enforcement tool." It
should be used to discipline attorneys only after a violation of law has been established in an
independent judicial proceeding in federal or state court, that is, in a civil injunctive action
or criminal prosecution, or a breach of ethical or professional responsibility has been established in a disciplinary proceeding before the appropriate state bar authority. Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York at 5, William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
Almost all the amici briefs argue that whatever rule 2(e) authority exists, it cannot extend
to disciplining lawyers for activities that do not constitute "practice before the Commission."
5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1976) allows a federal agency to discipline "individuals who appearin a
representative capacity before an agency." Whether this limitation restricts rule 2(e) to the
conduct of an attorney appearing as counsel in an SEC adjudicatory proceeding - thereby
viewing the rule as akin to a judge's summary contempt power - or whether the rule extends to a lawyer's conduct as adviser or draftsman outside the SEC's presence, is crucial in
resolving the Carterand Johnson case. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Michael R. Klein at 1112, William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
475. The Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association points out that the "responsibility of lawyers is not a subject about which the Commission has particular expertise. That expertise has long been considered to reside in the
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4. What constitutes "practice before the Commission"? Is it limited to
the conduct of attorneys when they "appear in a representative capacity
before" the Commission? Or does it extend to preparing or counseling
with respect to filings made with the Commission? Does it embrace the
general "office practice" of an attorney respecting advice or activities concerning any aspect of the federal securities laws even if there is no direct or
indirect contact with the Commission? For example, would it include
preparation of an opinion letter that a securities transaction is exempt from
the federal securities laws or preparation of an offering circular for an ex47 6
empt offering?
courts and in the bar itself through self-discipline subject to oversight by the courts." Brief
Amicus Curiae of Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Ass'n
at 25, William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
Similarly, the brief submitted on behalf of Carter and Johnson contends that:
Professional discipline may be imposed only for the violation of validly adopted
mandatory standards. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Opinion 1420, at 5 (1978). . . .The Commission never has promulgated
a code of professional responsibility for securities counsel, nor has it ever adopted
the American Bar Association . . .Code of Professional Responsibility.
Brief for William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr. at 54-55, William R. Carter, SEC
Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979). This brief also points out that the SEC administrative law judge in part disciplined Carter and Johnson for unprofessional conduct based
on a finding that the respondents engaged in "action inconsistent with Ethical Considerations contained in the ABA Code, an ABA Opinion, a report of an ABA Committee, a
resolution of the ABA House of Delegates or articles in an ABA publication." Id at 56-57.
The Carter and Johnson brief proceeds to point out a "fatal threshold deficiency in these
findings":
[N]one of these statements provides an appropriate basis for the imposition of professional discipline. The Ethical Considerations are by their terms aspirational
only; while they can provide assistance in interpreting the Disciplinary Rules, they
do not stand on their own as mandatory rules of conduct. Preamble and Preliminary Statement, Code of Professional Responsibility (1977 ed.), p. 1 . . . . Nor
may an ABA Opinion, an ABA resolution or articles contained in publications
such as the ABA's Business Lawyer form an independent basis for discipline. ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion 1420, at 6
(1978).
Id at 56-57. Thus, the issue is focused: Can the SEC find as a basis for imposing administrative disciplinary sanctions against securities lawyers violations of ethical considerations
which the American Bar Association asserts do not constitute a basis for imposition of disciplinary relief against lawyers generally?
476. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Arthur F. Mathews at 6-7 n.12; Brief Amicus Curiae of Sullivan & Cromwell at 13-14; Brief Amicus Curiae of Michael R. Klein at 10-13;
BriefAmicus Curiae of Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar
Ass'n at 9-10, 21-24, William R. Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
Commissioner Karmel, dissenting in a recent rule 2(e) proceeding settled by consent and
involving a lawyer who had also consented to an injunctive decree, stressed the "practice
before the Commission" factor:
I do not believe the Commission has the statutory authority to administratively
suspend an attorney's right to practice before this agency solely because he has
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5. Are rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings penal or quasi-criminal, as well
as remedial in nature,4 77 thereby requiring that evidence be judged and
weighed according to the "clear and convincing" standard of proof?.478
6. In rule 2(e) proceedings, does responsibility for rule lOb-5 or other
fraud violations, whether on a primary or secondary theory of liability,
require proof of scienter, and if so, what properly constitutes scienter? 79
7. In order to justify imposing a sanction more severe than censure,
must the Commission in a rule 2(e) proceeding - as is required in a civil
injunctive enforcement action in federal court - find a "reasonable likelihood" or "cognizable danger" that, absent such severe sanction, the respondent will 0commit future statutory violations or engage in professional
48
misconduct?
8. Does a securities lawyer have a duty "to seek higher authority" or "to
ensure his advice is followed" by going directly to the board of directors
when management ignores the attorney's advice respecting continuing se48 1
curities law violations by a corporate issuer?
been enjoined from violating the federal securities laws. The only conduct by the
respondent in his capacity as an attorney in question involved the writing of an
opinion letter advising that exemptions from the registration requirement for a securities offering were available. According to the consent settlement, those exemptions were not available. Even if that is so, respondent's conduct in rendering such
an opinion did not reach or affect the processes of this agency so as to fall within
the limitations I have enunciated for administratively disciplining an attorney
under Rule 2(e).
Richard D. Hodgin, SEC 1933 Act. Release No. 6131 (Sept. 27, 1979) (Commissioner
Karmel, dissenting). Accord, Bernard Jay Coven, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,229 (Sept.
26, 1979)(Commissioner Karmel, dissenting).
477. See notes 58-63, 72-73 and accompanying text supra. See also Brief Amicus Curiae
of Arthur F. Mathews at 1-2 n.3.
478. See notes 69-100 and accompanying text supra. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of
Arthur F. Mathews at 2 n.4.
479. See notes 10 1-12, 125-54 and accompanying text supra. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Arhur F. Mathews at 2-5 nn.5-1 1.
480. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Arthur F. Mathews at 7 n. 13, William R. Carter, SEC
Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979). This, of course, is the traditional judicial test for
imposing an injunction in the context of an SEC civil injunctive action. See, e.g., National
Student Marketing Corp. (Lord, Bissel & Brook), 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1051 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 1979).
481. The brief amicus curiae of the Los Angeles County Bar Association extensively examines whether there are instances when a corporate attorney has a duty "to seek a higher
authority" or "to ensure his advice is followed." This brief acknowledges at the outset:
The question of when counsel may have an ethical duty to seek higher corporate
authority is an issue not, to our knowledge, heretofore addressed by any code of
professional conduct. It certainly has not been resolved by the State Bar of California or by the ABA (although it is currently being debated within the ABA in
connection with the pending revision of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
It is obvious that the development of standards to guide the attorney who advises
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Whether the Commission resolves any of such issues in the Carter-Johnson case, and if so, whether the SEC's resolutions are proper, understandably must await scrutiny by the federal appellate courts. The last issue whether and under what circumstances a corporate lawyer must go to the
board of directors when management disregards the lawyer's legal advice
- will, in the long run, significantly effect the conduct of corporate and
securities lawyers.
The SEC General Counsel's brief. 82 forcefully argues that the corporation, not management, is the client of the corporate lawyer.48 3 Under this
reasoning, a lawyer has traditional agency obligations to keep his client
informed of material facts relating to the subject of the legal representation;484 therefore, a corporate lawyer must go to the board of directors
when management ignores counsel's legal advice.4 85 Whatever duties the
a corporate client is in an embryonic stage. Our present ethical standards were
evolved in the context of litigation obligations, and the lawyer as advocate, and are
not at all well suited to the role of the lawyer as corporate adviser.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n at 4-5 (footnote omitted), William R.
Carter, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979). The Los Angeles Bar Association
brief then proceeds to suggest, albeit tentatipey, the following three limited and unusual
circumstances under which a corporate attorney whose legal advice is ignored may have an
obligation to seek a higher authority within the corporation:
1. When the lower-level decision maker has a significant conflict so that his
personal interests may differ from those of the corporation, and his judgment may
be colored; or
2. When the lower authority proposes a course of action which clearly (in the
attorney's responsible judgment) violates the securities laws; and,
3. When the proposed activity has extreme and apparent adverse potential consequences for the corporate entity, its shareholders or the public.
Id at 5-6 (footnote omitted). Finally, the Los Angeles Bar Association brief points out that
any disclosure duty imposed on lawyers would pose serious conflicts with existing state law
professional standards that require lawyers to hold inviolate the confidences of clients. Id
at 9-10. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974). See also Los Angeles
County Bar Ass'n Op. No. 353 (Feb. 12, 1976) (dealing with securities laws violations; copy
attached as exhibit to amicus brief).
482. See Brief of SEC General Counsel at 99-106 nn.133-39, William R. Carter, SEC
Ad. Pro. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 27, 1979).
483. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-18; Committee on Professional Ethics, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Opinion No. 385 (Nov. 10, 1936),in
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION

205 (1956); cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970); Transocean Tender
Sec. Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. I11.1978).
484. See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 102-03 (1953); P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 541 (4th ed. 1952); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
EC 7 & 8, DR 6-101(A)(3); 61 ABA JOURNAL 1085-86 (1975).
485. See ABA Op. No. 202 (May 25, 1940); ABA Informal Op. No. 1349 (Oct. 6, 1976);
Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Texas, Op. No. 387 (Apr. 1977); Los Angeles County Bar
Ass'n, Op. No. 353 (Feb. 12, 1976). See generaly Cooney, The Registration Process.- The
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Commission espouses in the Carter-Johnson case will most likely be acceptable to the bar when - but only when - a court determines that they
are proper professional standards. That specific professional duties are articulated, for the first time, in an ad hoc administrative disciplinary proceeding imposing sanctions against reputable lawyers is puzzling, and to
most segments of the bar, wholly inappropriate.
XIV.

CONCLUSION: REENTRY PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS

One gratifying aspect of SEC enforcement practice is that there is no
equivalent to a mandatory life sentence in the SEC's arsenal of administrative disciplinary sanctions. Even when the ultimate sanction of revocation
or bar is imposed, there is an avenue for eventual relief. The Commission
adjudicates "reentry proceedings" in which a disqualified individual or
registrant, upon good cause shown, can convince the Commission to lift or
modify its previously imposed sanction, thereby allowing the barred person to participate once again in the securities industry.4 86 Similarly, attorneys and other professionals who have been barred pursuant to rule 2(e)
proceedings can petition the Commission to lift the sanction so that professional practice before the SEC can be resumed.4 87
Since the Commission from time to time enunciates new legal principles
and espouses and refines standards of care applicable to the securities industry, particularly broker-dealers, in the ad hoc adjudicatory framework
of administrative disciplinary actions, as opposed to rulemaking proceedings, defense of an SEC administrative proceeding should be substantively
as well as procedurally challenging and complex. 4 88 Administrative and
procedural due process issues are often involved.4 89
Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1335 (1978); Cutler, The Role of the
PrivateLaw Firm, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549 (1978); Meyers, supra note 9; Sonde, supra note 45, at

9; Van Dusen, The ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 16 (1975)
(Special Issue: Proceedings, ABA National Institute); The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

andthe Responsibilityof Lawyers Engagedin SecuritiesPractice,30 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1293-94
(1975).
486. See Applications for Relief from Disqualification, SEC 1934 Act Release No.
11,267 (Feb. 26, 1975), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

80,115.

487. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii) (1979). Sometimes a "re-entry" petition is successful,
see, e.g., Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 6105 (Aug. 15, 1979),
and sometimes it is not. See, e.g., Bernard Jay Coven, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 16,229
(Sept. 26, 1979).
488. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), after remand, 332 U.S. 194 (1947);
Cohen & Rabin, supra note 4.
489. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) ("an adipinistrative order
cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers
were those upon which its actions can be sustained"); cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963)(stock exchange has antitrust immunity only to extent necessary to
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And more importantly, as the Collins case4 9° demonstrates, the SEC's
long-established practices are not necessarily legally correct or acceptable.
In this regard, one need only be reminded of Mr. Justice Brennan's recent
concurring opinion in SEC v. Sloan,"' in which he pointed out that the
majority opinion, although reaching the correct result in condemning the
SEC's practice of "rolling over" ten-day trading suspensions, did "not
reveal howflagranty abusive"49' 2 the SEC's use of its statutory trading suspensions powers has been.
In the final analysis, only an alert defense bar, raising the proper issues,
settling the overwhelming amount of cases, but litigating on the merits
those in which the staff and the SEC reach too far, will assure the proper
development of both adjective and substantive law in SEC administrative
disciplinary proceedings.

achieve goals of 1934 Act and must afford affected persons procedural safeguards); Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 842 (1972) (intimate involvement of stock exchange brings its activities within the purview of 5th amendment due process).
490. Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
491. 436 U.S. 103, 123 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
492. Id (emphasis supplied).

